

Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969 A Critical Oral History



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CRISIS AND CONFRONTATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: 1968-1969

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- Document 190.** 21 March 1969: National Security Study Memorandum 34 from Henry Kissinger to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence, “*Contingency Planning for Korea*”
- Document 191.** 27 March 1969: [Secret] Letter from Henry Bardach to Ambassador Brown, “*Focus Retina and Consultations in Seoul*”
- Document 192.** 8 April 1969: Letter from President of the Republic of Korea Park Chung Hee to President Richard M. Nixon
- Document 193.** 15 April 1969: Telegram from the Department of State to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
- Document 194.** 15 April 1969: [Secret] Intelligence note from Thomas L. Hughes, INR, to the Secretary of State, “*North Korea: Estimated Reactions of Selected East Asian Countries and the Soviet Union to Possible US Courses of Action*”
- Document 195.** 15 April 1969: [Secret] Report by George H. Aldrich to Ambassador Brown, “*Relationship of Armistice Agreement to the North Korean Shooting Down of a U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft*”
- Document 196.** 15 April 1969: 10:00AM, Telephone conversation between National Security Adviser Kissinger and Secretary Rogers
- Document 197.** 15 April 1969: 5:40 PM, Telephone conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger
- Document 198.** 15 April 1969: 6:30 PM, Telephone conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger
- Document 199.** 15 April 1969: 10:00 PM, Telephone conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger
- Document 200.** 15 April 1969: 11:00 PM, Telephone conversation between National Security Adviser Kissinger and Dr. Kramer
- Document 201.** 16 April 1969: Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, 1415Z, (Seoul 01907)

- Document 202.** 16 April 1969: Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, “NSC Meeting on Korea, April 16, 1969 – 10:00 a.m.”
- Document 203.** 16 April 1969: Memorandum for the Record, “NSC Meeting on North Korean Downing of U.S. EC-121 Reconnaissance Aircraft”
- Document 204.** 16 April 1969: [Secret] Intelligence note from Thomas L. Hughes, INR, to the Secretary of State, “Pyongyang’s Motivations in Downing US Reconnaissance Plane”
- Document 205.** 16 April 1969: [Confidential] Memorandum of Conversation between Singjin Chyun, Kwang Soo Choi, Winthrop G. Brown, Leroy E. Debold, “EC-121 Incident”
- Document 206.** 16 April 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from the Department of State to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
- Document 207.** 16 April 1969: U.S. Military Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident Regarding the North Korean Puppet Regime. (classification #: 729.55, record # 3144)
- Document 208.** 17 April 1969: North Korean Violations of the Armistice Agreement
- Document 209.** 17 April 1969: Telegram from AMEMBASSY MOSCOW to SECSTATE, 1510Z, “Missing EC-121,” (Moscow 01628)
- Document 210.** 17 April 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from the Department of State to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, “EC-121 Rescue Operations”
- Document 211.** 17 April 1969: Telegram from the Department of State to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, “Missing EC-121”
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- Document 218.** 18 April 1969: Summary of President Park Chung Hee’s Meeting With U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Porter. (classification #: 729.55, record # 3144)
- Document 219.** 19 April 1969: State Department circular to all posts, “President’s Decision on Reconnaissance Aircraft”
- Document 220.** 19 April 1969: 9:25 AM, Telephone conversations between Secretary of State Rogers and National Security Adviser Kissinger
- Document 221.** 19 April 1969: South Korean Government’s Measures Relating to the Downing Incident by the North Korean Puppet Regime of a U.S.

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- Document 223.** 21 April 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY MOSCOW to SECSTATE, 1940Z, (Moscow 01684)
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- Document 225.** 21 April 1969: Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, "*Pueblo*"
- Document 226.** 22 April 1969: Telegram from AMCONSUL HONG KONG to SECSTATE, 0933Z, "*Peking Radio Reports April 15 Downing of US Reconnaissance Plane,*" (Hong K 02173)
- Document 227.** 22 April 1969: Intelligence Note from INR-Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, "*Peking Breaks Silence on EC-121, Charges US-Soviet Collusion*"
- Document 228.** 22 April 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from the Department of State to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, "*US Forces in Sea of Japan*"
- Document 229.** 22 April 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY MOSCOW to SECSTATE, 1420Z, "*US Reply to Soviet Government on Shoot-Down of US Plane,*" (Moscow 01688)
- Document 230.** 22 April 1969: South Korean Government's Diplomatic Measures and the Response of the Governments and the Press of Other Countries (22 APR-12 MAY). (classification #: 729.55, record # 3144)
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- Document 232.** 24 April 1969: Telegram from AMEMBASSY MOSCOW to SECSTATE, "*North Korean Aircraft Incident,*" 1335Z, (Moscow 1725)
- Document 233.** 30 April 1969: [Confidential] Letter from President Park Chung Hee to President Nixon enclosed in Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger the White House, "*Talking Paper for the President's Meeting with the Korean Deputy Prime Minister, Mark Choong Hoon*"
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- Document 235.** 1 May 1969: South Korean Government's Position Regarding the U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Downing Incident, Basic Guide. (classification #: 729.55, record # 3144)
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- Document 237.** 15 May 1969: U.S. Forces Korea Withdrawal Announcement by U.S. House of Representatives Military Committee Member Representative Young. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
- Document 238.** 2 June 1969: U.S. Defense Vice-secretary Delegation Foreign Minister Courtesy Call, Meeting Contents. (classification #: 729.21 US, record #: 3100)

- Document 239.** 3 June 1969: [Top Secret] Telegram from GEN WHEELER, CJCS, to ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC and GEN HOLLOWAY, CINCSAC, “*Retaliatory Strike Against the Changjin Power Plant in North Korea (S)*”
- Document 240.** 4 June 1969: 2nd U.S.-ROK Defense Cabinet-level Meeting Joint Statement. (classification #: 729.21 US, record #: 3100)
- Document 241.** 5 June 1969: U.S. House of Representatives, Representative STEPHEN YOUNG’s Announcement Insisting on U.S. Forces Korea Withdrawal. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
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- Document 243.** 25 June 1969: Distribution of Government Memorandum on Provocative Activities of the North Korean Puppet Regime. (classification #: 729.55, record #: 3147)
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- Document 246.** 7 July – 1 August 1969: [Secret] Secretary’s Visit to Korea, “*Objectives Paper*”
- Document 247.** 31 July 1969: Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
- Document 248.** 8 August 1969: Intelligence Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “*North Korean Political Strategy*”
- Document 249.** 8 August 1969: Our (South Korean) Government’s Position Regarding the Joint Statement Announced Immediately Following the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting. (classification #: 724.11 US, record #: 3017)
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- Document 251.** 14 August 1969: [Secret] Talking Points from NSC Meeting, “*Korea*”
- Document 252.** 17 August 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE “*Possible Downed US Helicopter,*” 0620Z, (Seoul 4452)
- Document 253.** 17 August 1969: [Secret] Telegram from BONESTEEL COMUSK to ADM MCCAIN, 0744Z
- Document 254.** 17 August 1969: U.S. Military Helicopter Downing, Basic Document. (classification #: 729.55, record #: 3146)
- Document 255.** [Secret] Telegram from Marshall Green to the Secretary of State, “*Your Participation in the Visit of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea August 21-22, 1969 – BRIEFING MEMORANDUM*”
- Document 256.** [Secret] “*Talking Points for Ministerial Level Meetings*”
- Document 257.** [Top Secret] Memorandum for the President, “*Your Meeting with President Park Chung Hee of Korea, August 21, 1969, 11:30 a.m.*” (With enclosed talking points and background papers)
- Document 258.** 20 August 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, “*Your Meetings with President Park*”

- Document 259.** 21 August 1969: [Eyes Only] Memorandum of Conversation, 1615-1815 hours, St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, "*Talks Between President Nixon and President Pak*"
- Document 260.** 21 August 1969: Meeting of U.S. and ROK Cabinet Members in Connection with President Park Chung Hee's Official Visit to the U.S. (classification #: 724.11 US, record #: 3017)
- Document 261.** 27 August 1969: Comprehensive Report on the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting. (classification #: 724.11 US, record #: 3017)
- Document 262.** 4 September 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to the SECSTATE, 0940Z, "*Downed Helicopter – Recommendations Resulting from 294th MAC Meeting,*" (Seoul 4846)
- Document 263.** 2 October 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State William P. Rogers, "*Helicopter Crew Members Held by North Koreans*"
- Document 264.** 10 October 1969: Record of Communication between Embassy Adviser Thomas M. Judd and Director Yoon Ha-jung. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
- Document 265.** 14 October 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., State Secretariat, from Jeanne W. Davis, "*Helicopter Crew Members Held by North Korea (S/S 14718)*"
- Document 266.** 15 October 1969: Meaning of U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird's Announcement and the U.S.' Position. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
- Document 267.** 22 October 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Nels C. Johnson, "*Constraining the Arms Race between the ROK and North Korea (C)*"
- Document 268.** 23 October 1969: Excerpt from Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Choi's Speech at the Korean-American Association. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
- Document 269.** 28 October 1969: Contents of Meeting between Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Porter. (classification #: 729.23, record #: 3104)
- Document 270.** 29 October 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, 0920Z, "*Downed Helicopter: Third Closed Meeting,*" (Seoul 05957)
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- Document 272.** 1 November 1969: [Confidential] Important Questions presented on the Occasion of the Visit by the Congressional Delegation of the United States, Military of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, Seoul.
- Document 273.** 5 November 1969: Letter from Edmund H. Kelly to Curtis W. Kamman regarding support for the National Unification Board
- Document 274.** 6 November 1969: [Restricted] Memorandum Presented by Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee of National Assembly, Republic of Korea, Seoul

- Document 275.** 15 November 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to AMEMBASSY TOKYO, CINCPAC, USUN, "*Limited ROK Contacts with North Korea*"
- Document 276.** 17 November 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, 0850Z, "*Downed Helicopter Pilots,*" (Seoul 06289)
- Document 277.** 17 November 1969: Letter from Curtis W. Kamman to Edmund H. Kelly regarding ROK's interest in reunification
- Document 278.** 18 November 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, 0930Z, "*Downed Helicopter,*" (Seoul 06312)
- Document 279.** 21 November 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to AMEMBASSY SEOUL CINCUNC/COMUSK, "*Downed Helicopter*"
- Document 280.** 24 November 1969: [Confidential] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, 100Z, "*Downed Helicopter-Fifth Closed Meeting,*" (Seoul 06382)
- Document 281.** 24 November 1969: Draft Insert for Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Hearing Transcript, 24 November 1969, Page 235, Line 12, "*Additional Money for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China*"
- Document 282.** 24 November 1969: Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from the President
- Document 283.** 25 November 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, "*General Wheeler on his Conversation with President Park of Korea*"
- Document 284.** 6 December 1969: [Top Secret] Telegram from ADM MCCAIN to GEN WHEELER, 0355Z, "*Summary of Conversation with Gen Mun, ROK CJCS*"
- Document 285.** 18 December 1969: Provocations and Infiltration of the North Korean Puppet Regime. (classification #: 729.55, record #: 3146)
- Document 286.** 30 December 1969: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, "*FY 1970 Economic Assistance for Korea*"
- Document 287.** 31 December 1969 (approx. date): Contents Regarding Details Regarding Provocation and Infiltration by the North Korean Puppet Regime, Military Assistance Regarding South Korea, Vietnam Issue, Okinawa Issue, and Economic Assistance to South Korea. (classification #: 729.55, record #: 3147)

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- Document 288.** 2 January 1970: [Secret] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to Department of State, "*Conversation with General Kim Kyung Wook*"
- Document 289.** 13 January 1970: The current situation regarding infiltrations into the South by the North Korean Puppet Regime in 1969. (classification #: 729.55, record #: 3146)
- Document 290.** 17 January 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Robert Mayo, "*Economic Assistance Program for Korea FY 1970*"

- Document 291.** 31 January 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, “*Economic Assistance Program for Korea FY 1970*”
- Document 292.** 3 February 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., “*Review Group Meeting on Korea*”
- Document 293.** 17 February 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Review Group from F.T. Unger, Lieutenant General, USA, Chairman, JCA Representative to NSC Review Group, “*NSSM-27, US Policy for Korea (U)*”
- Document 294.** 25 February 1970: [Secret] Draft Instructions to Ambassador Porter from Secretaries Rogers and Laird, “*NSSM 27 – Possible Withdrawal of US Division*”
- Document 295.** 26 February 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., “*ROK Force Capabilities*”
- Document 296.** 27 February 1970: Memorandum from Department of State, “*Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on Korea (1), February 25, 1970*”
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- Document 298.** 3 March 1970: [Secret] Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, “*NSC Meeting on Korea*”
- Document 299.** 4 March 1970: [Secret] Talking Points for the President, NSC Meeting – March 4, 1970
- Document 300.** 5 March 1970: [Limited Official Use] Telegram from AMEMBASSY SEOUL to SECSTATE, “*Korean Public Opinion Poll on National Unification*”

CRISIS AND CONFRONTATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: 1968-1969

Chronology of Events

1961

Major General Park Chung-hee led a bloodless military coup and assumed power in South Korea

1965

South Korean troops begin fighting in Vietnam

1966

October Second Party Conference is held in North Korea. After a series of purges and dismissals, the Political Committee comes to be dominated by partisans and partisan-related officials

1967

The purge of the Kapsan Faction in the DPRK

North Korean officials repeatedly complained about U.S. “espionage boats” entering into North Korean territorial waters

14 June South Korean Counter Intelligence Corps announced that on the 3rd of June, 28 North Korean commandos intruded into South Korea’s eastern coast

23 June The U.S. collected information on a North Korean plot to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee and to dispatch armed spy units into the South

1968

5 January President Park emphasized that there were clear signs of North Korean plots to dispatch armed spy units almost 10 times the size of those of the previous year

- 6 January** Radio Pyongyang announced that the U.S. Army had again dispatched armed navy vessels into North Korean territorial waters
- 11 January** The U.S.S *Pueblo* (AGER-2) departed for the East Sea from Saesbo, Japan
- Radio Pyongyang issued another stern warning stating: “As long as U.S. troops conduct reconnaissance by sending spy boats, our naval ship will continue to take determined counter-measures.”
- 21 January** An armed North Korean guerrilla unit of 31 commandos launched a raid on the Blue House Raid in an attempt to assassinate President Park
- 22 January** South Korean Counter-espionage agency launched
- The DPRK announced over loudspeakers along the DMZ that the North Korean guerrilla unit advanced from Kyungbok Palace to Seodaemun and that the unit successfully killed a South Korean national police officer, the Chief of Police, and destroyed four military trucks. Furthermore, the combat unit escaped from Park’s clique and is continuing its mission
- 23 January** U.S.S *Pueblo* was boarded and captured along with its crew by North Korean forces
- US Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov
- Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command Korea, General Charles H. Bonesteel met with South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Seong Eun
- US Ambassador to South Korea, William J. Porter meets with South Korean Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon
- 24 January** The Legal Office of U.S. Department of State concluded that the U.S. does not have the right to use force against North Korea
- During the 261st meeting of Military Armistice Commission (MAC) at Panmunjom U.S. Admiral John V. Smith discussed the Blue House Raid and U.S.S *Pueblo* Incident with North Korean Major General Pak Chung Kuk.
- President Park reassured Ambassador Porter that South Korea will not engage in unilateral retaliatory action against North Korea
- Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet directed forces to be prepared to engage in several operations
- North Korea declared that the Blue House Raid was a struggle against the South government by indigenous guerillas within the South

25 January US President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to recall air squadrons and support from the Air Force and Navy to active duty. Johnson also proposed sending additional aircrafts to South Korea

US Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg submitted a letter to the President of U.N. Security Council requesting a meeting of the Security Council be held to discuss North Korea's recent actions

President Johnson sent a letter to Soviet Premier Kosygin urging the U.S.S.R to aid in U.S. efforts to resolve the situation and to retrieve the *Pueblo* and its crew. U.S.S.R alerted the U.S. that it could not act as intermediary for the *Pueblo* incident

South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Ha urged Ambassador Porter to give equal treatment to the Blue House Raid and the *Pueblo* incident in the Security Council and other meetings

The U.S. approached the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to contact North Korea for the names of injured and deceased crew members of the *Pueblo*. The State Department also sent circular letters to all diplomatic posts with instructions for embassies to brief host country officials on U.S. stance on North Korea's provocations

In a meeting with Polish and Czech members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, DPRK General Pak Chung Kuk claimed that *Pueblo* discussions were out of the question until the United Nations Command explained why the *Pueblo* was in North Korean territorial waters and apologized for the encroachment

26 January South Korea expressed concern that if North Korea was invited to a meeting of the UN Security Council, this could be a *de facto* recognition of the DPRK. The U.S. emphasized that South Korea must make a strong case to the world at the Security Council

US Ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson in Tokyo informed Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba that the U.S. was transferring 20 U.S. Aircrafts to South Korea. President Park informed the U.S. that South Korea welcomed any further troop transfers to Korea

North Korean Minister of Defense Kim Chang Bong asked the Soviet Ambassador to Pyongyang to supply weapons and materials to deflect possible American air raids

An urgent telegram was sent from Seoul to the South Korean Ambassadors to the U.S. and the UN stating that the South Korean government attached greater significance to deterring North Korea's invitation to the UN Security Council than it did its own invitation

27 January General Bonesteel met with the South Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff. The South Korea government stressed three points: (1) The U.S. needed to coordinate with and to inform South Korea of important decisions (2) most people in South Korea believed the U.S. considered the *Pueblo* incident more important and thus had not done enough regarding the Blue House raid (3) South Korea and the U.S. must act in a way that discouraged future subversive actions on the part of North Korea

Soviet Premier Kosygin responded to President Johnson's letter (25 January) and informed him that the U.S.S.R did not share the same interpretation of the *Pueblo* incident as did the U.S., and that the U.S.S.R could not act as an intermediary

Spokesman of North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the U.S. and South Korea on the grounds that they were drumming up anti-communist sentiment and aggression toward North Korea

28 January Embassy in Seoul reports that South Korea fears of closed Military Armistice Commission-North Korean talks would leave out Blue House Raid and other North Korean infiltrations while focusing on *Pueblo* alone

State Department rejects Japanese proposal for a tripartite fact finding commission based on Japan's suggestion that the Soviet Union be included in the commission. State Department welcomes other Japanese efforts to support the U.S., particularly in the United Nations

Admiral Smith was authorized to sign a receipt for the prisoners, although the receipt may not contain an admission of guilt or an apology

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu Ha reminded the South Korean Ambassador of suspicions of indirect contact between the U.S. and North Korea by means of the Polish government. In doing so, North Korea would try to increase its image in international society and under these circumstances the South Korean government will express a strong objection to the U.S. Embassy in Korea

North Korea sent a message to the U.S. through the Neutral Nation's Supervisory Commission stating that if the U.S. recognized the *Pueblo*'s crew as POWs and revealed its intention to negotiate, North Korea would consider repatriating the crew back to the U.S.

South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Seong Eun announced that the DMZ would be barb-wired and that counterespionage equipment was deployed earlier than scheduled

29 January In a meeting with the Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev explained that by raising the issue of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* in the UN Security Council, progress was impeded. Kozyrev also suggested that the U.S. ought to withdraw the U.S.S. *Enterprise* from the area

South Korean Ambassador Kim stressed to Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco three points: (1) there should be no direct contact between the U.S. and North Korea in the case of mediation (2) a U.S. mediator should speak with South Korea prior to speaking with North Korea (3) South Korea opposes any Security Council resolution which would only be ineffective against North Korea. Sisco denied reports of direct U.S.-North Korea talks

The U.S. sent a message expressing a willingness to negotiate with North Korea in order to repatriate the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*

30 January The US State Department instructed UNCMAC negotiators to make strong statements on both the Blue House Raid and the *Pueblo* incident

The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communist forces launch the Tet Offensive.

North Korea requested military and other assistance from the U.S.S.R in the event of a possible outbreak of war

31 January United Nations Pakistani Representative Shahi recommended that five non-permanent Afro-Asian Security Council members meet in Geneva to urge North Korea to return the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and its crew

The Soviet ambassador to North Korea met with Kim Il Sung and requested that the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* be expelled from North Korea expeditiously

1 February The US embassy in Seoul reported that North Korea preferred to use the MAC channel as opposed to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission channel to communicate. The State Department reported that the U.S. was now in direct contact with North Korea through the MAC and that a formal meeting had been scheduled at Panmunjom for the 2nd of February

South Korean Presidential Secretary, General Yi Hu Rak reiterated the fear that South Korean security concerns would not be resolved at MAC. Yi also reported that South Korea had been doing a considerable amount of military planning

Richard M. Nixon announced his bid for the Republican presidential nomination.

Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Ha received a report from South Korean Ambassador to the UN that the U.S. reacted positively to the prospect of meeting in Panmunjom

2 February A MAC Senior Members meeting was held at Panmunjom. The meeting was inconclusive with Admiral Smith and General Pak presenting their differing interpretations of the event

In a meeting with US Ambassador Porter, President Park said that if North Korea would not cease aggressive activities, South Korea would be forced to retaliate

Through an aide-memoir, the South Korean government informed the US Embassy in Korea of its position regarding the Panmunjom meetings. The South Korean government would not raise a different opinion on meetings between the U.S. and North Korea, on the conditions that (1) the Blue House and Pueblo incident receive equal treatment (2) the Blue House raid be recognized as a violation of the armistice agreement by North Korea (3) the meetings be open to South Korea

3 February President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to President Park Chung Hee expressing his sympathy for the Blue House Raid, and also expressing his desire to strengthen South Korea's internal security and to resolve the *Pueblo* Incident

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin meets with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and says the situation could be resolved if the U.S. takes no further actions to increase tension. Dobrynin reminds Thompson that the Soviet Union would be forced to react if the U.S. uses force to resolve the situation. Dobrynin says it would be unlikely for the North Koreans to release the crew without an apology from the U.S.

Soviet Premier Kosygin delivered another letter to President Johnson. Kosygin reiterated the North Korean view of the *Pueblo* incident and restated that the U.S. could not resolve the situation through threats of force

4 February During the second MAC meeting at Panmunjom, General Pak levied accusations against the U.S. for intensifying pressures on the peninsula and demanded an apology. Admiral Smith asked for the names of the dead and wounded crew members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*

The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained to the US Embassy that it was not keeping the Foreign Ministry properly informed of the MAC meetings

Ambassador Porter reported that President Park was "clearly moved by President Johnson's message" from the 3rd of February. Park also claimed that the South Korean public was favorably disposed to public MAC meetings, although Porter was hesitant about the idea.

5 February During the third MAC meeting at Panmunjom, Admiral Smith blamed the North Koreans for increasing tensions on the peninsula, citing their infiltration and subversive activities in South Korea. General Pak requested that each country appoint special representatives

President Park sent a reply letter to President Johnson. He thanked President Johnson for his support, and cited over 5,000 armistice violations made by North Korea

Ambassador Porter is asked to consult with President Park prior to MAC meetings. The State Department reiterated that MAC meetings would not be held publicly, but that President Park would be fully briefed following each meeting

A high level meeting took place at the Blue House where South Korean officials demanded the participation of the South in MAC meetings at Panmunjom

6 February South Korean Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon reiterated to Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel that closed meetings between the U.S. and North Korea generate public suspicion. Chong Il Kwon asked that a South Korean representative be invited to the meetings

The U.S.S *Enterprise* was ordered to move southwest to the Straits of Tsushima to ease tensions in the area

The South Korean National Assembly urged President Park to undertake unilateral steps towards North Korea because the Blue House raid was a critical incident threatening the national security of the South

7 February The fourth MAC meeting at was held at Panmunjom where General Pak recommended that the meetings remain closed and then gave Admiral Smith a list of the dead and wounded crew members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*

President Johnson sent another letter to President Park to reassure him of the U.S. commitment to South Korea's defense and security and to calm suspicions of the closed U.S.-North Korean meetings

8 February Ambassador Porter met with President Park in a lengthy meeting in which Park noted his dissatisfaction with the removal of the U.S.S *Enterprise*

Prime Minister Chong reassured Ambassador Porter that South Korea would not remove its troops from Vietnam

President Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance as his personal representative for talks with President Park and other high level South Korean officials

9 February President Parks sent a response to President Johnson's 7 February letter stating 3 points: (1) Blue House raid should also be on the agenda of the Armistice committee (2) the U.S. should persuade North Korea to recognize and apologize for the Blue House raid and to declare in a formal statement that it would not intrude into South Korea again (3) in case North Korea does not agree, the U.S. and South Korea should take retaliatory measures against North Korea under the mutual defense treaty

10 February The fifth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom

12 February Cyrus Vance met with Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon and Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Ha.

Vance met with President Park for five and half hours. Park indicated that he strongly feels that the North was planning for an all out invasion of the South. Park requested a public statement be issued which declared that any further provocations would be met with retaliation. Park also complained about the absence of South Korea in negotiations with the North. Vance reassured Park of the shared interests between the U.S. and South Korea, but warned against any retaliatory action

13 February Cyrus Vance met with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other top South Korean officials. The Foreign Minister presented Vance with two documents, a Joint Defense Declaration and an Agreed Minutes between South Korea and the U.S. Each document called for retaliatory actions in the event of further North Korean provocations.

South Korean Cabinet Council extended the period of military service to 6 months

14 February Cyrus Vance met with the South Korean Cabinet. It was determined that the Joint Defense Declaration and Agreed Minutes were both unacceptable.

Final joint communiqué between Vance/Park agreed upon

15 February The sixth closed MAC meeting was held at Panmunjom

President Johnson was briefed by Cyrus Vance on his recent trip to Seoul

Joint communiqué between Vance and Choi pledging immediate countermeasures against guerilla infiltration, annual defense ministerial talks, and the modernization of South Korean armies was released

16 February The seventh closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom

Minister of National Defense of North Korea Kim Chang Bong arrived in Moscow for celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Red Army and was received by the General Secretary of the CPSU CC

19 February The 263rd open MAC meeting was held at Panmunjom during which General Park accused the United States of violating the Armistice Agreement. Admiral Smith accused North Korea of violating the Armistice Agreement, citing the House Raid. Park disagreed and said that the event was the work of indigenous South Koreans

Blue

20 February The eighth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom during which General Pak demanded that the United States issue an apology based on the confessions of the crew members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*. Pak insisted that the U.S. issue an apology prior to their release

President Park sent a personal letter to the 16 countries that were involved in the Korean War, requesting that if South Korea was attacked, that they would retaliate and come together to its aid under the Joint Communiqué

- 21 February** During a meeting between Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, the South Korean Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister, South Korean representatives requested that South Korea be granted full participation in determining the use of the \$100 million to be given to the South Korea's military. General Bonesteel agreed.
- 23 February** South Korean Ambassador to the US called on Assistant Secretary Sisco to assist in obtaining affirmations of the 1953 Declaration by sixteen countries who contributed troops in the Korean War
- 25 February** The ninth closed MAC meeting took place at Panmunjom
- 26 February** Leonid Brezhnev urged Kim Chang Bong to release the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* in order to prevent the situation from escalating. Brezhnev also complained that the U.S.S.R was not receiving adequate information about the MAC meetings from the North Koreans
- 1 March** The US Embassy in Seoul recommended that contact through the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be terminated given the lack of positive results
- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was replaced by Clark Clifford.
- Kim Il Sung reported to the Soviet Ambassador that he would visit Moscow soon
- The North Korean Foreign Ministry began to inform the U.S.S.R about the closed MAC meetings in detail
- 4 March** During the tenth closed MAC meeting, General Pak informed Admiral Smith that the affair laid within North Korea's own jurisdiction and rejected the proposal for an intermediary to conduct an investigation. Pak handed Smith a letter addressed to President Johnson written by the crew members, admitting to espionage and intruding into North Korean territorial waters
- 7 March** The 264th open MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 9 March** The eleventh closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 21 March** The twelfth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 28 March** The thirteenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 31 March** President Johnson announced that he would not seek re-election
- April** The South Korean government privately formed special "Unit 684" to assassinate Kim Il-Sung and to destroy his presidential palace

- 1 April** The South Korean Homeland Reserve Force was activated
- 5 April** The South Korean Defense Ministry ordered military drills for all high school and college students
- 9 April** Leonid Brezhnev's delivered a speech at the April 1968 CC CPSU Plenum regarding the Pueblo crisis
- 11 April** The fourteenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 17 April** The first conference between President Johnson and President Park was held 1010-1230 hours at the Library of the Kaiser Estate, Koko Head, Honolulu
- The second conference between President Johnson and President Park held 1700-1830 hours
- A Joint Communiqué was issued
- 22 April** The fifteenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 8 May** The sixteenth closed MAC meeting was held at Panmunjom at which Brigadier General Gilbert H. Woodward replaced Admiral Smith as U.S. Senior Member
- 26-29 May** The first U.S. - South Korea defense ministerial summit was held in Washington, D.C.
- 28 May** The seventeenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 19 June** The South Korean Police Department ordered military drills for all high and middle school students and women
- 25 June** North Korea announced the commencement of a "Month of Joint Actions for the Expulsion of the American Occupants from South Korea"
- 27 June** The eighteenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 5 July** The South Korean administration established a three-year plan for the battle against North Korean attacks and for defense industries.
- 6 July** The South Korean government released its 1969 budget plan with an emphasis on strengthening defense
- 10 July** The nineteenth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 14 August** South Korea reinforced its coastal police guard
- 29 August** The twentieth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 9 September** Twentieth Anniversary of the founding of the DPRK

- 12 September** The crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* gave a press conference in North Korea with foreign journalists present
- 16 September** The twenty-first closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 30 September** The twenty-second closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 10 October** The twenty-third closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 23 October** The twenty-fourth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 31 October** The twenty-fifth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- November** President Johnson approved the “Leonard Proposal” advanced by James Leonard, according to which General Woodward would apologize to the North Koreans under the condition that he could publicly repudiate the apology
- 4 November** About 100 North Korean commandos infiltrated into South Korean territory (Samchek and Uljin) resulting in casualties of local civilians
- 5 November** Richard M. Nixon was elected the 37th U.S. President with Spiro Agnew as Vice-President.
- 2 December** President Elect Nixon named Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor
- 17 December** The twenty-sixth closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom where General Woodward agreed to sign a North Korean document although he would make a formal statement indicating:
- (1) U.S. government did not consider the *Pueblo*’s activities illegal
 - (2) U.S. government did not see evidence indicating that the *Pueblo* intruded into North Korean territorial waters
 - (3) U.S. government would not apologize unless they believed the intrusion to have actually taken place
- 19 December** The twenty-seventh closed MAC meeting was held in Panmunjom
- 23 December** The 82 surviving crew members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and the body of the deceased were released

Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach delivered a “Review of United States Policy Toward Korea” to President Johnson

1969

- January** Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak, and Choi Kwang were purged from the Korean Worker’s Party

- 18 January** The South Korean East Coast Security Guard was established
- 28 February** The South Korean government announced a southward readjustment of the fishery demarcation line on the Yellow Sea to protect fishing vessels from North Korean abduction
- 1 March** The South Korean National Unification Board was established
- 15 March** South Korean Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon offered the Republic of Korea as a base for the Far East in case the US had to remove its bases in Okinawa
- 16 March** Operation Focus Retina, an airborne assault exercise designed to test the US capability to deploy troops to any trouble spot in the world in support of its allies got underway in Yoju, Kyonggi Province in South Korea. The exercise was held to discourage further infiltrations by North Korea and to reassure South Koreans of its treaty commitments
- 21 March** President Nixon requested a contingency study for South Korea to further examine possible military responses from the North
- 15 April** North Korean MIG fighters shot down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the East Sea south of Chongjin, North Korea. All 31 crewmembers were killed
- Kim Il Sung's birthday
- 16 April** A National Security Council meeting was held on the EC-121 incident. Retaliatory measures considered were: (1) air strikes against North Korean air defenses, (2) a blockade of North Korean ports, (3) the destruction of a North Korean aircraft, (4) a sea to shore bombardment, (5) an attack on targets adjacent to the DMZ, (6) a raid on grounds across the DMZ
- 18 April** President Nixon held a press conference and discussed the EC-121 incident. He announced that reconnaissance flights would continue over South Korea and admitted that the Soviet Union was unaware of the recent shooting incident
- President Park warned the U.S. that if retaliatory measures would not be taken towards North Korea, then provocations against both nations would continue
- 19 April** President Nixon stated that a retaliatory attack on North Korea was inappropriate
- 29 April** The Pentagon announced that three squadrons of F-4C Phantom fighter-bombers would be sent to beef up US airpower in Korea
- 30 April** President Park wrote a letter to President Nixon regarding the EC-121 incident

- May** The U.S. Department of Defense suggested a Korean military program supplement of \$108 million (75% increase)
- 6 May** Soviet Premier Kosygin visited North Korea
- 13 May** U.S. Senator Stephen Young suggested that United States Forces in Korea (USFK) withdraw its troops once South Korean soldiers in Vietnam were returned
- June** In a meeting with the House Appropriation Committee, U.S. Defense Minister Melvin R. Laird revealed a plan for the withdrawal and reduction of US troops from South Korea
- 11 June** A North Korean military delegation visited the Soviet Union to request additional military assistance
- 25 July** In a press conference in Guam, President Nixon elaborated on his Nixon Doctrine by stating that the U.S.'s expectation of its Asian allies was to attend to their own military defense
- 31 July** U.S. Secretary of State Rogers began his visit to Korea. The goal was to secure an assurance from the South Korean government that it would begin to assume a greater responsibility for its own defense
- 17 August** A U.S. helicopter *OH-23* with three members of the 59th Aviation Co. aboard was shot down over North Korean territory. All crewmembers were wounded in action
- 18 August** President Park said in an interview with *US News and World Report* that South Korea was willing to offer Cheju Island as a substitute for Okinawa as a US military base in the Far East
- 20 August** The North Korean daily *Rodong Sinmun* criticized President Park's visit to the United States, claiming that South Korea was participating in US efforts to initiate an aggressive war policy
- 21 August** President Park arrived in San Francisco for meetings with President Nixon. Talks between President Park and President Nixon took place at 1615-1815 hours. Discussions about Nixon Doctrine, Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet split, Japanese-Korean relations, and restrictive U.S. trade policies were on the agenda. A joint communiqué between the two countries was issued
- 22 August** President Park departed for South Korea
- 24 September** President Park gave speech stating that the USFK will not be stationed in South Korea permanently
- October** North Korea resumed the exchange of delegations with the People's Republic of China. Choe Yong-gŏn visited the PRC for the twentieth anniversary of the PRC.

- 10 October** In a phone conversation between South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Yoon and U.S. Embassy Advisor Judd, Yoon expressed his skepticism in regard to Laird's speech from June. He stated that it was not the intention of the U.S. government and requested a formal denial from the U.S.
- 23 October** Foreign Minister Choi expressed concerns over issues raised by the U.S. media regarding the withdrawal of US Forces from Korea and emphasized the current necessity of the troops in order to defend and protect the South
- 24 November** President Nixon sent a letter to National Security Advisor Kissinger suggesting the reduction of U.S. troop levels in South Korea. Nixon wanted to cut troop levels to half in Korea and have South Korea take up more responsibility for its own defense
- 3 December** The three crewmembers of the US Army helicopter, which was brought down over North Korean territory on 17 August, were returned after 108 days of captivity
- 11 December** A Korean Airlines AYS 11-125 with 51 passengers departing from Kangnung to Seoul was hijacked to North Korea. No passengers were wounded.
- 30 December** The Nixon Administration suggested that South Korea receive \$128.2 million in aid

1970

- 20 February** The results of a South Korean public opinion poll by the Ministry of National Unification was released. 90.6% of the population surveyed responded that national unification was a task of supreme national importance
- 17 February** Chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staff said the withdrawal of USFK from South Korea would be "untimely"
- 25 February** National Security Council determined 20,000 USFK troops be withdrawn from South Korea
- 20 March** President Nixon ordered one of the two divisions of USFK to be withdrawn from South Korea
- 3 August** In a conversation with Ambassador Porter, President Park strongly expressed his disapproval regarding the plan to withdraw US forces from South Korea
- 15 August** The Peaceful Reunification Initiative was announced by President Park
- 24 August** U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew visited South Korea and spoke with government officials explaining the inevitable reduction of US forces
- 12 September** The Red Youth bodyguard was launched by the KWP CC

2 November The fifth KWP Congress installed Kim Il Sung as the General Secretary

Compiled from:

Buzo, Adrian. *The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea*. St. Leonards, AU: Allen & Unwin, 1999.

Historical Studies Division of the Department of State. "Chronology of Diplomatic Activity in the Pueblo Crisis." October 1, 1968. Reproduced in *Declassified Documents Reference System*. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.

Lerner, Mitchell B.. *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

Scalapino, Robert A. and Chong-Sik Lee. *Communism in Korea: The Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

Suh, Dae-sook. *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Tkachenko, Vadim. "Lessons of the Korean Crisis of 1968." *Far Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January-March 2008): 112-134

And from many of the archival materials available in the briefing book.

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14a
Rostow

1241

23 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List

SUBJECT : North Korean Intentions

1. Per McNamara's request, the Director of Central Intelligence herewith submits a preliminary assessment of the Pueblo incident.

2. Since the fall of 1966, North Korea has been pursuing a tougher, more aggressive policy toward South Korea and the US. Pyongyang has deliberately heightened tensions along the DMZ, landed infiltration teams inside South Korea, and has been more aggressive in shooting incidents involving South Korean fishing vessels and patrol boats. This policy is probably intended by the North Korean leadership primarily as a demonstration against US and ROK action in Vietnam.*

3. The attempt of an armed North Korean infiltration team to attack the presidential mansion in Seoul was the most conspicuous exploit of this North Korean policy thus far. Now the seizure of the USS Pueblo adds a direct involvement with the US in an unusually dramatic way.

4. In our view the two incidents were not planned jointly. The attack in Seoul almost certainly involved considerable advance planning. It is unlikely that the attack was timed to coincide with the seizure of the Pueblo, which did not begin patrolling until 10 January.

* See SNIE 14.2-67, "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities with Respect to South Korea," dated 21 September 1967.

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NLJ 95-103
By icc, NARA Date 4-20-98

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5. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Pueblo's capture indicate that the North Koreans acted deliberately. If the local North Korean commander was exceeding his instructions, there was ample time for Pyongyang to countermand his actions.

6. What is known thus far does not suggest that the North Koreans are deliberately creating a pretext for hostilities. At this stage, however, regardless of whether they planned for it or not, they are probably now prepared to face a period of sharply heightened tensions. They claim, and they may believe, that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. They will undertake a heavy propaganda exploitation of the affair for some days at least. They will probably not release the crew or the ship promptly unless they judge that the US will resort to retaliatory action, such as an air attack against the patrol craft involved in seizing the Pueblo.

7. Pyongyang will be aware that the ROK on its own motion will probably undertake some violent retaliation for the episode in Seoul, presumably in the DMZ. The prospect of this will probably cause the North Koreans to exercise some caution in handling the further course of the affair.

8. If tensions rise sharply, the Soviets seem bound to take a hand at least privately. They will almost certainly advise the North Koreans to terminate the episode at an early date.

Distribution: McNamara
Nitze
Rostow (Walt)
Rusk
Katzenbach
William Bundy
General Carroll
Thomas Hughes
General Carter

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3

POL 27-14 RUMKUN
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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STATE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD
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By [Signature] NARA. Date 7-27-77

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1. Senior UNCMAC member should make strong, dignified and hard statements on both North Korean raid on Seoul and on seizure of Pueblo, keeping both in balance so as not to give South Koreans feeling we attaching more importance to latter.

2. If North Koreans question validity of raising Pueblo under Armistice Agreement, you are to ignore question and avoid argument on this. exchange. Wish you to concentrate on fact that raids and Pueblo seizure, following last year's harassments in DMZ and raids, are part of a new pattern of North Korean belligerence and aggressive actions which dangerously increase tensions in this area. If they are persisted in, they will have the most serious consequences to the maintenance of the Armistice and to the preservation of peace in Korea. North Koreans should be warned that these acts

BA Fleck
EA/SFarger:mk 1/23/68

Tel. No. 6684

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

DOD - Mr. Steadman
L - Mr. Meeker

EA - Mr. Bundy
White House - Mr. Rostow
S/S - Mr. Read

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cannot be perpetrated with impunity.

3. Leave it to you to work out statement on raiders. With respect to Pueblo you are to draw on DOD statement/~~on~~ State Dept. Spokesman's ignoring approach to Soviets, and statement/stressing the following:

- a. Pueblo was in international waters at 39° 25'05" North, 127° 54'09" East.
- b. Seizure was in violation of international law. Request an apology for this illegal action.
- c. Vessel and crew must be returned intact and immediately.
- d. U. S. reserves right to ask for compensation under International Law.

4. You should end presentation with the following words:

US Government
I have been instructed by the ~~Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense~~ to say the following directly to you. The events of last year, and especially the last few days, have put new complexity on the situation in Korea. The North Korean regime has embarked on a campaign of provocation, sabotage, and assassination in violation of the Armistice Agreement and international law. The Republic of Korea and the United States threaten no one. If the North Korean regime persists in this campaign, which can only endanger the peace of this area, the responsibility for the consequences will rest with the North Korean regime.

RUSK

GP-3.

End.

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Meeting began: 12:58 p. m.

Meeting ended: 2:30 p. m.

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
TUESDAY NATIONAL SECURITY LUNCH

January 23, 1968

In the Mansion

Secretary McNamara told Clark Clifford that "this is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent intrusion into Cambodia. We lost a B-52 with four H-bombs aboard. We had an intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans."

Clark Clifford asked, "May I leave now?"

The President asked if there had been any reaction from the Soviets on the ship incident. Rostow said a message was coming up now.

Secretary Rusk said the Soviets had advised the U. S. Government that they had nothing to do with the incident and that the U. S. government should talk with North Korea.

Secretary Rusk said the problem of rescuing the ship and its crew is considerably different from retaliation resulting from an attack.

The President asked what are the alternatives. The President said he was sure they included:

1. Hitting the North Koreans with U. S. forces.
2. Getting a thorough explanation
3. Capturing one of their ships

The President said he was anxious to know exactly what happened.

Secretary McNamara said he had no explanation other than the information that the ship was in international waters, more than fifteen miles out.

Secretary Rusk said that his department is studying the Armistice Agreement on the definition of international waters. He said there is a close relation to waters "contiguous" to North Korea, but the armistice does not define new international boundaries for the high seas. Where the ship was before the incident is unknown.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 92-142

By cb NARA Date 9-10-99

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General Wheeler said this was not necessarily the case. Using a map, General Wheeler pointed to the position of the ship at 9:25 the night before and at 12 noon it was 25 miles off shore and 16 miles away from the nearest land associated with North Korea.

Secretary McNamara said it was unclear whether or not the ship had strayed into waters near the coast of North Korea prior to the incident.

Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans put out a very bitter statement charging the U. S. Government with spying and aggression. General Wheeler said the North Koreans charged us with engaging in acts of aggression.

Secretary McNamara said the alternatives included picking up units of the North Korean fleet or units of the North Korean army along the DMZ or re-enforcing U. S. troops in South Korea. He said we could fly U. S. aircraft from the states to re-enforce units currently stationed there.

Secretary McNamara said if this incident indicates any new threat on South Korea, this would be desirable because North Korean air power is stronger than South Korean air power. The opposite is true of ground forces. Another alternative is to send additional naval forces.

CIA Director Helms said this incident is one in a series of increased harassment. He cited the recent plot against Blue House and many violations along the demilitarized zone.

The President asked for an explanation of the B-52 crash.

General Wheeler said a fire erupted in the navigational compartment of the aircraft and the plane plummeted to the ice about 7 1/2 miles short of the runway in Thule, Greenland. All but one of the crew was recovered. Technical and disaster teams have been sent to the area in an effort to locate the nuclear device.

Secretary McNamara said that there is approximately 250 to 400 feet of water below the ice. A special group has been sent to coordinate the search. Secretary McNamara said the decision was made that no more live bombs will be carried aloft at any time. Secretary McNamara said that General Wheeler and he had agreed to this yesterday. The only time they had been carried live was during air alerts. General Wheeler said there is no need for this and the practice will be discontinued.

Returning to the ship incident off North Korea, Secretary McNamara said there was a period beginning about 10 p. m. in which DoD is not aware of exactly what happened aboard the ship. Secretary Rusk said the commander of the ship did not ask for air cover or help or did not try to get out of the area quickly.

General Wheeler said at 12 o'clock Korean time (noon) the ship encountered a North Korean patrol boat. The Pueblo indicated it was a hydrographic ship when approached. At 13:45 hours the message came back that the ship was being boarded. General Wheeler said the machine gun aboard the ship was not uncovered. The General showed the President a photograph of the ship.

Director Helms said he advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning of information about the incident.

Secretary Rusk then read from a cable which was brought into the meeting on a session which Ambassador Thompson had with the Soviets in Moscow. The Soviets said this was not their problem. They said the presence of U. S. troops in South Korea is a source of tension. They said they would not take action on the matter.

The President asked what other channels are open to us.

Secretary Rusk said the Mixed Armistice Commission meets at midnight tonight to discuss the attack on Blue House. We will raise the matter of the ship at that time.

The President asked what has been the reaction of the South Koreans?

Secretary Rusk said the Minister of Defense chided us for urging them not to retaliate when they are attacked and yet now finding ourselves caught in this situation.

It is unclear whether our men were wounded by self-destruct devices or by enemy fire.

General Wheeler said the man who lost a leg was engaged in blowing up equipment. He said the use of the term 'wounded' seemed odd unless enemy fire was involved on some of the casualties.

The President said we need to see what our options are in this situation.

Secretary McNamara said he had a couple of people working on this under Paul Nitze.

Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans may want to trade these sailors for infiltrators who have been captured crossing into South Korea.

The President said he thinks that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea.

The President asked if we were confident of our situation around Khesanh.

The President asked General Wheeler if we had given General Westmoreland everything he needed.

General Westmoreland said yes, sir.

General Wheeler said Westmoreland is confident of being able to handle the problem in Khesanh. He said that re-enforcements have been sent into the area and the weather is not continuously bad. Even in the event of bad weather there is sufficient artillery. In addition, the ARVN have sent a Ranger Battalion to the area to make this a joint effort.

The President pointed out that we have had a very good press from Saigon in the last two or three weeks.

Rostow said General Sidle is an excellent man who is moving the ARVN out front in the press. General Wheeler said Sidle has a good program and also is making Westmoreland more prominent in the news.

The President asked if anybody had heard from Senator Ted Kennedy on the refugee study. Walt Rostow said he had not.

Secretary McNamara said he saw a preliminary report from the field. Based on the questions asked, it appears the report will emphasize excessive fire from allied weapons is resulting in civilian casualties and refugees.

Walt Rostow asked should the incident be referred to the United Nations, involving the ship.

The President said this would be protective and would show a lack of malice on our part.

Secretary Rusk said we might like to take this to the Security Council. First, we should see what comes from the Mixed Armistice Commission.

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- 5 -

Director Helms said the Soviets have their own ships of this kind including two ships off the Korean coast to keep an eye on the Red Chinese. In addition, they have one ship off Guam.

With reference to the expected enemy offensive near Khesanh, General Wheeler said General Momyer is coordinating all air support.

Secretary McNamara said that the anti-personnel barrier has been defended for use around Khesanh.

General Wheeler said that "gravel" (ammunition used to blow up personnel) will be placed in the area tomorrow.

The President read portions of General Westmoreland's cable outlining developments in the area and the potential terrorism which is expected in Saigon.

There was a discussion about the budget handling of military and economic aid. Secretary McNamara argued that these two items should be separated out in order to avoid the results of last year. At a minimum, Secretary McNamara asked that Korea and credit sales should be separated.

Secretary Rusk said on the basis of past record this proposal would have problems with the authorizing committees. The President asked Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk to get together on this.

The President asked Clark Clifford his opinion on the qualifications of Frank McKinney as Ambassador of the Philippines. Clifford said he thought McKinney was a capable man.

Secretary Rusk said he would look at this matter and give the President his recommendation.

Secretary McNamara said that a representative of the Jordanian government is in Washington and wants more than 100 million dollars in equipment.

General Wheeler said he wants 12 squadrons of F-4s, 175 tanks, and anti-aircraft. Senator Symington is strongly against re-arming the Arabs.

Secretary McNamara said we should provide some arms and tanks but Israel will be very upset if we give the 105 millimeter gun.

Secretary McNamara said that King Hussein's position is in danger. The loyalty of his army is in doubt. If we do not provide arms, they might use Russia as a supplier.

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- 6 -

Secretary McNamara recommended that we agree to give some tanks and reinstate the deal which was in effect prior to the Middle East crisis in principle.

The President asked Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to look into the matter further.

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SUMMARY MINUTES OF PUEBLO GROUP
January 24, 1968; 10:30-11:45

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Nitze
Assistant Secretary Warnke
Richard Steadman
General Earle Wheeler
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Deputy Assistant Secretary Samuel Berger
CIA Director Helms
[REDACTED]
Walt Rostow
Clark Clifford
George Christian

1. 3(a)(4), (a)(5)

Prior to the beginning of the meeting, George Christian raised the question of how to deal with the press. In response to his question as to what should be said about our going to the Russians with the request that they ask the North Koreans to return the Pueblo and its crew, it was suggested that he say the U. S. has been in touch with Moscow, is not satisfied with the Russian response and will be in touch with the Russians again. The suggestion was made that the press could be told that Ambassador Goldberg was seeing U Thant this morning. As to what could be said about U. S. reaction to the incident, it was suggested that he say the capture of the Pueblo, because it was a matter of great gravity, was being closely studied prior to the President's decision on his course of action.

Secretary McNamara said the purpose of this meeting should be defined and further organizational arrangements decided. He felt that we should try to answer three questions:

1. What were the North Koreans trying to do by capturing the Pueblo?
2. What do we think the Koreans will now do?
3. How does the U. S. respond to this incident?

Secretary McNamara suggested that an organization similar to that which handled the Cuban crisis should be set up. He felt we needed to

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By WJ, NARA, Date 7-19-94

close promptly the gaps in our knowledge and to gather the considered views of those attending the meeting so that recommendations could be made to the President before midnight. He said we must respond firmly and promptly to the North Korean action.

Under Secretary Katzenbach suggested an interdepartmental group under the chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger.

In response to a question by Mr. Rostow, Secretary McNamara said the seriousness of the incident was made clear by our belief that the North Koreans are not about to give up the Pueblo soon.

Director Helms, in answer to the question of why the Koreans captured the Pueblo, suggested two motivations:

1. To hinder the movement of Koreans to South Vietnam, and
2. To harass the U.S. in its conduct of the war in Vietnam.

He referred to several reports from Bloc sources concerning proposals to open a second front in Korea. He also had a report that China would like to see the war in Korea reopened. He concluded that their present estimate was that the North Koreans would not reopen the war now but would make the situation as tough as possible for us. He said essentially it is a question of whether we or they have the tougher will.

Secretary McNamara doubted that the North Korean purpose was to reduce the level of Korean forces in South Vietnam. He said that there were 1,200,000 free world forces in South Korea, and that the risk involved in capturing the Pueblo was much too high if the purpose was to effect the level of forces by 10 to 15,000 troops. He wondered whether they did not have another objective which involved tying down the U.S. -- a much more serious objective.

Mr. Helms said he agreed that one objective would be to create the appearance of a second front which would reduce U.S. freedom of action. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Soviets had this objective in the Middle East crisis but that it hadn't worked very well. Mr. Helms called attention to the response of Soviet Foreign Office official, Kuznetsov, when asked by Ambassador Thompson to convey our concern to the North Koreans. He noted that Kuznetsov replied negatively without reference to anyone and without promising to consult his superiors. It was obvious that the Russians knew what was going on in North Korea. Secretary McNamara agreed that the Russians were knowledgeable.

Mr. Berger said it may well be that the Russians assumed we could not respond very effectively to North Korean provocation and that they agreed that the North Koreans should take advantage of the "target of opportunity," i. e., the presence of the Pueblo off North Korea.

Secretary McNamara responded that there is a great deal we can do, including mining, conducting a quarantine, blocking shipping into North Korea, etc.

Mr. Berger said that possibly the North Koreans wanted to create a second Vietnam. They knew that we were holding down the South Koreans who are anxious to retaliate for recent North Korean raids. Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Helms agreed that this was a possible motivation for the action.

Mr. Rostow said that possibly they were thinking that the U.S. would be reluctant in an election year to make a major response involving such actions as calling up the reserves. It is possible that they are challenging us and trying to make our problems more difficult. He noted that their action had already led us to divert the aircraft carrier Enterprise from South Vietnam by putting it into the Sea of Japan off North Korea. He said it is possible that the attempt to assassinate President Park was part of this plan.

Mr. Katzenbach described the action as a calculated attack on a target of opportunity. He noted that the North Koreans didn't know the Pueblo was coming their way before the 10th of January. After that date they may have planned to capture it, acting when the Pueblo was off Wonsan. He said that what the North Koreans do now depends a great deal on what the U.S. does. He doubted that the North Koreans would return the ship or the crew.

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The North Koreans, [redacted] will hold the crew for ten days at least in order to interrogate them. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans had held some of our pilots for a year and had treated them very roughly before releasing them. Secretary McNamara added that the fact that they will be holding the U.S. crew increases the seriousness of the situation.

Deputy Secretary Nitze said the North Korean motivation might be their hope that pressure on us might lead us to take a weaker position on Vietnam negotiations. Thus, it might be necessary for us to ask Congress for additional authority to take military action in order to make clear to the Soviets that they must not misunderstand our attitude toward the Pueblo incident.

Secretary McNamara said if their effort was aimed at tying our hands in other areas, they had succeeded since we cannot move in South Vietnam until the Pueblo incident is resolved.

Both Mr. Christian and Mr. Rostow mentioned the large number of telegrams from private U.S. citizens which had already been received by the White House. These messages, spontaneously sent, were demanding immediate U.S. action.

Mr. Rostow suggested that the North Vietnamese action may have been timed with the North Vietnamese military action at Qhe Sanh.

Mr. Katzenbach doubted the relationship. The North Korean Premier, Kim Il-Song, is opposed to negotiation of the Vietnam war. If there is a relationship, he did not understand why the Russians were opposed to doing anything about North Korea.

Mr. Rostow said he assumed that the Soviets knew of the North Vietnamese action. Considerable pressure was being exerted on us, both in Vietnam and in Korea.

Mr. Helms commented that North Korea wants to be in the hands of neither the Russians or the Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow added that Soviet influence is more effective in North Korea than it is in North Vietnam. One far-our possibility was that the North Korean action was prompted by the Chinese in an effort to cross up the negotiations on Vietnam. Mr. Helms commented that the attack on the South Korean President's home had been planned for at least two years.

Mr. Katzenbach said the most plausible position is that the Pueblo incident was a North Korean action which had been undertaken with the consent of the Russians and Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow restated his view that the Pueblo incident may be tied in with numerous Communist actions in the Pacific area. He added that the Russians may have been interested in getting the equipment from the Pueblo.

Mr. Berger said that the North Koreans may be stepping up harassment of all kinds. It could be that the Soviets knew of the North Korean campaign and decided against interfering.

All agreed that the North Koreans will hold the ship and the crew and that they will not respond to diplomatic pressure alone.

Mr. Rostow reviewed some of the diplomatic actions being taken or which could be taken:

1. Ambassador Goldberg is to see UN Secretary General U Thant at 11:00 A. M. He is to try to interest U Thant in a solution of the Pueblo incident but is not to request the Secretary General's good offices.
2. We could take the issue to the UN Security Council in order to buy time in which a decision can be made as to what U. S. military action is to be taken. There would be no expectation that a solution could come out of the UN Security Council meeting.
3. A letter from the President to U Thant might be used to give the Secretary General a sense of the gravity of the situation. The letter would link North Korean infiltration, including the Blue House effort, to the Pueblo capture.
4. A second effort to enlist the Russians in promoting a solution might consist of a Presidential letter to Kosygin.

Secretary McNamara said we must first decide what we will do. Mr. Berger pointed out that although Korean President Park has agreed not to retaliate for the present, the Koreans will do so no matter what we say if harassments continue to increase. General Wheeler said our commander in Korea is already deeply concerned and had asked whether he should play the current situation hot or cool with the Koreans.

General Wheeler said he was not now prepared to recommend specific military actions but we could do any or all of the following:

1. Reinforce our military strength in South Korea and in the area nearby. We could send additional air and naval units to Korea^{and} to areas closer to Korea. One question was whether we could use Japanese facilities in this reinforcement activity. If we can, it would make a great deal of difference. Mr. Berger replied that we could use Japanese facilities. Mr. Katzenbach said we should consider sending a Presidential letter to Sato or possibly a Presidential emissary.
2. We could use our naval preponderance in the area, both surface and under sea, to do any of the following:
 - a. find North Korean shipping at sea which could be seized or sunk. The purpose would be to seize or destroy something of value to North Korea which was at sea.

b. blockade North Korea by mining selected harbors, either with standard mines or with MARK 36 bombs. Submarines could also be used in this effort.

c. punitive activities against North Korean coastal ocean-going traffic and the blocking of all such traffic.

d. air and naval strikes against selective targets. The port of Wonsan was a tough target because it was well defended. Railroad and POL storage were other targets.

d. a raid in force on an isolated outpost along the Korean DMZ. Although General Wheeler did not favor this suggestion, he said it would be possible to destroy such an outpost and capture the garrison.

f. photo reconnaissance should be undertaken before any other action. A drone unit had been moved to Okinawa and RF 4 planes are in South Korea. These could be used if weather permits.

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Secretary McNamara suggested two general types of action:

1. A general military movement into the Korean area which would signal our present intentions and be an indication of things to come.

2. A buildup of U. S. military forces which could include the call up of military reserves and a request of Congress to authorize the extension of the terms of service of those now in the military.

Mr. Rostow said one thing we might do would be to direct the South Koreans to seize the Soviet hydrologic ship which is now following the Enterprise. This action would be symmetrical with the North Korean action and it would get the South Koreans involved in the situation.

Mr. Nitze said such an action would provide an obvious reponse: i. e., the Soviets might shoot back.

Mr. Clifford asked whether there was any merit in trying to get the ship back. General Wheeler responded that this would be very difficult to do because of the air defense around Wonsan and the shallow waters of the port. Mr. Katzenbach said an effort to get the ship back would create psychological problems, i. e., that we placed greater value on the ship than on the personnel.

General Wheeler said that he hated to see a U. S. ship in the hands of an enemy. In addition, there was some equipment still on board the ship, including a computer which would be compromised. He repeated that an effort to sink the Pueblo by submarine would be very difficult because of the shallow water. An air attack on the ship would encounter stiff North Korean resistance.

Secretary McNamara said there were three areas in which action should be taken;

1. on the diplomatic track;
2. reinforce our total military strength, using existing Presidential authority such as extending the term of military service;
3. applying U.S. military power in the area such as restricting foreign shipping, the use of mines, blockade, etc.

Mr. Katzenbach said one idea would be to put another U.S. ship in the area where the Pueblo was seized and give this ship full air and naval protection. This would indicate that we believed we had a right to put the Pueblo where it was, but also have a beneficial effect on U.S. prestige. General Wheeler said the U.S.S. Banner would be available for such a mission.

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Mr. Helms said that for some weeks we have wanted to know more about North Korean troop dispositions. However, the State Department had opposed [redacted] Current developments would probably alter this earlier judgment.

Mr. Rostow said we should put in writing what we know about the incident, what things we are not sure about, and then instruct the intelligence community to focus on whether the Pueblo incident is related to Qhe Sanh or the attack on the Blue House; also, whether the motive is diversionary.

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Secretary McNamara agreed with this method of proceeding. He thought we should have a plan for photo reconnaissance, [redacted] [redacted] by the end of the day.

Mr. Rostow said that at the 1:00 P. M. NSC meeting, we should be prepared to report to the President on the work already done--the intelligence situation, the reconnaissance option, diplomatic moves, reinforcing military moves, including existing Presidential powers. He said that military and diplomatic moves should be used to convey to the North Koreans and the Russians that they have miscalculated the effect of the Pueblo incident on the U.S. In addition, we should initiate a military build-up on the scene.

Mr. Katzenbach suggested that we must answer the question: "What next." All agreed that before we start down the road, we must carefully look at where it will end.

Mr. Clifford said the North Koreans will say that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. He asked how we could prove to everyone that the ship was in international waters.

Mr. Katzenbach noted that the South Koreans seized a North Korean ship some 40 miles offshore. General Wheeler added that this was a case of hot pursuit; therefore, would not be applicable to the Pueblo incident.

There followed a discussion of how we could prove the exact location of the Pueblo. The ship had been on its track since January 10 but had maintained radio silence. It had instructions to go no closer than 13 nautical miles from shore. Mr. Clifford asked whether we could [redacted] disprove the North Korean claim that the Pueblo was within its territorial waters. Mr. McNamara said we would have to [redacted] because of the seriousness of the actions we would be taking. He added that we would need the fullest justification for our action which would have to be based on proof of the exact location of the Pueblo when it was attacked. Mr. Nitze added that the North Koreans had 83 of our military personnel to brainwash and possibly make confessions.

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Turning to the photo reconnaissance problem, Mr. Nitze noted that one pass [redacted] was quite safe but two or three passes would make it vulnerable. Mr. Berger asked what we would do if the North Koreans fired on the photo reconnaissance plane. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans have been practicing with SAMS against targets flying at altitudes used [redacted]. The drone would create no problem but its reconnaissance was of a limited usefulness. Mr. McNamara added that [redacted] was essential.

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Mr. Rostow reviewed the work to be done by 1:00 P. M. and the papers to be prepared for the group when it meets again at 6:00 P. M. in State Department. Mr. Helms will have the reconnaissance plan. Defense will list our military capabilities for action in the area. Existing Presidential authority will be compiled by Defense. CIA will prepare intelligence refinements including why the Koreans took the action and what their present intentions are. State will prepare the diplomatic options and the decisions to be taken in this area. State will also prepare the basis for U.S. action and its presentation to the public. An overall scenario or plan of action will be pulled together by State.

Mr. Clifford said in his view the question was whether the loss of a U.S. ship with its crew was worth a major military confrontation with North Korea.

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Secretary McManus felt that in this situation we should be able to secure the optimum use of all the available military resources. We could probably reach agreement on how the North Koreans should react and what we should do depending upon their further reaction. However, it is necessary to give the North Koreans promptly a clear message of our intentions.

Mr. Christian noted that consideration be given to whether the President should inform the public as to what we are doing.

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TELEGRAM

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EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: A. STATE 102967; B. SEOUL 3571

1. PRESIDENT PARK REACTED STRONGLY TO REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO PRIME MINISTER TO EFFECT THAT ROK GOVERNMENT AVOID REPRISALS AGAINST NORTH KOREANS. HE ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AND KEPT ME FOR HOUR AND HALF. HE OPENED WITH REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF POSITION AS I KNEW IT, WITH EMPHASIS ON PUEBLO INCIDENT. I RECOUNTED FACTS AS

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3598 ~~SECRET~~
THEY HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO US AS WELL AS ATTITUDE I TOOK IN MAC MEETING THIS MORNING. I ALSO TOLD HIM OF NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND SAID HE COULD RELY ON US TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH HIM AS THIS AFFAIR DEVELOPED.

2. PARK COMMENTED IMMEDIATELY ON FACT THAT WE HAD ASKED NORTH KOREA FOR APOLOGY AND IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE SHIP. TO THIS WE SHOULD

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 98-12
By WJ NARA Date 10-30-88

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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HAVE ADDED, HE SAID, THAT WE WANTED ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE RAIDING OF ANY KIND INTO SOUTH KOREAN TERRITORY. I SAID UNC HAD ASKED FOR MAC MEETING BECAUSE WE WANTED TO GET AT NORTH KOREANS ON SUBJECT OF THE RAID, AND THE SHIP AFFAIR HAD DEVELOPED LATER. HE COULD BE SURE THAT RAID WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN EXCHANGE AT PAMMUNJOM THOUGH WE HAD NO PRECISE INDICATION FROM ROK GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM AS TO WHAT IT DESIRED. PARK SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BECOME ACUTE WHEN NORTH KOREANS SAY FIRST.

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3598E ~~SECRET~~

THAT THERE WAS NO RAID, THAT ATTACK ON BLUE HOUSE IN SEUL WAS SIMPLY A PEOPLES' UPRISING, AND SECOND, WHEN THEY REJECT OUR REQUEST FOR APOLOGY AND REFUSE TO RETURN THE SHIP. IF WE TRY TO MINIMIZE THE AFFAIR FROM THEN ON, AMERICAN PRESTIGE WILL FALL GREATLY AS MATTER HAS GONE TOO FAR ON BOTH SIDES.

3. I SAID THE MATTER HAS TO BE CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY AND THAT WE MUST THINK ABOUT RATHER THAN REACT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ENEMY'S INITIATIVES. THE ENEMY HAD TAKEN THESE ACTIONS AT TIMES AND IN PLACES OF HIS OWN CHOOSING. HE WAS NOW UNDOUBTEDLY IN AN ALERT POSTURE AND THERE WERE MANY REASONS WHY WE SHOULD NOT ACCOMMODATE HIM. IT WAS THIS WHICH LED US TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING ON SUBJECT OF REPRISALS.

4. PARK SAID VEHEMENTLY THAT WE SEEMED TO BE MORE WORRIED ABOUT REPRISALS BY ROK GOVERNMENT

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3598E ~~SECRET~~

THAN WE ARE ABOUT GETTING SATISFACTION OUT OF NORTH KOREANS. HE SAID HE RESPECTS THE UN

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Department of State

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COMMAND AND THE WISHES OF THE AMERICAN ALLY AND HE WILL NOT UNDERTAKE UNILATERAL REPRISALS AT THIS POINT. HE WANTED TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT RETALIATION WILL BECOME INEVITABLE IF THERE ARE ANY MORE ATTACKS BY THE NORTH ON SOUTH KOREA. HE SAID OBJECTIVE OF THE RAID WAS TO KILL THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY AND THEY HAD VERY NEARLY SUCCEEDED. HE KNOWS THAT THERE ARE 2400 ADDITIONAL MEN IN NORTH KOREA WITH SIMILAR TRAINING AND PURPOSE. THESE MEN HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM NORTH KOREAN ARMY AND GIVEN SPECIAL TRAINING. THEY ARE LOCATED IN SIX CENTERS AND HE WOULD LIKE TO STRIKE THEM AND ELIMINATE ENTIRE UNIT IN ONE BLOW. HE SAID HE IS CONVINCED THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE DONE SOONER OR LATER OR THEY WILL COME DOWN HERE AGAIN AND AGAIN, STRIKING AT MANY DIFFERENT TARGETS.

5. PARK SAID THAT IF UNITED STATES GETS NO

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3598E ~~SECRET~~

SATISFACTION IN MATTER OF THE PUEBLO WE SHOULD STRIKE NORTH KOREAN NAVAL SHIPS ALONG EAST COAST AFTER FIRST NEUTRALIZING NORTH KOREAN AIR POWER. THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO COOPERATE IN SUCH A VENTURE.

6. WHEN HE PAUSED I SAID HIS FRIEND PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIS ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH BY THE ROK GOVERNMENT. I SAID WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO GREAT PROVOCATION BUT THAT HE WOULD BE MEASURED IN UNITED STATES AND EVERYWHERE ELSE THROUGHOUT THE NONCOMMUNIST WORLD BY RESTRAINT HE SHOWS IN THESE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE REPEATED AGAIN HIS VIEW THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DO SOMETHING BECAUSE OF THE ATTITUDE WE HAVE TAKEN IN DEMANDING APOLOGY AND IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE SHIP, AND HE WANTS ADDED TO THAT IN ANY WAY WE CAN GET IT ACROSS

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Department of State

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THAT THERE MUST ALSO BE ASSURANCE TO THE SOUTH

PAGE 6 RUALOS 3598 ~~SECRET~~

KOREAN GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO MORE FORAYS FROM THE NORTH. HE IS CONVINCED THAT IF WE HAVE TO ACT AGAINST NORTH KOREA, CHINESE INTERNAL TROUBLES WILL KEEP THEM FROM MOVING PROVIDED THEY ARE GIVEN ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO THREAT TO THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

7. MEETING TERMINATED ON NOTE OF REITERATION THAT ROK GOVERNMENT WOULD ENGAGE IN NO UNILATERAL REPRISALS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD CONSULT FULLY WITH HIM AS DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR.

8. COMMENT: I THINK WE HAVE WHAT WE WANT FROM HIM IN THE WAY OF ASSURANCE, BUT IF THERE IS ANOTHER INCIDENT ALL BETS ARE OFF. I SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER BRIEF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PARK ADMIRING HIS RESTRAINT AND STATESMANSHIP AND ASSURING HIM OF CLOSE COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION. GP3 PORTER

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Authority WLS 93-477 ("3")

Mr. Jenkins

By [Signature] NARA, Date 5-16-97

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January 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting Held January 24, 1968, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Treasury, Henry H. Fowler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance
Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach
Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze
Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow
Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith
White House Press Officer, George Christian
White House Press Officer, Tom Johnson
Nathaniel Davis
Harold H. Saunders

I. The President noted that the meeting had been called to discuss the Cyprus problem but thought the Council would benefit from a late briefing on the status of the USS Pueblo which had been captured by the North Koreans. Secretary McNamara said he had little in the way of facts to add to what has been in the press except for one point-- that the incident appeared to have been pre-planned. In addition to this, two other facts made this a particularly serious incident: (1) the Soviets appear to have known of Korean plans in advance; (2) the Koreans seem to have no intention of returning either the ship or the men soon.

The Secretary promised the President a fuller reading by the end of the day on what North Korean motives might have been, what they were likely to do now, and how we should respond.

The President asked whether the Captain of the ship had ever asked for help. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler described the chronology of the ship's capture in detail (and agreed with Mr. Rostow

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to develop a common set of facts). In answer to the President's question, they said that the Captain had radioed an SOS.

In response to further questioning by the President, Secretary McNamara explained that the Commander of the Fifth Air Force had decided not to send planes to the ship's rescue because (1) he hesitated to commit a small US force against a larger Korean force in an area where Korean air defense is especially tight and (2) that force might have arrived in darkness.

Secretary Rusk noted that the negative reaction of the Soviets and North Koreans was not unexpected. He agreed with Secretary McNamara that apparent Soviet foreknowledge made this a most serious incident. He opined that the motive behind the capture was to pressure us further on Vietnam with the threat of a possible second front.

The President asked about Congressional briefing and reaction. General Wheeler promised a detailed report of his staff's efforts to inform the Congress. Secretary Rusk reported on his appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning. He noted that they were outraged, viewed the incident as serious, but had no specific course of action to propose.

Mr. Marks noted that North Korean broadcasts, while covering the facts of the incident fairly straightforwardly, had made a major effort to generate fear in South Korea using the incident as a point of departure.

Mr. Helms summarized by suggesting that the North Koreans had seized a target of opportunity to distract our attention from Vietnam. The President interjected that perhaps they hoped to detain our carrier (the Enterprise) in northern waters for a few extra days.

The President was handed a transcript of the North Korean broadcast of a "confession" by the Captain of the ship. He asked Secretary McNamara to check the authenticity of the purported broadcast by the Captain. In response to the President's question, Mr. Rostow suggested that the statement appeared to have been written by a Communist rather than by an American and that, judging from the "confession's" mention of the USSR as the ship's intelligence target, the Soviets might have helped draft it. Mr. Katzenbach suggested that the North Koreans might have deliberately drafted the "confession" so as to involve the USSR.

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The President asked for further opinions on Soviet complicity. Secretary McNamara cited the fact that Ambassador Thompson was in Kuznetsov's office within 9-1/2 hours of the incident and the Soviets had already established a position.

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said the ship had radioed that it was destroying its classified equipment. All had not been destroyed, and the Secretary said we were evaluating the problem. He did say, answering the President, that he felt the overall political problem was far more serious than the intelligence compromise might be.

Mr. Helms summarized further, agreeing with what had been said. While he regarded the incident as serious, he pointed out that in the context of the cold war, it was a nitpick. He cited as evidence of collusion between the USSR and North Korea the importance which Moscow attaches to North Korea in its competition with Communist China. On request, he cited two intelligence reports which indicated the policy of North Korea to help North Vietnam by diverting us and the South Koreans from giving full attention to the war in Vietnam. He noted that North Korean pilots and 10 MIG 21s had been sent to Vietnam without Soviet knowledge, and a general policy of increasing pressure on South Korea to discourage it from sending additional forces to Vietnam.

The President concluded this portion of the discussion by urging the Secretaries to make sure Members of Congress were properly informed in order to head off unhelpful statements based on misinformation. In response to the President's query, Secretary Rusk said that his briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that morning had covered four subjects: the ship, the crash of the B-52 bomber off Greenland, the NPT, and Vietnam. He concluded that the meeting was "definitely a plus."

II. The President, in introducing a discussion of the Cyprus problem, welcomed Mr. Vance to the Council table and said he wanted to thank him publicly for his efforts last November and December in avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey. He then asked Mr. Battle to summarize the problem for the Council.

Mr. Battle said that, while Mr. Vance's mission had saved us from war, the Cyprus problem remains. New small incidents occur weekly which heighten tension on the island. Next time it will be impossible to hold Turkey back, especially while the Greek internal situation is what

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it is. Ambassador Yost had reviewed the situation after Mr. Vance's return. He concluded--and the IRG and SIG have concurred--that the situation is unstable and that it is important that we be ready to move in if required. Via the Vance mission, we have involved ourselves again in the Cypriot problem. The UN is now discussing how to tackle the long range problem and we must let the UN effort run its course, but we are not optimistic about what U Thant can achieve and should not let him fail without having something of our own ready to put in his place. Mr. Battle concluded by saying that he did not want to step into this problem, but he felt we had no choice but to be ready.

Mr. Helms noted that the Greeks have withdrawn their troops as agreed with Mr. Vance, although there are still some 1500 on the island as a regular part of the National Guard. He noted that the Greeks claim that 300 Turk officers remain in a similar capacity. There is still no inter-communal cooperation. Makarios' declaration of a Presidential election at the end of February might further inflame the situation. In sum, the situation is still extremely uneasy.

In response to the President's request, Mr. Vance summarized his feelings as follows: "The situation is still held together with paste and glue, and more paste than glue." If it flares up again, war can not be avoided. The majority of Turks had wanted to go to war in November. The Greek people felt humiliated and many of them are anxious for a chance to have a go at the Turks. The Cypriots are fatalistic.

He believed that the US should take an active role in trying to achieve a settlement. The pace of the problem is quicker than the pace of the UN Secretary General. He hopes the problem can be solved within the framework of the UN, but he is "not sanguine."

Mr. Sisco agreed that the UN would not be able to do the job. He noted one slight opening in the last 24 hours--that Makarios has apparently agreed to discuss his own draft Constitution with the Turkish Cypriots. He shared the prediction that U Thant would be at the end of his road in a few days. The President asked whether there is more that Ambassador Goldberg could do. Mr. Sisco said the Ambassador had made clear his support of the Secretary General and had urged Cypriots and Turks to get together. He pointed out, however, that the Turks distrust U Thant. The Cypriot Foreign Minister wants to tie the pacification efforts envisioned in the Vance agreement to replace the

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withdrawn Greek troops with Cyprus' protection against Turkish invasion. The Turks want to concentrate on pacification alone.

Mr. Sisco pointed out that the governments contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force are restive and may be reluctant to renew their contributions when the current mandate for the force expires at the end of March unless there is some progress in further implementing the Vance agreement and moving toward a more permanent arrangement.

Secretary Rusk noted that it is time for serious talks with the Turks and Cypriots. He hoped we could move some diplomatic chips in before the next crisis--before we "get to the end of the road."

Under Secretary Katzenbach agreed that the time fuse is shorter than the UN process. He noted that we are concerting with the Secretary General in order to avoid being blamed for his failure.

In response to the President's request to summarize, Mr. Battle said that we would be in touch with the Secretary General and the parties concerned over the next few days. However, we would like to get our mediator appointed and briefed quietly in order to have him ready to step in the moment he was needed.

III. Turning to Vietnam, the President summarized for Secretary McNamara and Secretary Katzenbach a talk with Senator Edward Kennedy. The Senator had come back from Vietnam feeling that (a) corruption is increasing in the South Vietnamese government and (b) there is some feeling among our generals that we are doing unnecessary things. He asked Secretary McNamara to talk with Senator Kennedy and try to find out exactly what is bothering him.

The President asked General Wheeler whether he remained confident that General Westmoreland has everything he needs to handle the impending attack on Khesanh. General Wheeler said he was; he had cabled General Westmoreland to be sure he had everything he needed and received an affirmative reply.

The President noted that the trend and color of stories from Vietnam recently seemed better to him. He suggested that Secretary McNamara make this observation to the field as encouragement.

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IV. In conclusion, the President asked Secretary Fowler to describe his progress in testimony before the Congress on the Administration proposal for a surtax. Secretary Fowler read the summary statement he had made at the end of his testimony. He concluded by saying there is little question now in anyone's mind whether the tax increase is necessary. The President appeared impressed by the Secretary's summary and asked him to pass it to CEA Chairman Gardner Ackley so parts of it could be incorporated in the President's economic message to the Congress.

Harold H. Saunders

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Meeting began: 7:50 p. m.

Meeting ended: 8:25 p. m.

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH:

- Secretary Rusk
- Secretary McNamara
- Clark Clifford
- Walt Rostow
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson

January 24, 1968
Cabinet Room

The President opened the meeting by reading a memorandum from Bob Fleming on the network press coverage at 6:30 p. m. (Attachment A).

Secretary Rusk: We met early tonight. We have received a message from Ambassador Porter in Korea. He thinks the Pueblo incident and the Blue House plot are connected with North Korean support for North Vietnam.

We propose the following diplomatic action:

1. We should take this matter to the Security Council. In the United Nations there is a long and strong background for our position in Korea. This would gain time for us. It also would give the Secretary General reason to proceed with private discussions. I think we should take it there, although it is likely that no resolution will pass.
2. Send a telegram tonight to the Republic of Korea to get their agreement on what should be put to the United Nations.
3. Go to the 16 countries who as part of the UN forces had troops in Korea. We should inform them of the situation and get them nervous about it. We should alert them to the possibility of a renewed crisis in which they are involved.
4. We should go to Prime Minister Sato of Japan. He has substantial trade with North Korea. He may be able to bring some

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NLI 92-142

By , NARA Date 9-10-99

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leverage to bear with North Korea.

5. We should go back to the Soviets and tell them that their first response was not enough.

The President: I think we should get Ambassador Goldberg down here tomorrow morning for an 8:30 breakfast. Can all of you make it?

Secretary Rusk: Secretary Fowler and I are having breakfast tomorrow to go over our positions prior to meeting with Wilbur Mills.

The President: Why don't the two of you come to the breakfast and then talk afterwards about your problem.

Dean, ask Goldberg to jot down his notes and recommendations. Tell him I do not have confidence in the UN but I do have faith in him (Ambassador Goldberg). I want him to know that we are not going to make decisions about things to put to the UN without him here.

Secretary McNamara: We do want moves which will buy us time. I propose the following steps:

1. Proceed to move armed forces from the U.S. and other places in the area to South Korea and South Korean waters. I propose moving about 250 aircraft in addition to those that are aboard the Enterprise.

The President: Why don't we move the Enterprise back to Vietnam. We do not want them thinking we are diverting from our responsibilities there, do we?

Secretary McNamara: The Enterprise can remain off Korea without any effect whatever on our actions in Vietnam. It was going to the Gulf of Tonkin to supplant and not supplement any operations. We can keep the carrier it was to replace on station off Vietnam.

The President: Are you sure that we have enough air power and support to take care of the situation at Khesanh?

Secretary McNamara: We do have a problem, but I am reasonably confident that what General Wheeler and General Westmoreland have reported is satisfactory.

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The President: What's the strength of the North Korean air force?

Secretary McNamara: They have approximately 400 jets compared to 200 jets in South Korea.

The President: How does the aircraft we are sending compare with the North Koreans'?

Secretary McNamara: Our aircraft would be superior to the bulk of their air force. We propose to send, roughly 63 Air Force F-4's; 33 Marine F-4's; 50 F-100's; 50 A-4's; 30 F-8's; 22 F-105's; and possibly some other aircraft. The F-4's and most of the other planes do have bombing capacity.

My second recommendation is that the President has authority to call up units of the reserves. I recommend that we activate selected Air Force and Marine units. There will be approximately 200 to 300 Air Force units involved. All of these units are in a high state of readiness. This would be calling up to active duty approximately 250 aircraft. These would become part of the strategic reserve taking the place of the 400 regular jets which we will have the capability of sending to South Korea.

The President authorized the Secretary to begin making initial plans and draw up the necessary papers for the dispatch of the aircraft to South Korea and the activation of the units suggested. The President stressed that he would authorize more than what has been suggested if it is considered necessary. He said he would prefer to have more than enough to take care of whatever job might be required.

Secretary McNamara: I propose, although there is some difference of opinion on this, that we move the USS Banner in to replace the Pueblo off North Korea. We are planning to send it into the area to join the Enterprise. so that if we decide to move, it will be in position.

If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the Banner, we should be prepared to cover it with air and other support units.

The President: First, Bob, I want you to be prepared to move and be ready to make these decisions effective after the breakfast tomorrow morning.

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2. Take the tentative steps which are required to get ready for this action.

3. I would send 300 planes. Get more than you think you really need.

"Be ready to go when you come out of this meeting."

Secretary McNamara: We also would like to send Oxcart flight over North Korea tomorrow. The President approved this action.

Secretary Rusk: Also under consideration is sending a drone over Wonsan. However this has not been recommended to the President.

If we put the Banner back on station, we must have adequate cover for it. A second incident in which we come out second best would be disastrous.

The President: What about the B-52's? Should we send some in?

Secretary McNamara: They can operate easily from Okinawa. Flying time is only about 2 1/2 hours.

Walt Rostow: At what level do we propose to reapproach the Soviets on this subject? Do we reapproach them at the Thompson-Gromyko level?

The President: I see no difference in this situation than in the one in which Kosygin messaged me raising hell over Israel. The President then sent Tom Johnson into the Oval Office to get the hot line messages which had been exchanged during the Middle East crisis.

The President read portions of Chairman Kosygin's initial message to President Johnson on the situation in the Middle East.

Secretary Rusk: I think a message to Kosygin from the President would be appropriate at this time.

The President: Go ahead and draft a message tonight for dispatch tomorrow. Make it strong.

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Walt Rostow suggested that the message be sent through the hot line.

The President: I will not use the hot line on this. We will send it as quickly as possible by cable.

The President asked Clark Clifford if he expected any problems during the testimony on Thursday before the Congress.

Clark Clifford: I expect no real problems, although Senator Tower made a comment today that he was disappointed at the appointment. The Senator said he thought the President would now also be running the Defense Department as he is now running the White House and State Department.

The President asked Secretary McNamara if he had appointed a board to thoroughly investigate the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, a special representative was sent to review the matter. In addition the Navy appointed a special panel to investigate it.

We will have good men to testify if called upon.

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Information of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK on 24 January 1968, 9:00 p.m. to 9.40 p.m., for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of all Socialist Countries accredited to the DPRK

[Source: MfAA C 1023/73; translated by Karen Riechert]

The information was given by Comrade Kim Dae Bong, Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK.

I asked you to come here to inform you on behalf of the government of the DPRK about the invading armed American ship seized by our navy. I would like you to inform your governments about that.

Based on materials received, I want to inform you about the armed spy ship of which you might already have read in the newspaper.

The U.S. imperialists, who try ever more desperately to instigate a new war in Korea, yesterday let invade into the coastal waters of the DPRK the armed spy ship, which committed systematically hostile actions (39th degree latitude 17,4'; 127th degree altitude 46,9'). The mentioned spy ship was at a distance of 10 miles from the island of Hodo, 7.6 miles from the island of Jodo and of 10 miles from another point of the DPRK. This is a bay, which, as you know, according to the principles of international law, belongs to the territorial waters of any state.

This ship, which had committed acts of piracy, had been seized by us outside the harbor of Wonan. The equipment of the ship: a fully armed spy ship of approximately 1,000 tons, a crew of 83, consisting of 6 officers, 75 sailors, and two specialists. The two specialists are members of the notorious intelligence agency of the U.S.A. The enemies resisted our countermeasures, so one got killed and three were wounded, one of them severely. The spy ship is equipped with one air defense machine gun, dozens of guns, ten thousand rounds of ammunition and hand grenades, radar and other espionage equipment.

As all the facts prove, the ship was assigned for reconnaissance of military objects and the coastal defense units. It is therefore an intelligence collecting ship subordinate to the American navy. The enemy itself acknowledges, that the ship is equipped with special electronic interception devices for the purpose of reconnaissance of signal and radar stations. There will be more details published by the press.

In January 1967 the enemy let the patrol boat No. 56 enter our territorial waters, followed by countless provocations on a daily basis. The provocation by the spy ship is the most despicable provocation so far. These machinations have to be strongly condemned. Hereby I would like to finish my remarks and ask you again to inform your governments about this incident.

Question by Gen. Jarck (GDR): How did the government of the DPRK lay down the size of its territorial waters?

Answer: We did not publish anything officially about that. Only for internal matters and for solving technical matters, we informed the socialist states, that our territorial waters comprise of 12 miles. This is not about miles, though, but about the spy ship entering a bay of the DPRK. The distance from the island of Jodo is 7.6 miles.

These are the most evil attacks against our country. Nothing allows the enemy to hide his aggressive acts. This constitutes also a severe violation of the armistice army.

Question by the Acting Ambassador of the USSR: Is an official declaration to be expected?

Answer: I think we will express our point of view and publish a declaration. I would like to express my hope, that all socialist states fully support our actions and our attitude, and condemn unanimously the serious machinations of the U.S.A. imperialism.

Question by the acting ambassador of the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Pawlow: Is there a connection between the incident with the ship and the events in Seoul?

Answer: It is not by accident that the enemy's provocations on sea happened at a time, when armed partisans acted in South Korea. The enemies even mobilized divisions and army corps in order to suppress the armed partisans. All that shows us, that U.S.A. imperialism maximizes preparations for another war of aggression. Therefore we are extremely vigilant. According to information, the U.S.A. imperialists have moved their 7th fleet into our direction. Thereby, they aggravate the situation and the tension becomes acute.

Thank you very much for your participation and attention.

Minutes done by translator Ri.

Seen by [signed] Jarck



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 03600 242227Z



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ACTION SS 25

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EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER

REF: STATE 103652

1. GENERAL DEARTH OF HARD INFO ON NORTH KOREA HERE MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO JUDGE NK MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS. IN CASE OF PUEBLO, IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE JUDGEMENT SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG PUEBLO WAS IN AREA AND WHAT ITS ACTIONS AND EQUIPMENT WERE.
2. PUEBLO INCIDENT AND BLUE HOUSE RAID ARE CLEARLY RELATED.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ: 92-152
By: ju NARA, Date: 8-7-92

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3600E ~~SECRET~~
ONCE SEOUL RAID HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT, NORTH KOREANS, UNCERTAIN OF WHAT ACTIONS WE AND ROKS MIGHT TAKE, MAY HAVE DESIRED TO REMOVE MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON THEIR OWN COUNTERMEASURES. IN SO DOING, NORTH KOREANS MAY WELL HAVE HAD ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST USS LIBERTY IN MIND. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT ACTION WAS TAKEN TO PROVIDE KPA WITH MAJOR "VICTORY" FOR ITS 20TH ANNIVERSARY FEBRUARY 8, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO US THAT NORTH KOREANS WOULD HAVE TAKEN SUCH GREAT RISK FOR PROPAGANDA.

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03600 242227Z

GANDA PURPOSES ALONE.

3. WHILE TIMING OF PUEBLO SEIZURE IS RELATED TO SEOUL RAID, THERE IS COMPLEX OF REASONS WHY NK SHOULD UNDERTAKE BOTH. IN THIS, VIETNAM PLAYS CENTRAL ROLE. KIM IL-SUNG HAS LONG ADVOCATED GREATER COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE TO NVN AND HIS LATEST PRONOUNCEMENT, CALLING FOR "MORE POSITIVE ACTIONS" TO AID HANOI, WAS CARRIED BY AP ON JAN 18. AT TIME WHEN ALL ASPECTS OF VIETNAM STRUGGLE ARE INTENSIFYING, NK LEADERSHIP MAY WELL HAVE FELT THAT THEY COULD MAKE NO GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO COMMUNIST CAUSE AND TO THEIR OWN

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PAGE 3 RUALOS 3600E ~~SECRET~~
PURPOSES IN KOREA THAN TO TAKE BOLD ACTIONS DESIGNED TO REDUCE SUPPORT IN ROK FOR AUGMENTED OR EVEN CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM, TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OF AND TO FURTHER REDUCE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN PARNMGVOT, AND TO SHAKE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND ROK. BOLD ACTION COULD ALSO, OF COURSE, CREATE A DIVERSION IN KOREAN PENINSULA AND FORCE U.S. TO DIVERT MILITARY RESOURCES FROM VIETNAM EFFORT AND STIMULATE ADDITIONAL DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS PRESSURES AGAINST U.S. ASIAN POLICY.

4. FORECASTING NK ACTIONS IS RISKY GAME. CERTAINLY THEIR PAST CONDUCT IN REFUSING TO RELEASE OUR HELICOPTER IN 1965 AND RETURNING PILOTS ONLY AFTER LENGTHY NEGOTIATION, PLUS THEIR PATTERN OF TREATMENT OF ROK FISHERMEN, GIVES NO GROUND FOR OPTIMISM THAT THEY WILL REACT FAVORABLY BY RELEASING VESSEL AND CREW IMMEDIATELY. WE ARE MORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THEIR POSSESSION OF SHIP AND CREW TO MAXIMUM EXTENT FROM BOTH TECHNICAL AND PROPAGANDA POINTS OF VIEW. AFTER THESE

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3600E ~~SECRET~~ NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03600 242227Z

CREW, BUT UNDER CONDITIONS OF CONSIDERABLE HUMILIATION TO U.S.

5. ALTHOUGH ACTIVITIES OF PAST FEW DAYS MAY CAUSE THEM TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION, WE CAN EXPECT NORTH KOREANS TO CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR BASIC PLAN FOR INCREASED SUBVERSIVE EFFORT AGAINST ROK THIS YEAR, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE NOT PENALIZED IN SOME WAY FOR THESE TWO COUPS. THEIR PROPAGANDA IS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT MAJOR REVOLT IS ALREADY SWEEPING SOUTH, WHICH THEY MUST SUSTAIN BY ACTION.

6. NK WILL NOT PERMIT ANY ACTION BY US TO GO UNCHALLENGED. THEY SEEM CONFIDENT AND SURE OF THEMSELVES AND APPEAR CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE NEITHER CAPABILITY NOR DETERMINATION TO DEAL WITH THEM WHILE SO HEAVILY ENGAGED IN VIETNAM.

7. GP-2. PORTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Confrontation in Korea

1. The Pueblo incident and the violent incursion by the North Koreans at Seoul have created a confrontation which now engages the interests of several parties, not only those of the US and North Korea. The attitudes and actions of the USSR, China, and the ROK, not to mention pressures and advice from others not so immediately involved, will complicate the further course of events.

2. We do not believe that we are dealing with a series of coordinated actions among the Communist powers which were intended, well ahead of time, to produce such a confrontation at this moment. It is true that all the Communist parties have an interest, because of Vietnam, in bringing diversionary pressures on the US. It is also true that the Communists may believe that the present military-political situation in Vietnam makes the US especially susceptible to such pressures.

3. We believe, however, that the present strained relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese rule out any serious collaboration between them. Nor do we believe that the Soviets had direct part in preparing either of the North Korean actions. The possible evidence on this point (Thompson's conversation with Kuznetsov) does not indicate any more than that the Soviet leaders expected Thompson's visit and prepared for it shortly beforehand. Moreover, the Soviets would wish, because of the magnitude of the risks potentially involved, to have exclusive control of the course of events; almost certainly they would not expect to have this degree of control over the North Koreans.

4. The North Koreans, of course, clearly have developed a pattern of aggressive actions toward the ROK inspired, at least in part, by a desire to

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exploit Seoul's involvement in Vietnam and to support Hanoi with diversionary pressures on the US. Probably the incursion at Seoul was conceived deliberately as a move of this kind, and as one at a new and higher level of overt violence and risk which was thought to be justified by the present situation in Vietnam. This would not mean, however, that the Pueblo incident was part of any prepared scenario.

5. Whatever may be the whole truth of the origins of the present confrontation, however, from this point forward all the Communist parties will wish to handle the affair in such a manner as to inflict the maximum feasible damage on the US position, particularly with reference to Vietnam. This would mean to compel some diversion of effort, but more especially to increase pressures on the US Government, at home and abroad; the effect they would hope, would be to make it more difficult for the US to sustain its present course in Vietnam. In attempting to maximize such pressures, however, account will be taken of risks; none of the Communist parties, we believe, would want the new focus of tension in Korea to develop into actual hostilities.

6. Moscow will now be making its advice heard in Pyongyang. We believe that this advice will be to milk the situation for all the embarrassment and pressure it is possible to inflict on the US, but to avoid further provocative action which might lead to US retaliatory measures. Probably Moscow will advise the Koreans to talk but to stonewall as long as feasible at the MAC table. The Soviets will also probably advise the Koreans to be prepared for the eventual return of the Pueblo crew. At this stage, such a course would probably suit the North Koreans' book. Should they be disposed to take a more belligerent course; however, we cannot be sure that the Soviets would be able to control all their moves.

7. What we know of the present relations between China and North Korea suggests that Peking has far less influence in Pyongyang than Moscow does. Indeed, the Chinese may not be consulted by the North

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Koreans. To the extent the Chinese do offer advice it will probably be ambiguous; they will be concerned primarily not to be less venturesome than the Soviets. We do not believe, however, that the Chinese would urge Pyongyang to any course of undue risk. This judgment derives from what we believe to be China's attitude toward the Vietnam war as well as from its internal situation.

8. In estimating the risks inherent in the present situation the Communist side will be conscious that the ROK, with or without US concurrence, has the capability to take actions which could balloon the crisis out of control. This consideration will probably argue for an additional measure of caution in further handling of the crisis.

9. In sum, we believe that at the present stage the Communist side will be in essential accord that their further moves should aim at forcing the US into humiliating acceptance of the North Korean affront if possible. The Communist parties will probably also agree that they should prolong the standoff for sometime, or at least until they become convinced that the US will resort to major retaliatory action, e.g., air strikes against North Korean naval targets. If in their view the danger of an uncontrollable clash becomes too great, they will probably take some partial step toward settling the Pueblo incident. The North Koreans may reach this view fairly quickly. Obviously the calculations on the Communist side will be close ones and easily subject to error.

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Authority NND 941293
By DL NARA Date 10-4-08

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NND 21032
HLM/AL 2/25/03

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: North Korean Objectives

Q. Provide a forecast of likely North Korean actions relating to the PUEBLO, e.g., release the ship, or continue to hold the ship, exert "blackmail," etc.

A. Forecast of likely North Korean actions relating to the PUEBLO;

1. Refuse flatly to release both ship and personnel, holding personnel for a lengthy period perhaps extending to months, even years.

2. Exploit personnel, ship and ship's mission by all available media as well as, possibly, public trial of selected personnel as War Criminals.

3. Refuse to release ship but release selected members of crew as "humanitarian gesture."

4. Release all personnel, in a surprise move, at Panmunjon.

5. Offer to release ship (after all sophisticated gear is removed) upon appropriate indemnification for all alleged injuries and apologies by US.

Q. What is the best estimate of what North Korea's objectives are in the PUEBLO incident and in the recent raid on the Blue House and other recent activities?

A. 1. Other than the reaction of an extremely security conscious nation to the presence of an overt collection craft near its shores, no firm deductions are possible as to North Korean motives for the timing of the USS PUEBLO seizure on 23 January.

2. A possible motive, and the most sinister one, is that of making preparations for renewed infiltration and terrorist activities against the Republic of Korea. An indication that these activities may be initiated earlier than usual this year is the infiltration of a heavily armed North Korean team through the DMZ and into Seoul during the period 19-21 January. North Korean activities along the DMZ and in South Korea reached the highest level yet in 1967. Both the number of incidents and casualties on both sides were greater than those for previous years, more important, perhaps, was the trend in the DMZ area toward meticulously planned and executed acts of sabotage, ambush, and mining. These reached a peak in numbers in July 1967, and in boldness and destructiveness in September when two trains were derailed north of Seoul. From September until the raid on Seoul in January, however, the DMZ was relatively quiet. Based on past performance, it was expected that early spring would see the resumption of activities, perhaps at a higher level than in 1967. It is too early to ascertain whether they are beginning already.

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By: Alan Lipson Date: 02-25-2003

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By DL NARA Date 6-4-08

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3. Another possibility is that the North Koreans, like the North Vietnamese, need a propaganda victory both for international and domestic consumption. North Korea's economy has been flagging while that of South Korea's improves. South Korea has made a substantiated contribution to our effort in Vietnam but North Korea has done relatively little to offset this. Increased activities in 1967 were intended to divert US attention and create havoc in the ROK, even these failed in spite of the concern they have caused. South Korea's over-all image has improved worldwide in recent years but North Korea remains relatively obscure. Even Egypt has made something of a comeback with the sinking of an Israeli ship, the ELIAT, in international waters.

4. The possibility that North Korea was prompted to seize the PUEBLO by the USSR is remote but it cannot be ruled out. Just how this would serve Moscow's interests (beyond embarrassing the US), is not known. Pyongyang's relations with Communist China are not believed close enough to allow Peiping sufficient leverage to inspire such an act and ChiCom involvement in the act can be virtually ruled out.

5. The PUEBLO's operations were its first in this area and the first in some time by a US collection ship. The USS BANNER has operated off the eastern USSR and along the China coast. No previous North Korean reaction to seaborne collectors is known.

6. It must be emphasized again that North Korea is one of the most, if not the most, security conscious nation in the world. Small, but relatively powerful with the third largest army in the communist world, it is sensitive to any encroachment, real or fancied, on its prerogatives as a sovereign nation. The presence of intelligence collectors in any form, airborne, seaborne or on land near its borders is viewed as an act of aggression. It also probably assumes that United States will not react violently to acts of aggression against the intelligence collectors. In conclusion, the seizing of the PUEBLO was probably an opportunistic act to silence a US collector, embarrass the US and improve North Korea's image.

7. Blue House Incident: The raid on the Blue House, President Pak's official residence, had as its objectives, according to one captured agent, to destroy the residence and kill all government officials present. They probably were also intended to undermine confidence in the Seoul Government, create the maximum in confusion and to tie down ROK troops by raising the spectre of a major threat to internal security. There is also the possibility that this raid signals an early opening of the yearly campaign of infiltration, DMZ incidents and harassment. Normally these incidents begin in early spring and taper off with the onset of inclement weather and sparse foliage. In 1967, however, they peaked in summer, dropped off abruptly and remained at a low level, with the exception of the derailling of two trains in September, until the recent raid.

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24 January 1968

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

January 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 92-346

By cf, NARA Date 5-4-97

SUBJECT: Pueblo Incident

Evidence That the North Koreans Planned it Beforehand

Apparently two North Korean trawlers circled the Pueblo the day before the incident.

[redacted]

1.5(c,d)

[redacted]

In the NSC meeting Secretary McNamara mentioned that we do not know exactly where the Pueblo was sailing in the hours before the incident. Therefore we must bear in mind the possibility that it was the Pueblo's previous operations that triggered the alert.

[redacted]

1.5(c,d)

One might also speculate that a well-planned and Soviet-coordinated operation would not have had the considerable period of circling and harassment prior to the kill -- as this did open up at least the theoretical possibility of effective U.S. counter action by air.

In short, so far as coordinated planning which involved the Soviets is concerned the evidence is not very conclusive. So far as I can tell, we do not have evidence of such extensive, long-term advance planning as to conclude that the Soviets must have been cut in. (The statement in the CIB this morning that "The seizure of the Pueblo was well planned" was edited out after ONE strongly objected -- and then printed in error.)

Direct Evidence of Soviet Knowledge

So far as I can tell, speculation that the Soviets knew of the incident beforehand is inferential and not direct.

The Soviet reply to Ambassador Thompson was fairly predictable, and I frankly do not think it would have been too difficult to clear out through the top Soviet leadership in the hours available. One could speculate about the wording of our commander's confession, but I doubt if this is conclusive without clearer supported evidence than we now have.

1.5(c,d)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

1.5(c)(d)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Soviet, as distinguished from North Korean, press reaction has so far been sparse and cautious -- only brief reports on the international service.

Previous Intelligence Information

1.5(c,d)

There is the [redacted] report mentioned in the NSC meeting today. According to this report the Soviets were trying to get the North Koreans to open a second front. It should be added, however, that [redacted] did not give credence to the report and were trying to check it out further. So far as I know, they have not yet been able to.

1.5(c,d)

[redacted] have also indicated that the North Koreans might be engaged in harrassment with Soviet encouragement. There is also an FBI report along the foregoing general lines. [redacted] the Soviets were putting strong pressure on North Korea to make diversionary attacks on South Korea in order to lessen the pressure on North Vietnam.

The other report mentioned in the NSC meeting today indicated that the North Koreans, without Soviet knowledge, had given ten planes and pilots to the North Vietnamese in response to Chinese demands. Reportedly they were also mounting diversionary incidents along the border in order to discourage South Korean troop commitments to Vietnam. This last report is highly plausible. It is also highly plausible that the Soviets, also, have encouraged border incidents and harrassment of the South Koreans.

The Soviet-Korean Relationship

Everybody agrees that the North Koreans have moved away from the Chinese and toward the Soviets. I think observers tend to believe that they are in a somewhat intermediate position at present and not -- like the Mongolians -- in a dependent and fully coordinated stance. As Mr. Helms pointed out at the NSC meeting, Soviet aid undoubtedly has and does make a difference. Nevertheless, I believe the North Koreans have not yet accepted the invitation to the Budapest Conference and are maintaining considerable independence of action.

Added Thoughts

It is worth remembering that the Soviets are in a treaty relationship with North Korea. Apparently they are technically obligated to come to North Korea's defense only in an actually-recognized state of war, and even then are not obligated to do more than assist. Nevertheless, the treaty somewhat sharpens the pressures on Moscow's credibility and fidelity to its socialist ally.

1.5(c,d)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

1.5(c,d)

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The Soviets cannot have forgotten President Johnson's response to the Tonkin attacks. They surely have a healthy regard for the hazards they run in an unprovoked attack.

When all is said and done, it remains very possible that the Soviets premeditated and connived at the Pueblo incident. I set down the foregoing principally to urge some caution in our conclusions as the evidence comes in.

ND
Nathaniel Davis

1.5(c,d)

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Note - 67
68a 378
1-22-68
2-24-BKS
January 24, 1968

1502

DECLASSIFIED

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes ^{HLS} By ju, NARA, Date 8-7-92

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-152 30

Subject: Soviet Policy Toward North Korea and the Pueblo Incident

The USSR appears to have been caught unawares by the Pueblo incident. Despite several reports in recent months that the USSR has been urging Pyongyang to take a more hostile stance against the US, there is no indication that Moscow instigated the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo or that Moscow even knew in advance that the incident would take place. Moscow's initial response-- to refuse to convey a US message to Pyongyang--and its sparse propaganda treatment suggest that the USSR wants to avoid all direct involvement in the present differences between the US and North Korea. At present it is uncertain whether Moscow has offered any advice to North Korea. The USSR probably would caution the DPRK only if full-scale US-North Korean war seemed imminent.

The Background: Reports of Soviet Instigation. While there have been several reports in the past several months alleging that Moscow has been urging Pyongyang to increase military pressure on the US, we doubt that Pyongyang was encouraged to provoke a serious incident such as this. A bloc source reported in September that his government was checking an unsubstantiated report that the USSR desired a "second front" in Asia and that it wanted North Korea to

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intensify incidents along the Demilitarized Zone in order to bring about a war in Korea. Another foreign source stated in December that the USSR had asked the DPRK to make diversionary attacks on South Korea to ease pressure on North Vietnam. Soviet diplomats on two separate occasions warned of the possibility of North Korean attacks on South Korea. Finally, an FBI source reported speculation by an unnamed source that a large-scale incident, "provoked by the North Koreans at the instigation of the Soviets," would take place in early 1968.

Probable Soviet Attitude. It appears highly unlikely that the USSR encouraged Pyongyang to provoke a full-scale war in Korea. Moscow may possibly have informally advised Pyongyang that it did not object to diversionary harassment of US and ROK forces, but in conveying such a message almost certainly warned against provoking the US and the ROK into a major reprisal. At some point during discussions in the past on DMZ incidents the Soviets probably made it clear to Pyongyang that they cannot be expected to intervene directly against the US if full hostilities are resumed as a result of North Korean actions. In the present instance, Moscow would be even more concerned about the North Korean action in view of extensive Soviet use of similar intelligence gathering ships.

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-3-

Soviet Obligations to North Korea. The USSR and the DPRK concluded on July 6, 1961, a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Article 1 of this Treaty states that if either party suffers an armed attack "and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." Under this wording, Moscow would have to assist the DPRK only in the event of war, and then could, under a strict interpretation of the Treaty, limit its support to the provision of military aid and advice.

The Treaty and the Pueblo Incident. Moscow probably regarded the seizure of the Pueblo as a dangerous provocation of the US. Thus far the USSR has taken a cautious public stance. There have only been two references to the incident, both on TASS International Service: a summary of the North Korean statement concerning the seizure of the ship and a short summary of "warlike appeals" in the US. Privately, the USSR has informed the US that it does not know what happened and considers it "inappropriate" to become involved. Soviet reaction thus far suggests a quick decision to take a position endorsing North Korean claims while avoiding a public commitment to support future North Korean steps. At the same time, the USSR has determined that it cannot take any actions which could be regarded in Pyongyang as pressure.

Advice to Pyongyang? In summarizing the official North Korean account of the Pueblo affair, TASS did not repeat the warning that the "Korean People's Army...will...wipe out the aggressors at one blow at any time." At

this stage of the crisis at least the Soviets appear to hope to avoid direct involvement and also to hope that the North Koreans themselves will not take steps which could intensify the crisis and raise the danger of a strong US reaction. It is less certain what--if any--advice the USSR has offered the DPRK. Moscow may feel at least some embarrassment that its support for North Vietnam has not saved that country from daily bombardment by the US. It certainly would prefer not to deal with another situation in which a socialist state, in this case having treaty ties with the USSR, came under US attack. While Moscow could probably avoid direct involvement under most circumstances, it recognizes that this probability could rapidly shrink in the event of total DPRK intransigence.

Countervailing Pressures on Moscow. At the same time, there are certain countervailing pressures on the Soviets. Moscow probably recognizes that any advice would be regarded by Pyongyang in its present highly militant state of mind as unwarranted interference; on the eve of the Budapest consultative meeting of communist parties Moscow might want to avoid alienating other parties by not appearing militant or sufficiently loyal to its allies. If, however, the situation appeared to Moscow to be on the verge of a full-scale US-North Korean war, the Soviets would probably advise caution. Such advice might, however, simply take the form of indicating to Pyongyang that in the event of a full-scale war Soviet support will be limited to the political and aid spheres. Finally, it should be noted that if they did

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render such advice, the Soviets would merely be repeating earlier warnings; if such considerations were disregarded by Pyongyang when it decided to seize the Pueblo, their effect at present might be very limited.

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DATE: JUL 23 2000~~

SECRET SPECAT LIMDIS UK 50245 CJ
SPECAT LIMDIS FOR ADMIRAL SHARP AND GEN WHEELER
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN POSTURE (U)

1. (S) THIS IS AN ATTEMPT BY ME TO DRAW SOME CONCLUSIONS REGARDING NORTH KOREAN POSTURE FROM EVENTS OF LAST FEW DAYS.
2. (S) FIRST CONCLUSION IS THAT THESE EVENTS, THE STRIDENT OUTpourings OF PROPAGANDA FROM PYONGANG ECHOED FROM MOSCOW, AND NORTH KOREAN STATEMENTS AT TODAY'S ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING ALL TEND TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS REPORTS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS THAT NORTH KOREANS INTEND TO WAGE IN EARNEST AN ADVANCED VERSION OF "PROUDS WARFARE" COMBINING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, CONTINUOUSLY REITERATED PROPAGANDA THEMES, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE. THE PATTERN SEEMS CLEARLY TO INDICATE THAT KIM II SUNG IS A DETERMINED PRACTITIONER OF THE CONCEPTS ADVANCED BY CHE GUEVARA IN HIS ARTICLE ON "MANY VIETNAMS" PUBLISHED 12 AUGUST 1967 IN THE TRICONTINENTAL, A PUBLICATION OF THE HAVANA-BASED "AFRO-ASIA-LATIN AMERICAN UPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION." THERE ARE ALSO ADDITIONAL EVIDENCES THAT HE STILL SUFFERS FROM BELIEF THAT U.S. MILITARY EFFORT SO EXTENDED IN SUPPORT OF VIETNAM THAT U.S. UNABLE ADEQUATELY ASSIST ROKS, EXCEPT PERHAPS BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH HE SEEMS TO BELIEVE WOULD NOT BE USED IN CURRENT CONTEXT OF DISSIDENCE AND ANTI-WAR FEELING IN U.S.
3. (S) THE BLUE HOUSE RAID ON NIGHT OF 20-21 JANUARY CONFIRMED IN ACCURATE DETAIL THE PREVIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTED FROM HERE THAT NORTH KOREANS HAD TRAINED AND DEVELOPED "30 MAN SUICIDE TEAMS." INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE ONE AGENT CAPTURED INDICATES 2400 MEN IN SPECIAL UNITS HAD BEEN UNDER ARDUOUS TRAINING FOR TWO YEARS AND

ACT: J5-2 J-3
INFO: CJCS-6 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-8 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-5
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PAGE 1 OF 3

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Authority NND 9411304
By NARA Date 7/14/00

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MESSAGE CENTER

THAT LATEC RAIDS MAY BE UNDERTAKEN BY TEAMS OF COMPANY SIZE. CREDIBILITY THIS SOLE CAPTIVE NOT CORROBORATED FROM OTHER SOURCES ESTABLISHED BUT HE HAS PROVIDED MUCH INFORMATION AND RETRACED ON THE GROUND THE INFILTRATION ROUTE OF HIS TEAM WITH CONFIRMATORY EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

4. (S) CURRENT PROPAGANDA BLASTS ADHERE STRICTLY TO SAME BASIC THEMES REPORTED FROM HERE OVER PAST YEAR. ESSENTIALLY THE TWO THEMES ARE: (A) U.S. IMPERIALISTS WITH PARK CHUNG HEE PUPPETS ARE AGGRESSORS TRYING TO PROVOKE NEW KOREAN WAR AND (B) SUBVERSIVE AND GUERRILLA RAIDS SOUTH OF DMZ ARE MANIFESTATIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH KOREAN PATRIOTS AND NOT CONDUCTED BY NORTH KOREANS.

5. (S) CONTINUING EVIDENCE DROP IN BOTH NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS THAT KIM IL SUNG MAY BE SUFFERING FROM SERIOUS MISCALCULATION AS TO US CAPACITY TO REACT IN KOREA AT SAME TIME WAR CONTINUES IN VIET NAM. THIS CONTAINS SEEDS OF REAL DANGER IF CREDIBILITY OF US DETERMINATION AGAINST OVERT ACTION REMAINS IN DOUBT.

6. (S) OUR ESTIMATE OF NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR "POROUS WAR" TACTICS IS UNDERGOING CONTINUING REEVALUATION AND WE ATTRIBUTE EVEN HIGHER CAPABILITIES NOW THAN PREVIOUSLY GIVEN THEM. I AM CONSIDERING AT THE MOMENT EMPLOYING ANOTHER BATTALION PLUS FROM THE 7TH US DIVISION TO REINFORCE LOCAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF NIKE/HERC SITES AND SPECIAL WEAPONS STORAGE AREAS. THERE HAVE BEEN TODAY NUMEROUS FIRE FIGHTS AND SIGHTINGS OF SMALLER AGENT GROUPS IN I CORP AREA NORTH OF SEOUL, PROBABLY REMNANTS OF THE ORIGINAL BLUE HOUSE RAIDING TEAM. A NUMBER OF CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY BOTH SIDES. WE ANTICIPATE INCREASING TEAM

PK 4 UNKJ688 SECRET LIMDIS SPECAT INFILTRATIONS IN NEAR FUTURE TO INCLUDE AGENT BOAT LANDINGS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN MY DISCUSSION WITH ROK MCD THIS MORNING I FOUND HIM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT WHAT HE CALLED HIS "UNDER ESTIMATION" OF NUMBERS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF WELL TRAINED NORTH KOREAN TEAMS. HE WISHES TO PRESENT TO UNC/USFK IN NEAR FUTURE PLAN FOR ROTATING MOBILIZATIONS WITHIN REAR AREA SECURITY DIVISIONS TO PROVIDE 16,000 MEN FOR COAST WATCHING AND ASSOCIATED COUNTER-LANDING OPERATIONS.

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WILL REPORT LATER ON
THIS WHEN CONCEPT CLEARER.

7. (S) IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVED NORTH KOREAN PATTERN OF OPERATIONS IS PROCEEDING ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY PREDICTED IN NUMEROUS MESSAGES FROM HERE AND AS BRIEFED IN WASHINGTON AT ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE, USIB, ETC. MY CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS THAT WHILE SOME OF OUR PREDICTIONS HAVE SEEMED "FAR OUT" THE NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS HAVE EXCEEDED THEM AND AT HIGHER TEMPO.

8 (S) THE ORIGINAL NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVES OF: (A) DIVERTING EFFORTS FROM VIETNAM B) HARASSING ROK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND (C) THE UNDERLYING THEME REGULARLY STATED BY KIM IL SUNG OF ENCOURAGING SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND ACHIEVING UNIFICATION-- ON COMMUNIST TERMS-- BEFORE MR IN EARLY 70'S SEEM TO BE MAKING HEADWAY, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST TWO OBJECTIVES.

9. (S) IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, I RECOMMEND EXPEDITIOUS DECISION REGARDING SOME AUGMENTATION U.S. EIGHTH ARMY, PARTICULARLY FOR LOCAL SECURITY REINFORCEMENTS. WE ARE ALSO REVIEWING SEA INFILTRATION THREAT AND MAY SOON RECOMMEND THAT TO EXTENT FEASIBLE ROK NAVY AND AIR FORCE RESOURCES INVOLVED BE FURTHER SUPPORTED BY ADDITIONAL U.S. NAVY SEA SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS AND POSSIBLY ASSISTANCE OF TWO U.S. DESTROYERS

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Authority: NND 941304
By: WARA Date: 7/14/02

MEMORANDUM
 OF
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 ON
 THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS ACTS OF BARBARITY AGAINST
 THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON JANUARY 21, 1968

24 JANUARY 1968

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Handwritten signatures and initials:
 XH LIN [Signature] [Signature]

Handwritten notes:
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~~29151~~
 68. 1. 20

The hideous character of the north Korean Communists has long been known to the world ever since their unprovoked armed aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950. Recently, especially for the past two years, these same Communists in the northern part of Korea have become more bellicose and are sharply intensifying various acts of violence against the Republic of Korea as described in the Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/6712).

All these seem to indicate ominous signs of preparation and probing on the part of the north Korean Communists for renewed aggression.

The latest and most serious violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 and aggressive act against the Republic of Korea took place on January 21, 1968. At about 10 o'clock that evening, 31 armed Communist infiltrators from the northern part of Korea reached the capital city of Seoul with the mission of assaulting the Presidential Residence. When checked by the national police at a distance of about one thousand yards from the Presidential Residence, the Communist infiltrators opened fire and threw hand grenades at the passing civilian

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buses, killing one police officer and five civilians.

The security forces of the Republic of Korea killed five infiltrators and captured one at the first encounter that evening.

The captured infiltrator told the press who interviewed him soon after his capture that his group left north Korea on January 16, crossed the Military Demarcation Line at 6 p.m., January 17, and reached the outskirts of Seoul on January 19. Each of them was heavily armed with a sub-machine gun, a pistol, hand grenades and an anti-tank mine, all of which were Russian made.

This most barbaric act of the north Korean Communists was followed by their piratic seizure of the United States naval vessel "Pueblo" on January 23 on the high seas off the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula.

These incidents are but a most serious manifestation of the aggressive designs of the north Korean Communists, and as such, pose a very grave threat to the peace and security of the Far East.

Fearful of the continued success and growth of the Republic of Korea in political, economic and other fields, and impatient with their own failure to solve their serious internal troubles, the Communists in the north are in desperation to disrupt the peace and stability

of the Republic of Korea and the Far East through aggression and subversion.

Such aggressive and extremely dangerous acts of the north Korean Communists therefore should not be condoned. They should be condemned by the entire body of peace-loving nations. They should receive proper attention of the United Nations, the world organization concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. In a real sense, they pose a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations and its political and military arms present in Korea.

In this connection, it is to be emphatically assured that all acts of Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea will be effectively countered.

The Communist aggressors should realize that any attempt to commit aggression will only serve to strengthen the unity, vigilance and resolve of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea in the defense of their peace and freedom.

The Republic of Korea, together with its allies, will continue to maintain a high degree of capability to effectively counter any and all forms of Communist aggression in that part of the world. The will of all freedom-loving peoples, the conscience of all peace-loving

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nations, and the authority of the United Nations are
with the cause of the Republic of Korea.

The world will not condone aggression, and the
Republic of Korea will resolutely condemn and check
any north Korean Communist act that might threaten peace,
freedom and lives of the Korean people.

(101/100000)

下記 Note-verbale 1968. 1. 25 14:40 平島
美國大使館 Emerson 呈報致駐日大使館

3/5

OMI-55

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to invite the latter's attention to the most serious breach of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 and the most flagrant acts of armed provocation which were recently perpetrated by the north Korean Communist regime.

A group of thirty-one north Korean "officers" of the so-called People's Army of the north Korean puppet regime, the largest single group that ever infiltrated deep into the southern part of Korea since the Armistice of 1953, attacked the Republic of Korea's policemen on duty and civilians in the street of Seoul in an attempt to assault the residence of the President of the Republic. Although they were repelled towards north without succeeding to reach their target, there were casualties of several policemen and civilians in these clashes, some of whom being

brutally shot to death by the attacking communists.

Two days later the world was again caught by surprise of the news of seizure of USS "Pueblo" by the north Korean Naval and Air Force elements on the high seas off Wonsan, north Korea.

A sharp increase in volume and intensity of the north Korean communists' armed attacks and provocative activities have long alarmed the free world in the periods preceding the recent renewed provocations. It is conclusively proved that "central authorities" of Pyungyang have now deliberately organized schemes for launching large scale acts of provocations and subversions, changing their tactics of maneuvering limited actions for more violent and destructive armed operations in the rear area and the centre of the Republic of Korea.

Their militant actions thus reveal that their immediate intent appears to subvert the Republic of Korea by means of violence and also to disturb the status quo of the present Armistice Agreement, thus creating a new crisis in this peninsular.

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It is further evidently clear that the north Korean communists' slogan of so-called peaceful reunification of Korea is nothing but a deceptive and fraudulent propaganda. Their real objective has never changed; it is no other than an eventual communization of the whole Korean peninsula by force.

By these communist acts of ferocity, the nature of the north Korean puppet regime, i.e. bellicosity, aggressiveness and barbarism have further been disclosed. In this alarming situation, the two governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States must reapprehend the cold realities and the vicious enemy they are faced with at present.

Needless to say, the governments are urged to take measures to further strengthen the defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea's forces and to augment their united efforts to deter with resolute response this new and dangerous military venture against peace in this peninsula.

At this juncture, it is considered particularly

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necessary that the authorities concerned of the two governments take measures to insure closer and more efficient coordination and cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States forces in Korea in anti-infiltration operations, and also that sufficient supply of anti-infiltration equipments be expedited for the Republic of Korea military and police forces to improve their capabilities in such operations.

It is also noted that the north Korean communists, by their recent vilification and international crime, have presented themselves ^(again) as a force of the most serious menace to the peace and security of all the peace-loving free nations, openly challenging and flouting the authorities of the United Nations. It is also necessary that the two governments should cooperate to the fullest extent in condemning the north Korean puppet regime as such before the international society.

By this, the two governments shall aim at letting the bericose north Korean communist regime realize the

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consolidated strength and will for peace of the nations
of the free world just as it had been determinedly
demonstrated during those critical days of the communist
armed aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950-53.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to
renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest con-
sideration.

Seoul, January 24, 1968

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ACTION: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~SECRET~~ AmEmbassy MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

STATE 104325

NODIS

Ref: MOSCOW 2566

To: Gromyko

Please deliver soonest/following message from President

Johnson to ~~Chair~~ Chairman Kosygin:

BEGIN QUOTE: January 25, 1968

Dear Mr. Chairman: On previous occasions you and I have discussed with each other the duty of all-great powers to exercise their maximum effort to maintain the peace. On this basis I am urging your most serious personal attention to the irrational action of North Korean authorities in seizing the USS Pueblo in international waters in the Sea of Japan. This calculated action by North Korea is almost literally without precedent in modern times and cannot be accepted. It was engaged in no hostile action, it was clearly in international waters and was seized under circumstances which we find literally intolerable. You yourself have similar ships in various parts of the world, including at least one now present in the Sea

Drafted by: *SHR*
Text rec'd from White House

Tel. No. 5381

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *SHR*
S/S - Mr. Read

Clearence:

SHR
The Secretary

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E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4
NY 93-458

By: *CB*, NARA, Date 5-22-75

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of Japan, and could not accept ~~the~~ action of the sort perpetrated by the North Koreans.

I ~~am~~ was disappointed that Mr. Kuznetsov, in a conversation with Ambassador Thompson, seemed to brush the matter aside as something which does not involve Soviet responsibility. This does not reflect the true responsibilities of our two governments for the reduction of tensions and for the prevention of conflict. This act of provocation by North Korea has created a deep sense of ~~our~~ outrage among the American people.

I do not know what North Korea has in mind in this situation. But, recalling our conversations at Glassboro, I am sure that we must argue that our common interests in preserving world peace would not be served by increased tensions in this area of the world.

I am taking the liberty of addressing this frank message to you in the hope that you will use whatever influence you have in Pyongyang and press them to release immediately the USS Pueblo and its officers and men. I hope you will find it possible to be responsive to our concern. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson END QUOTE

END

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 577

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03635 251058Z

TO
ACTION EA 15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-5-97

INFO IO 13, GDP 01, CIAE 03, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSD 00, USIE 00,
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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0809
CINCPAC POLAD
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0238

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 3635

REF: SEOUL 3599

1. DURING EVENING JAN 24 AND EARLY MORNING HOURS
TODAY SEARCH OPERATIONS FOR NK INFILTRATORS RESULTED
IN SEVERAL FIREFIGHTS, MOST OF WHICH IN AREAS NOT FAR
SOUTH OF DMZ WHERE AGENTS PRESUMABLY WORKING WAY
NORTH IN ATTEMPT TO EXFILTRATE. SINCE REFTL FOUR
MORE AGENTS KILLED, BRINGING TOTAL NK CASUALTIES
SINCE SEOUL ATTACK TO NINETEEN KIA AND ONE CAPTURED.
CASUALTIES AMONG US FORCES, WHICH INVOLVED IN MUCH

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3635E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
OF MOST RECENT ACTION, NOW TOTAL ONE KILLED (SEOUL 3625)
AND TWELVE WOUNDED. ROK CASUALTIES (INCLUDING
CIVILIANS AND POLICE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED) NOW TOTAL
SEVENTEEN KILLED, TWENTY-SEVEN WOUNDED. ONE FIREFIGHT
EARLY THIS MORNING (BS996980) ACCOUNTED FOR

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EIGHT US WOUNDED, TWO ROKA KILLED AND ONE WOUNDED.

2. SOME ACTIVITY DURING NIGHT JAN 24-25 ALSO REPORTED ALONG DMZ. US-MANNED GUARD TOWER (CT089029) WAS ATTACKED BY ESTIMATED 8-10 NK WITH SMALL ARMS AND GRENADES APPARENTLY FROM NORTH OF BARRIER. DAWN SWEEP OF BARRIER REVEALED FENCE NOT FAR FROM SITE BREACHED WITH THREE-FOOT HOLE. FOOTPRINTS AND BLOOD TRAIL AT POINT OF BREACH INDICATE ONE OR TWO AGENTS MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED INFILTRATING WITH FIREFIGHT DESIGNED AS DIVERSION.

3. ON POLITICAL SIDE, PRESIDENT PAK CALLED EMERGENCY MEETING OF CABINET AND DRP LEADERSHIP

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3635E ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AND URGED THEM TO "PREPARE MEASURES TO COUNTER AND ROOT OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL SUCH ATROCIOUS ACTIVITIES" AS SEOUL INFILTRATION. PRIMIN TOLD AMBASSADOR PAK HAD STRONGLY ADMONISHED CABINET AND DRP TO QUIT POLITICAL SQUABBLING OVER PLACING BLAME AND START PULLING TOGETHER IN TIME OF CRISIS.

4. FOLLOWING ON HEELS OF SEOUL ATTACK, SENSATIONAL NEWS RE PUEBLO SEEMS TO HAVE FURTHER ALARMED PUBLIC'S CONCERN RE INTENTIONS OF NK AND SECURITY OUTLOOK IN ROK. IN THIS CONTEXT, SOUTH KOREANS FOLLOWING EVENTS CLOSELY AND MANY SEEM TO HOPE RECENT PROVOCATIONS WILL INDUCE US TO STRENGTHEN SUPPORT OF ROK DEFENSE. MEANWHILE ROKG SEEMS BENT ON RALLYING PUBLIC SUPPORT BY CONTINUING TO DRAMATIZE GRAVITY OF THREAT. POLICE CHIEF KILLED IN SEOUL ATTACK GIVEN IMPRESSIVE FUNERAL TODAY, WITH LARGE NUMBER OF NOTABLES HEADED BY PRIMIN ATTENDING. CURFEW STILL IN FORCE AND POLICE TROOPS STILL CIRCULATING IN

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03635 251058Z

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3635E C O N F I D E N T I A L
CITY URGING CITIZENS TO COOPERATE IN ROUNDING
UP AGENTS. IN SUM, ATMOSPHERE IS ONE OF GENUINE
CONCERN AND TENSION BUT NO RPT NO SIGNS OF
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Record of Meeting on January 25, 1968

At 10:00 AM on January 25, 1968, a meeting was held in connection with the United States response to the "Pueblo" capture. In attendance were:

Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Installations and Logistics,
International Security Affairs, Public Affairs, and Systems
Analysis (Acting)
Acting General Counsel

SecDef cautioned that in view of the delicacy of our diplomatic efforts, and the importance of avoiding any implication that our actions might constitute an ultimatum or threat to use excessive military force, no word of the discussion in the meeting should go beyond the room.

Our primary objective is to get the men of the Pueblo back. Return of the ship is a secondary objective. Excessive military pressure would tend to decrease the chance of getting the men back.

We are adopting several courses of action:

- 1) Work through the UN. This is not firm yet. The main objective would be to gain time for the Soviets and North Koreans to decide what they want to do. We would hope to get a resolution in our favor passed by the Security Council. Pakistan seems to hold the key vote. The question is whether they would favor us on the basis that they fought in Korea, or whether they would oppose us on the basis of their current relations with the Chinese communists.
- 2) Work through the Soviets. Kuznetsov had told Amb. Thompson that they "couldn't do anything", but following that, the Soviets agreed to pass our request on to the North Koreans. The President plans to send a fairly stiff note ~~to~~ Kosygin asking for return of the men.
THROUGH
- 3) A limited reserve call-up. (Announced at about 11:30 this morning.)
- 4) Military reinforcement of Korea/Japan. No overt action of this kind is to be taken yet. But we will prepare for such movements now.
- 5) Possibly take actions to secure Congressional support. (Discussed below.)

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ACTION ITEM The Navy and Air Force will inform unit commanders of designated units that they may be ordered to move. They should do what they can to eat up the leadtime required. We are willing to take the risk that word of these actions may leak to the public. The Navy will start moving Kitty Hawk toward the area (she is now roughly 3 days away). She is coming off the line anyway, and it may be possible to shift her liberty port from Hong Kong to Sasebo.

ACTION ITEM By the end of the day, the Service Secretaries will furnish data on the closure time of all units.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Morris to work with J-4 to assure adequate stocks of bombs for US forces. The likely course of action is to divert stocks now en route to SEA. Approximately 10,000 tons are being diverted now, but a rise to 15,000 tons is acceptable if necessary to get the right mix of weapons. Mr. Morris will also work to see that the diversion from SEA are replaced.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Warnke will act as the Department's "lawyer" in defense of the "Phoenix" incident -- why it was there, why no cover, whether we reacted properly, which side was in the right, etc, etc.

Regarding Congressional support, SecDef suggested that two general courses were possible:

- 1) A resolution along the lines of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
- 2) Some particular action(s) of the Congress that would demonstrate support.

There were the following suggestions for actions under the second alternative:

- 1) Extend terms of service.
- 2) Call individuals rather than just units. (Resor)
- 3) A special MAP appropriation for South Korea.
- 4) A \$1 - 2 billion budget supplement.
- 5) Declare an emergency (Warnke)
- 6) Have the President enumerate his existing emergency powers (CRAF, requisitioning of ships, establishment of priorities under the Defense Production Act, etc.) and request Congressional validation.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Morris to cover existing authority and possible request for new authority to deal with strikes.

SecDef wants a careful and detailed review of the readiness of every unit, active and reserve, which is not assigned to SEA, Korea, or Europe.

ACTION ITEM The Service Secretaries and Chiefs will carefully examine and up-date the existing readiness tables. They will particularly look at the units now engaged in replacement training with an eye to seeing what could be done if we lightened the training load by changing current rotation policies in SEA. The tables will also be enlarged to cover units not now included (such as airlift and reconnaissance aircraft).

ACTION ITEM Mr. Ignatius will consider whether Oriskany should be held

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where she is instead of returning to the CONUS. He will also check on a large block of Marines now due for release.

ACTION ITEM The Service Secretaries will inform SecDef of any limitations in materiel in the reserve forces. (Obsolete equipment, etc.)

ACTION ITEM The JCS will continue to work on plans for the recovery of gear jettisoned from Pueblo. They will work a mining plan for Wonsan. They will work on drone flights over the area. They will consider using reconnaissance flights to document any North Korean attempts to recover the gear in international waters.

Existing plan for reconnaissance flights were discussed. Banner is to replace Pueblo in 57 hours. State has withheld (for 3 days) concurrence on a plan to maintain COMINT aircraft on station below the DMZ.

CJCS reported on the following:

The Air Force will identify 3 ANG squadrons to replace Enterprise. These will consist of 2-25 UE F-100 squadrons, and one 18 UE RF-101 squadron.

He is considering the movement of 12 EB-66s and 6 F-105 Wild Weasel aircraft to the area.

(Adm. Moorer estimated that he could maintain 2 CVAs off Korea for about 6 weeks without affecting SEA operations.)

There will be a plan for protecting Banner.

There are about 4100 tons of aircraft ordnance in Korea now, with about 10,000 more on the way. We need Shrike, Bullpup, Walleye, Falcon, Sparrow, and Sidewinder missiles.

The Air Force has been asked to check on the availability of ECM pods.

The Chiefs recommend establishment of a submarine surveillance and attack capability with 9 submarines. This could be done completely covertly, and within a week.

The drone flights have been laid on.

The Chiefs recommend moving 15 B-52s to Okinawa, 11 to Guam (for a Pacific total of 105 instead of 79), plus 11 tankers in support. SecDef said that that would have to be checked with the President before executing.

The Army in Korea is currently at 79% of TO&E. The Chiefs feel this should be brought to 90%. The Army can start sending about 2000 men per week starting in about 10 days. They estimate a total of 8500 required to move from 79% to 90%. SecDef felt that the 8500 figure sounded high, and it is being checked.

The Chiefs are considering moving 2 Hawk units from Fort Bliss to

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Korea. They are checking with Gen. Bonesteel and Adm. Sharp. SecDef cautioned again on getting his approval before actually moving Hawks.

The Chiefs are also considering the need for additional naval gunfire support (cruisers/destroyers) off Korea.

ACTION ITEM The SecDef asked the Chiefs to consider changing the land-based/sea-based tactical air mix in SEA, with the idea of moving some of the CVAs now on Yankee Station up to Korea, and replacing them in SEA with land-based air. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, estimates that current bases in Korea can hold about 352 aircraft (tactical plus airlift).

ACTION ITEM There is to be no movement out of Southeast Asia or Europe without the written approval of Sec Def or DepSecDef.

ACTION ITEM SecAF and SecNav are to furnish data on the number of people involved in the reserve call-up.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Ignatius is to work with Mr. Goulding to prepare answers (for public release) as to why naval reserve units have been called, since the understanding is that they are training, rather than combat units.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Goulding is to prepare a "dirty question" list dealing with our actions, both taken and proposed.

ACTION ITEM The Chiefs are to check on the status of helicopters in Korea. They are also to consider where they could get more if needed. SecDef suggested that they might be available from the training base if current SEA rotation policies, were changed, terms of service involuntarily extended, etc. SecDef encouraged general thinking about "new ground rules" of that kind in dealing with all our new issues.

ACTION ITEM Mr. Morris is to examine, with the Chiefs, the problem of ordnance and ammunition, as well as combat consumables, for the ROKs. He is also to examine our capability for expanding ordnance production.

CSAF advised that our first military action, should ^{we} become involved, should be to take out the North Korean air capability.

ACTION ITEM CJCS will inform CINCPAC of probable movements and actions in which we might become involved. He will also be cautioned to keep this out of the public press.

The CMC noted that since most of their pilots were reserve officers, the emergency powers should include extensions of obligations, as well as involuntary extension of terms of service (which apply to active forces).

Russell Murray

Russell Murray 2nd
Acting ASD(SA)

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ACTION EA 15

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SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, IO 13, P 04, INR 07, EUR 15,
ACDA 16, MM 01, RSR 01, /114 W

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FM ANEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8550

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 3633

SUBJECT: PUBLIC REACTION TO PUEBLO SEIZURE

REF: SEOUL 3596

1. DRP ASSEMBLY CAUCUS WAS BRIEFED JAN 25 BY MND AND MINISTER HOME AFFAIRS ON NK ARMED AGENT ACTIVITIES AND CAPTURE OF PUEBLO. CAUCUS PASSED RESOLUTION URGING GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTION PUNISHING NK PUPPET GROUP BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS, POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY; URGING US TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES INCLUDING MILITARY

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3633E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ACTION TO PUNISH NK IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRIDE AND MORALE OF ALL FREE NATIONS. RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED ON USG TO FULTILL COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHEN AND MODERNIZE ROK FORCES AND TO SUPPORT ANTI-SPY OPERATIONS. URGED UNITY OF BOTH RULING PARTY AND OPPOSITION.

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2. BELLICOSE MOOD DOMINATES HEADLINES, NEWS SECTIONS AND EDITORIAL PAGES OF KOREAN PAPERS JAN 25 AS PUEBLO SEIZURE REMAINS MAJOR INTEREST FOR SECOND DAY. HEADLINES DRAMATIZE DESPATCH OF ENTERPRISE, CONVENING OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECSTATE DECLARATION THAT STRONG MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN.

3. ALL PAPERS REPORT WITH AIR OF EXPECTATION THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL MAKE IMPORTANT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON FAR EAST TODAY (THURSDAY LOCAL TIME). SECSTATE CHARACTERIZATION OF SEIZURE AS ACT OF WAR AND STORIES THAT "MILITARY RETALIATION" DISCUSSED

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3633E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO WIDELY REPORTED, PRESS STORIES ON ENTERPRISE REPORT SHIP "OFF WONSAN BAY."

4. EDITORIALS HAVE BEGUN TO DESCRIBE KOREA AS "SECOND FRONT." THEY LINK PUEBLO SEIZURE AND NK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AS DELIBERATE PART OF NK PLAN TO STEP UP AGGRESSION AGAINST ROK, TEST WILL OF US TO MAINTAIN COMMITMENT TO KOREA IN MANNER COMPARABLE TO TONKIN GULF ATTACK ON US DESTROYERS, AND HELP REDUCE PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM BY DISPERSING US MILITARY STRENGTH.

5. EDITORS SKEPTICAL THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL EFFECT RELEASE OF SHIP OR CREW. APPLAUD VIGOROUS RESPONSE BY USG BUT BELIEVE ONLY MILITARY ACTION - NO SPECIFIC COURSE SUGGESTED - WILL PREVENT FURTHER AGGRAVATION OF SITUATION. EXEMPT, PORTER

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20a

NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S THURSDAY NIGHT
MEETING ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

JANUARY 25, 1968

ATTENDING WERE THE FOLLOWING:

- The President
- Secretary McNamara
- General Wheeler
- CIA Director Helms
- Under Secretary Katzenbach
- Secretary Nitze
- Clark Clifford
- Walt Rostow
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson

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The President: What recommendations do you have?

General Wheeler: We are looking at four or five military possibilities:

1. The placement of mines in the Wonsan Harbor. This would require substantial air action to handle the situation properly and require neutralization of air fields in the area. We would have to destroy the Wonsan military facilities. It is probable that we would require naval craft for support.
2. Mine other North Korean ports. We would select two or three important ports. The same problems requiring the need for air support would be present.
3. Interdict coastal shipping. For this we also need heavy air cover.
4. Strike any one of a list of targets in North Korea by air or by air and naval gun fire. Hopefully we will have better photographs of North Korea after a reconnaissance mission tonight.
5. Replace Pueblo with another ship protected by ample air and naval cover.

Anything else would require substantial military action.

The suggestion has been made that we seize North Korean ships. But

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 92-142

By cb, NARA Date 9-10-99

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they have no large ocean going craft. And we do not know where the four small vessels they have are located.

The President: What are we going to do with the aircraft that we plan to send to South Korea. Will they be there for purely defense purposes in case of further incidents?

General Wheeler: They would be there in the event that a decision was made to take reprisal action against North Korea in addition to their defensive value.

Secretary McNamara: If the North Koreans were to release the ship and or the crew in ten to twelve days the only thing we would have suffered would be humiliation. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the U.S.S. Banner, we will need air support to protect it.

If we do not get the Pueblo back the President would want full air power there to take care of any massive response. In my judgment, mining would be the smallest increment of military action.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We could keep their shipping and their patrol boats in the Wonsan Harbor.

Secretary McNamara: To do that we must have air cover and naval craft.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The North Koreans have made gains right away. I believe they regard this action as a low risk effort. They have shown that they can do this. They may underestimate our difficulties elsewhere or place a high value on causing us more difficulties in this area. There is some indication this may be what they want to do. They are seeking to make life much more difficult for us.

There is no evidence (Richard Helms also confirmed this) that the North Koreans want to start another war.

They may be willing to return the crew and the ship. They may get something from the equipment aboard the ship.

But this still leaves us with the fact that they took a tug at Uncle Sam's beard and got away with it. I would put a high probability factor on their returning this ship.

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The President: Well, what do we do now?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I would prefer to see the screw turned on North Korea.

In gradual steps we would move aircraft to South Korea. It makes good sense to move in the fighter bombers for the reasons Buzz (General Wheeler) has given, and also to show the North Koreans and the United Nations the seriousness of the situation.

I would send in a squadron of aircraft tomorrow. Then send in other planes on Saturday and more on Sunday. I do have a question about the B-52's. If you send the B-52's to the area without any public knowledge there is not much punch that this gives to the diplomatic effort. If we send the B-52's to the area with public knowledge that this is connected to Korea it may be too big. This may be too much. But you do increase the potential of the United Nations doing something by sending in the fighter bombers.

The President: What is the practical effect of this?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that will get rid of the issue quicker. By moving the aircraft in gradually you will get more out of it than by doing it all at one time or by not doing it at all.

The President: The incident: Pueblo seizure, may be more than a pinprick. In my judgment this must be coordinated with what is happening in South Vietnam. (Stepped up attacks on U. S. units in Vietnam along with major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong build ups).

Secretary McNamara: I agree with that, although I have no real evidence of the connection.

I view this situation very seriously. The great danger that we must avoid is that the Soviets and the North Vietnamese will interpret something that we do as a sign of weakness. If we show weakness and are not firm, I think it will prolong the Vietnam war substantially.

Clark Clifford: I would like to view this matter differently. Let us assume for the moment that our only goal is to get the men and the ship back.

What would be the best way to achieve that end?

If we get the ship and the men back without taking substantial military action the President will get credit for restraint.

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We may have gotten a hair pulled from our beard. I would be ready to sacrifice that hair because our options are limited at this time.

We must be ready for the next try. We have very few alternatives at this point. So, again I ask what are the best ways to get the ship and the men back.

The President: I see little hope that the United Nations will yield anything productive. We do need to show that this is a very serious matter. We must show to the North Koreans and their brothers that they must avoid the confrontation. We need to show our plan in the United Nations and display some muscle to back up that plan.

Tommy Thompson (Ambassador to Moscow) said the Communist never react well to a show of force. That was not the lesson learned in the Middle East and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We must not let them misjudge our strength so that they will be encouraged to do this type of thing again. Personally I would like to find some of their ships and do the same thing to them which they have done to us.

What about some other alternatives that we have not discussed such as the South Koreans taking offensive action across the DMZ. The North Koreans have been doing a lot of infiltrating and harrassment, so why not reciprocate?

General Wheeler: The ROK are eager to go into North Korea on hit and run raids like those taken into South Korea by the North Koreans. We have exercised great restraint on the South Koreans to the point where the South Koreans will no longer tell our American General the ROK plans.

Under Secretary Nitze: Mr. President, we discussed the fact that the Pueblo threw overboard classified equipment. Another alternative is for us to send a destroyer into the area where the gear was thrown overboard. The destroyer would have divers aboard to bring the gear up. This is completely legal and it is possible that the North Koreans would take action against this vessel. If they did we would be in a good position in the eyes of world opinion to retaliate.

We do not know if they are trying to recover that gear themselves.

The President: I thought we had an intercept that showed that they are trying to recover the material with divers. Isn't that true Walt?

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Walt Rostow: That is correct. We had an intercept today which indicated they are diving in the area.

Secretary Nitze: There will be an ox cart mission tonight which should give us some additional information about that.

Walt Rostow: Our alternatives are basically two:

1. Actions to get the ship back.
2. Actions to strike back in retaliation for this ship seizure.

We should search all photographs and look for their ships. Personally I would not be opposed to seizing a Korean ship flying a Polish flag. We should strain for ways to find their ships and determine operational methods to place mines without knocking out their airfields and other facilities used for defense. Of course we must be fully prepared for what counter actions the North Koreans might be prepared to take.

The President: Would you address yourself to the question presented by Clark Clifford: What will produce the ship.

Walt Rostow: A conviction by the North Koreans that they will run into more trouble than it is worth. That will produce the ship.

They think we are strained and tied down in Vietnam.

Therefore a measured show of force is appropriate. I feel we should put in additional air power for the following reasons:

A. We need increased air power in the Republic of Korea anyway. This incident dramatizes the deficiency of the aircraft in South Korea. It was surprising that we only had four planes there and that they were "out to lunch."

B. If this effort fails and we undertake to disgorge the ship, we still need heavy air cover.

The President: The only thing you know is to put more aircraft there. Is that the answer to Clark's question? Thompson says this will make them more entrenched.

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Under Secretary Katzenbach: What I believe Ambassador Thompson had in mind was that we should not say "hand over or else." They are tough little bastards. I do not think Tommy had in mind a series of steps to make North Korea know that we are about to do something and that we mean business,

I think a measured show of force supports our diplomatic efforts.

You can tell publicly --- I do not think it has been mentioned before --- that we are giving South Korea two Destroyers. You can move in the B-52's. In my judgment all of these actions support our diplomatic efforts.

We can start by saying that no North Korean shipping will come out of two or three harbors. By blocking them off, we take reversible steps. In other words these are steps that do not require that we take additional steps.

We should not let the North Koreans think that the Security Council is the way we have planned to deal with this. They must know we are prepared to take further actions, military ones if necessary.

The President: You and Bob McNamara work out a schedule of movements for the aircraft to South Korea. What do you say in answer to Clark Clifford's question. What do we do if this is our whole objective.

Secretary McNamara: We must protect ourselves from permitting the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese and the Soviets getting the belief that we are weak. I would go back to Kosygin. I think the Soviets knew of this or if they did not they have enough influence to shape the conduct of North Korea. I would not deal in a belligerent, public way, but I would show them that it is essential to give up the ship and the men.

Director Helms: What is wrong in telling the North Koreans they must get the ship to us by a certain date or face the consequences.

The President: The simple answer to that is that we do not want a war with the Chinese and the Soviets.

General Wheeler: Here is a proposed schedule for movement of tactical air. We are talking about an order of 8 days using forces in West Pac. In the first three days you would have 28 F 104's, 14 Reconnaissance aircraft and 28 F105's,

Two days later you would have the bulk of the U. S. Strike force. This would be 28 F 105's, 18 F 100's and 17 F4D's.

After seven days you will have initial combat readiness.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: When will this become public knowledge?

General Wheeler: As soon as the units begin to move out. These things are very easily discernible from the movement of men and equipment.

The President: I do not see what is wrong with sending out the 28 fighters and the 14 reconnaissance planes now.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that is fine.

Secretary McNamara: What you want is a series of movements. I do not think we need to make a decision tonight on this. I would recommend mid-day tomorrow.

The President: I do want to space this out (the movement of aircraft into South Korea) but I want President Park to know that we are going to do this.

Secretary McNamara: We can do this easily.

Clark Clifford: Mr. President, in a discussion we had yesterday at the Department of State I presented a view. Since you were not there I would like to give it here.

I do not think our case with reference to the ship is a strong one. The North Koreans have a better case on where the ship was. They were there. We weren't.

This was a "spy ship". There is a general feeling in the world that if you catch a spy you do him in. The North Koreans can say that we invaded their waters. We do not have a clear case to support. We must not issue an ultimatum. The odds are they would tell us to go sell our papers. Like blackmail, it is no good if you publicize it. It will become public knowledge we are sending in planes. The North Koreans have indicated something more may be coming. We do want to be prepared and ready for that. I recommend that we approach the Soviets again. I recommend that we go to the United Nations. I suggest that we start a quiet build up. We should send another message to Kosygin.

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The North Koreans may conclude they have gotten as much out of this incident as they can. Frankly I can stand a minor set back to our position rather than to take action which may lead us into another war. The capture of a spy ship is not worth us going to war.

The President: Okay, let's get a spaced-out movement.

Secretary McNamara: I will get the orders prepared tonight. We can issue them tomorrow at mid-day.

The President: I ask all present to assemble again at 11:00 a.m. on Friday.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We went to the Red Cross and asked them for the release of the ship's crew and also for the return of the body of the dead sailor. I thought we should do this regardless of what other action we are taking.

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ACTION SS 25

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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EXDIS

SUBJ: USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-153
By NARA Date 3-26-93

1. I WAS CALLED IN TO SEE KUZNETSOV 11:00 A.M. TODAY. REFERRING TO OUR MEETING JAN 23, HE SAID OUR CONVERSATION HAD BEEN REPORTED TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND HE INSTRUCTED INFORM ME AS FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT. NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED REGARDING YOUR COMMUNICATION TO MFA OF USSR ON JAN 23 IN CONNECTION WITH INCIDENT INVOLVING USS PUEBLO IN AREA OF KOREAN PORT OF WONSAN. AT SAME TIME, I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT SCVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT ASSUME ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY IN CONNECTION WITH INCIDENT.

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END TEXT.

3. KUZNETSOV SAID HIS COMMUNICATION WAS ORAL STATEMENT AND SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND PUBLISH IT. ALSO, SOVIETS EXPECTED US WOULD NOT PUBLISH IT EITHER. THIS CONNECTION, KUZNETSOV COMPLAINED THAT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT MY MEETING WITH HIM DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY HAD APPEARED EVEN BEFORE I ARRIVED AT MFA. I POINTED OUT REPORTS HAD HERELY SAID US APPROACHING USSR WITHOUT STATING WHERE AND WHEN. I ALSO ASSURED HIM I HAD NOT TOLD PRESS ABOUT MEETING. WHEN I COMMENTED IT WOULD BE

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DIFFICULT FOR US NOT TO SAY SOVIETS DECLINED TO BE INTERMEDIARY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF FACT THAT WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY MADE STATEMENTS ON SUBJECT, KUZNETSOV SAID HE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF PAST BUT OF PRESENT MESSAGE. I REPEATED I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD FAIL TO MAKE THE POSITION CLEAR. HE MERELY SMILED AND SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS. I PRESUME SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT FIRST SENTENCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL REPLY AND SEE NO PROBLEM IN OUR MAINTAINING OUR POSITION THAT THEY HAVE REFUSED TO INTERVENE.

4. I TOLD KUZNETSOV I WOULD REPORT HIS MESSAGE BUT NOTED THAT, AS I HAD SAID AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED ABOUT SOVIET NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

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5. BEFORE LEAVING, I REFERRED TO FACT NORTH KOREAN STATEMENT ON INCIDENT AS CITED IN SOVIET PRESS SPOKE OF VESSEL HAVING BEEN DETAINED IN "COASTAL" RATHER THAN "TERRITORIAL" WATERS. NOTING I DID NOT HAVE PERTINENT CHARTS, I INQUIRED, FOR MY PERSONAL INFORMATION, IF KUZNETSOV KNEW WHERE POINT INDICATED BY COORDINATES LISTED IN NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS. KUZNETSOV REPLIED HE UNABLE GIVE ME ANY INFORMATION AND SAID SOVIETS' SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALSO NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT.

6. COMMENT: IF THE NORTH KOREANS ARE ANYTHING LIKE THE SOVIETS, THE PRESENCE OF OUR NAVAL FORCE OFF WONSAN WILL MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NORTH KOREANS TO RETURN OUR VESSEL AND CREW. WHILE I DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ACT AS INTERMEDIARY, I AM SURE THAT THEY WILL NOT SO LONG AS THESE FORCES REMAIN IN PLACE, AND IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL EVEN USE THEIR INFLUENCE QUIETLY. THEY ALWAYS REACT NEGATIVELY TO OPEN THREATS OF FORCE.

7. I SUPPOSE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ENGINEERED THIS AFFAIR EITHER TO BRING PRESSURE ON US IN CONNECTION

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WITH VIETNAM OR SIMPLY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON OUR INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, BUT JUDGING BY THE OVERALL SITUATION HERE I THINK THIS UNLIKELY. THE FACT THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL OUR SHIPS COULD INDICATE CAUTION ON THEIR PART BUT IT COULD ALSO MEAN THAT KOREANS ACTED WITHOUT OR AGAINST THEIR ADVICE.

GP-1. THOMPSON



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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH
SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY McNAMARA
UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH
GENERAL WHEELER
WALT ROSTOW
U. N. REPRESENTATIVE GOLDBERG
MR. SAMUEL BERGER - STATE DEPARTMENT
CLARK CLIFFORD
RICHARD HELMS
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
TOM JOHNSON

In the Family Dining Room
January 25, 1968

The President discussed the draft letter to President Park of Korea. That letter is attached as appendix A.

Walt Rostow: I would like to ask a few "devil's advocate" questions:

- How much time do we use up by our actions at the U.N.?
- Do we have control of the time situation if we get involved in U.N. debate?
- What is the danger if we go to the U.N. for some sort of humiliation? (What is the possibility of the resolution resulting in some humiliating statements?)
- How much danger is there in a resolution for us?

Ambassador Goldberg: We are not in control at the time completely. We can say this is a matter of utmost urgency. We can say that we will have 24 hours and that time is of the essence. We can control the time within reasonable limits.

In addition, we can wind up the Security Council exercise on Monday or Tuesday. Then we can knock it off or extend it according to our wishes.

Walt Rostow: There are less fish hooks in this if we do not go for a resolution.

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Secretary Rusk: We ourselves need time to get our aircraft and other forces to the area, to talk with Congress, and to give the Soviets an opportunity to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans.

Secretary Katzenbach: I do not think the Security Council will tie the Korean incident to Vietnam. The non-communists will not want to discuss it.

Ambassador Goldberg: We will not be able to keep Vietnam out entirely.

Walt Rostow: We just received information that a North Korean aircraft is flying to Moscow with two men and 792 pounds of cargo aboard. This could be equipment taken from the Pueblo. It is suggestive that the Soviets were in on this.

Secretary Katzenbach: Could CIA pick up on film the area where the boat is, via satellite photography?

CIA Director Helms: We are programed for that area.

Secretary McNamara: Shouldn't we send a vessel to the area where the Pueblo dumped overboard its equipment to dive for it?

General Wheeler: Based on radio messages, we have information that the North Koreans are diving for it at this time.

Secretary Katzenbach: Couldn't we get photographic evidence showing the spot where the divers are located and also the coast line. This would be absolute proof of the ship's position and the fact that the ship was also outside territorial waters.

Richard Helms: If we send a plane up there he had better be ready for a fight. They have MIGs flying cover for the divers, I am sure.

Secretary McNamara: The particular plane that we will fly over they will not be able to fight because of the nature of the aircraft. Of course, if there were other aircraft sent, there likely would be aerial interception.

Richard Helms: We will send the plane tonight our time, which is early morning there. What we get will depend on the climatic conditions.

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Secretary Katzenbach: Do you think the stuff that was thrown overboard was damaged sufficiently to make it of no value?

Secretary McNamara: I doubt it. We just do not know.

The President: What is the answer why the Air Force cancelled the orders?

Secretary McNamara: It was because of darkness and the time before darkness made the effort marginal. Also, there was a substantial enemy force there. So the commander felt he should not do it and cancelled the order.

The President: Dean and Bob, what should we do?

Secretary Rusk: I would recommend going ahead to the Security Council.

Ambassador Goldberg: I could go to the Security Council tonight and ask for an emergency session. I would call on the President of the Security Council, give him a letter, and release the letter.

The President: What do we do from there?

Secretary Rusk: We've gone to Kosygin. We've gone to Sato. This will get the Secretary General in it. Indonesia, also, has been contacted. The ambassadors of the 16 countries which had troops in Korea are being contacted.

The President: How do we get the ship and the boys back?

Secretary McNamara: 1. We need authorization to extend duty.
2. We need authorization to call up individual reservists.

This would give us something to get a vote on in the Congress. We could ask for special authority to increase aid to the Republic of Korea. I would ask Congress to validate authority to call up civilian aircraft if we are short on transport.

The President: Clark, how did your testimony go this morning? (Mr. Clifford was called to testify on his nomination to the Senate as Secretary of Defense.)

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Notes of President's luncheon
Meeting, Jan 25, 1968

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Clark Clifford: I think I got through the testimony all right this morning.

Secretary McNamara: The request to extend tours and call people from the reserves is a good one. We could use this legislation.

Secretary Katzenbach: Would this legislation give authority or would it actually activate units?

Secretary McNamara: It would give the President authority. I would request authority to call up about 150,000 reservists.

Secretary Katzenbach: A request for \$100 million in aid does not serve the purpose at all.

The President: Now that all of you have said that, what I want to know is how we are going to get that ship out.

Secretary McNamara: What I recommend immediately is that we ask for authority to call up individual reservists, not units.

Secretary Rusk: We also must face the situation of infiltration.

General Wheeler: We must be in a position to cope with any eventuality.

Secretary Rusk: Remember that North Korea has a 1961 alliance with the Soviet Union and China.

Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs want an extension of the terms of service. The Marines lose 1600 trained men per month. Mr. President, you improve quicker the quality of our armed forces by extension of tours than by any other method. 2,500 men a day leave the service.

The President: When we get all our men out there and all these planes out there and all these extensions, what do we do then?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we are not prepared to make a recommendation on that today.

Secretary Rusk: I have reservations about the Tonkin Gulf resolution unless the other side forces our hand.

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Ambassador Goldberg: As a layman I would like to give you one reaction you may want to consider. I think we want to avoid taking steps which would make it look as if we are seizing on this incident to plug up all the loopholes that are existing in our current military posture. We do not want it to appear through any of our actions that we are using this to fill the gaps in our military program.

Secretary McNamara: Arthur, the facts just will not support that view. If I do not need these men I will not ask for them. We do not have gaps in our forces we have to fill.

Secretary Katzenbach: Won't they relate this to Vietnam (the extension of military tours.)

General Wheeler: We could carry on with our rotation in Vietnam at the same time we do what is necessary in Korea.

Secretary McNamara: I can assure you that we have no plans whatever to extend tours in Vietnam absent Korea. In fact, we think that one of the reasons why morale is so high in Vietnam is because of the limited tour of duty. We think it is a good system.

Director Helms: Isn't there a shortage of U.S. officers in Korea?

General Wheeler: There is a world-wide shortage of Captains and Majors throughout the army.

(The President was interrupted by the telephone. He talked for several minutes with Senator Dirksen. After the conversation ended the President reported that he had told Senator Dirksen that we will take whatever diplomatic moves that are available, that we will meet whatever needs the military has, and then we will make decisions about our courses of action. I told him our principal interests were in getting the ship back and in getting the boys back. We must come up with a way to get that ship back.)

Secretary Katzenbach: Mr. President, the only way to get that ship out with the crew is talking through diplomatic channels. We must make it clear that this is the wiser course for North Korea. It is only through diplomatic channels that we will get them out. We must show them that this matter is sufficiently serious to release the ship and the crew.

I think we should take our steps fairly slowly. We should see how we are doing in the United Nations before we ask for broader authority in Korea.

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Secretary Rusk: We cannot shoot the men out of there. The North Koreans do not have vessels on the high seas that we can seize.

Director Helms: The only North Korean we have in our possession is the number two man in the North Korean news agency who defected. His point of view is that they will exploit the incident and then turn the ship loose for humanitarian reasons.

The President: That is about the same thing the Ambassador to Korea said.

Ambassador Goldberg: They do have territorial shipping. Assuming they have ships plying at coastal waters, couldn't we seize one of these?

Secretary McNamara: They have only four, and they are of very little importance.

Ambassador Goldberg: Grabbing anything of theirs is permitted by law in limited retaliation of this act. However, sowing mines is an act of war. This would not be considered retaliatory.

Secretary Katzenbach: Military action alone does not get them back. Seizing a couple of ships does not get them back. I think they are more concerned about what we may do. This is more important than taking some limited action so that they know what our response is. You are worse off when they do not know what you might do.

Secretary McNamara: We would like to move certain forces to the area. We need to pace ourselves. The Chiefs would like to move 26 B-52s, 15 to Okinawa and 11 to Guam.

The President: Go ahead and send the B-52s.

Secretary Rusk: We should touch base with Sato before we do this.

Walt Rostow: Ambassador Goldberg called this an incident. What is important is the North Korean policy and what is behind that policy. We know this is new pressure against South Korea and ourselves. If we are to act we must be prepared for any action they may take.

The President: What else do you have in mind, Bob?

Secretary McNamara: I would move other aircraft to the area.

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The President: Why not move them out?

Secretary McNamara: I think for two reasons we should delay in moving the aircraft. It reduces your effectiveness of approach at the U.N. We are not contemplating any action right away.

Dick Helms: We do not see any signs of a major offensive action by the North Koreans into South Korea.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would like to address myself to the points raised by Bob McNamara. He is the man who will be responsible if our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. fail. I think to make military moves would not bother me. As the letter to Ayub Khan said, we do want to settle this matter by diplomatic means if possible.

I see some positive signs that would be provided by the military action (of sending air units to South Korea.)

Secretary McNamara: Let's get Sato's permission first. We'll then move the B 52s.

Secretary Rusk: Let's do not call it permission. It is notification.

The President: We must move up our forces to awaken the people to the danger. I would move our forces to the bases we already have. I would move them without saying much. I would be guided by the views of the military. Let's get our defenses in position.

The intercepts show North Korea is going into full mobilization. I would not send the B 52s out to bomb North Korea but I would put them into position. The Chiefs think they should be moved. We have got to have our hand out and our guard up.

Secretary Rusk: I am inclined to agree with Arthur that the military moves will support our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. It will show the urgency and the seriousness of the matter.

Secretary McNamara: It is easy then, We will move the B 52s this afternoon.

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Secretary Rusk: I do not see why you have to announce these units squadron by squadron, and give our battle plan.

Secretary McNamara: It will leak all over the place if we don't.

George Christian: I always feel like we should give all the information we can on a matter like this. Our position looks rather weak when we fail to give the units and later it leaks out all over.

The President: Clark, what is your judgment on this whole situation?

Clark Clifford: It has been my experience that when a situation of this type arises the public is first outraged. Later they change their mind.

If anything, I have a feeling that we need to proceed with caution. The situation about the ship is rather fuzzy in my mind. I have great concern about us getting out word of mobilization in this country. Suppose tomorrow that the North Koreans announce that they are mobilizing. Then we really build this situation up. Then, what if we do nothing? I am not comfortable with this large military build-up.

We may find that the matter will simmer down a lot during the U.N. discussion. I feel I should urge great caution in this matter and that we should proceed accordingly. If it appears we poise a threat to North Korea and do nothing, we are in a very difficult situation.

Secretary Rusk: If North Korea goes crazy and launches an attack we couldn't do very much.

General Wheeler: I would agree with that. The South Korean airforce is very weak compared with North Korea.

Secretary McNamara: But we must remember that we have the Enterprise and that it could retaliate with substantial force. There is a place where you get into a very critical position with this build-up.

The President: Then it becomes do we do something or nothing. What is your judgment, General Wheeler?

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General Wheeler: I would like to proceed with positioning our force in South Korea as recommended. I would place 170 land-based aircraft in the area. I would proceed to station the U.S.S. Kittyhawk off North Korea.

I would put her on the coast available to us. This would give us 300 carrier aircraft and 150 land-based aircraft. This would give us ample aircraft to protect us against any eventuality.

The President: Why now?

General Wheeler: We can move the aircraft quickly, but we have to have at least 18 hours to give the pilots a night's sleep and to provide some time to shake down on the bases. We must move maintenance units and spare parts. It would be four to five days before all of the units are operationally ready. The 26 B 52s will give us heavy strike capability if preemptive strikes begin.

The President: General Wheeler, how do you appraise our actions in light of what effect they will have on North Korea? What I am saying is, is it worth it to have your extra assurance when it may be viewed as a great provocation?

General Wheeler: First I do not think we can take the B 52s away from Vietnam. General Westmoreland faces a very serious situation. In recent cables he has asked for 120 B 52 mission capability per month. We are doing that. We should reach that level by February 1.

It would be imprudent to draw down on Westmoreland's supply of B 52s. He is about to have the most vicious battle of the Vietnam war.

B 52s have an all-weather capability. If other aircraft are unable to fly, the B 52s become very vital in support of our ground forces.

To the larger question, all military schools teach us that military power is in existence to enhance our foreign policy capabilities and to preserve the internal security of the United States.

I think that more military moves would support our diplomatic efforts that are our first order of business. But we should be prepared to move

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on the other front if the need arises. Some would regard this as a provocation, I am sure. I know the Soviets would. I believe that it will prove to friend and enemy alike that there is determination on the part of the United States to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary.

Public sentiment does change, but while we are moving on the diplomatic front we must be prepared to do something else if necessary.

Secretary McNamara: We will alert our B 52s. We can get by with not announcing this. By alerting them tonight, we can reduce the lead time.

The President: Buzz what you are saying is that you do not know what you will be called upon to do but you do know that if we take the B 52s away from Westmoreland that this would be inappropriate. You believe we should put in the others to be ready in the event of an attack.

General Wheeler: That is correct, sir. You will recall that in 1950 the North Koreans moved in artillery and moved across the DMZ. I would not discount the possibility of this happening again.

I would want the B 52s and the fighter bombers to back up the ground forces.

The President: What you would do is have them so they could pulverize the enemy before they got across the DMZ if necessary.

General Wheeler: That is correct, sir. Also they are continuing their infiltration across the DMZ. The most symbolic act of the infiltrators was the attack on Blue House.

President Park said he would stand still for a reasonable time. But I think Park will retaliate if there is another Blue House incident or something of that type. I would like to have my units there in case they are needed. If diplomatic efforts fail there will be pressure to take retaliatory actions against North Koreans. We must be ready to react to what they might do. Although we don't like to imagine it, there could be a restart of the Korean War.

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I asked the President to approve moving the units in the soonest possible time.

- We should place the Kittyhawk in the Japan area in the next four days.
- I would deploy the 26 B 52s.
- I would issue instructions covertly for the movement of the 173 aircraft.

Ambassador Goldberg: These military actions will create a sense of urgency for the U. N. to act. The only time those guys (the representatives to the United Nations) will do anything is when they have to.

Clark Clifford: Buzz Wheeler makes a very logical case. But it disturbs me deeply. I think the President must proceed on the basis of probabilities and not possibilities. I think the North Koreans are not able to mount a massive military activity. They are engaged in harassments.

We should not send fleets of our aircraft to Korea. I think that is wrong. I think this heightens tension and builds it up.

If North Korea is planning something important that could then begin the provocation for us moving. I would get the planes and crews ready here at home. But our moral posture will be better if the North Koreans move first.

I am deeply sorry about the ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption of the Korean War.

The President: We know what we will do if we had these planes out there and if North Korea attacked. What do we do if we get the planes out there and North Korea does not attack? That is something we must consider.

We should go to Sato and get his approval for moving the B 52s to Okinawa.

I want to get some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion as to why they believe they need the aircraft there now if we do not expect an attack.

Of course we should authorize Ambassador Goldberg to go to the U. N. and present our case.

Let's meet again tonight at 6:30.

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OBSTACLES TO A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION BY FACING THE NORTH KOREANS AND THE SOVIETS WITH AN ULTIMATUM OR WITH MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A PRELUDE TO AN ULTIMATUM. MOREOVER, THERE ARE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN PURSUING BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ACTIONS.

3. DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. TO PLACE IN SOUTH KOREA OR IN CONTIGUOUS WATERS APPROXIMATELY 300 US TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. THESE WILL INCLUDE FOR THE TIME BEING ENTERPRISE AND KITTY HAWK WHEN SHE COMES OFF STATION TOMORROW. MOVEMENT OF AIRFORCE TACTICAL AIR UNITS IS DEFERRED FOR THE TIME BEING.

B. TO DIVERT 10,000 TONS OF AIR MUNITIONS FROM THE PIPELINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO KOREA. THE SOUTHEAST ASIA PIPELINE WILL BE REIMBURSED THIS QUANTITY.

C. TO CALL UP AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AIR RESERVE AND NAVAL AIR RESERVE UNITS, TOTALLING

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SOME 372 AIRCRAFT OF ALL TYPES.

D. TO DIVERT TO KOREA CERTAIN BULLPUP, SHRIKE, WALLEYE, FALCON, SPARROW AND SIDEWINDER ASSETS, OTHERS TO BE DETERMINED.

E. IN ADDITION TO NAVAL TASK GROUP 70.6, TO DEPLOY TO KOREAN WATERS A FORCE OF ABOUT NINE SURVEILLANCE AND ATTACK SUBMARINES.

F. TO REQUEST AUTHORITY TO MOVE FROM CONUS 15 B-52DS TO OKINAWA, 11 B-52DS TO GUAM, AND APPROPRIATE TANKER SUPPORT.

G. TO REQUEST AN INCREASE OF ABOUT 8,500 MEN IN ARMY FORCES KOREA TO RAISE THE US MANNING LEVEL TO ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION.

H. TO ESTABLISH A DRONE RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY UTILIZING KADENA AND SOUTH KOREA.

I. TO EXAMINE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER ASSETS IN KOREA AND ASCERTAIN, IF REQUIRED, THE SOURCE OF HELICOPTERS AND CREWS.

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4. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE APPROVAL, APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE, OR RECOMMENDED ACTIONS, THE JCS ARE EXAMINING URGENTLY VARIOUS MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH WE MIGHT TAKE AGAINST NORTH KOREA, IF DIRECTED. FRANKLY, THE RANGE OF ACTIONS POSSIBLE IS NOT GREAT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE EXAMINING A POSSIBLE MINING OR A COMBINATION OF AIR STRIKES AND MINING OF WONSAN HARBOR; A REPETITION OF THE PUEBLO MISSION USING BANNER WITH APPROPRIATE NAVAL AND AIR PROTECTION. WE ARE, OF COURSE, PLANNING TO FLY BLACK SHIELD RECONNAISSANCE ASAP, TO BE FOLLOWED BY DRONE RECONNAISSANCE WHEN OPERATIONALLY FEASIBLE. IF YOU HAVE ANY PROPOSALS AS TO ACTIONS WE MIGHT TAKE, I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THEM. IN ADDITION, I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL IN THE AREA. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS TO INCLUDE THE DECISION OF HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR THE ACTUAL MOVEMENT OF UNITS TO KOREA. GP 1

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S BREAKFAST MEETING
WITH:

- Secretary Rusk
- Secretary McNamara
- Ambassador Goldberg
- Walt Rostow
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson

January 25, 1968
In the Mansion

Mr. Rostow: We have just received a message from President Park of the Republic of Korea. He is pleased that we are taking the matter to the Security Council and raising both the Pueblo incident and the Blue House incident.

At the UN we can urge the following:

- Urge that the ship and men be returned.
- Urge the North Koreans to behave with respect to the 38th Parallel.
- Urge a resolution for return of the ship.

We must not do anything which would tie our hands in the United Nations.

Ambassador Goldberg: Going to the Security Council will give us time. There is a danger of getting our hands tied. The South Koreans also are sensitive to the North Koreans being heard before the United Nations.

The President: What are the gambles we take by going to the UN?

Ambassador Goldberg: It is best to urge a resolution demanding the return of the ship. I do not recommend a resolution asking the UN to condemn the action of the North Koreans. We should ask the UN to support a return to the Armistice Agreements. Of course the Soviets will veto that resolution, but taking this action will satisfy the diplomatic needs.

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It is interesting that Malik will be the Soviet representative today. You will remember that he was absent on the last vote which sent the UN forces to Korea. You can be certain that he will not be absent this time.

As I see it, we will get the following votes:

- United States - Yes
- Great Britain - Yes
- Republic of China - Yes
- Canada - Yes
- Denmark - Yes
- Brazil - Yes
- Paraguay - Yes
- France - ?
- Senegal - ?
- Ethiopia - Yes
- India - No
- Pakistan - ?
- Hungary - No

Ambassador Goldberg said France has always been with us on the Korean issue, but he considered it questionable whether or not they will vote with us now.

The President: urged that we send a message to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan telling him that we definitely needed their support on a matter of this importance. However, the President and Ambassador Goldberg noted that Pakistan has problems with China and may vote no.

The President: Was the Turner Joy an intelligence ship? (This was one of the ships attacked during the Gulf of Tonkin.)

Secretary McNamara: The Turner Joy and the Pueblo are not the same type of ship. They do have some collection devices.

Ambassador Goldberg: Returning to the UN votes, Korea has been a UN matter since 1950. We do need Pakistan's vote. A Pakistani is president of the council. He expressed great personal support for us in a conversation yesterday. He is in a delicate position.

There is another alternative. We could use the good offices of the Secretary General. He has indicated some willingness to do this.

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We could put a time limit on the Secretary General. In the Security Council we could do much the same thing (put a time limit on it).

I would take the matter to the Security Council tomorrow. I think we should call for an urgent session. We may not get a resolution, but it will take care of our diplomatic situation.

The President: Why did the Soviets say in this message that they have passed along our position to North Korea?

Secretary Rusk: It looks like an added measure on their part.

On the matter of the UN, a resolution which would be hostile to the U.S. would not receive more than 3 to 4 votes.

Ambassador Goldberg: Do we push a resolution to a vote? I would think we would do this only if we have 9 votes.

The President: Our primary objective is to gain time, to give all concerned an opportunity for reasoning together. It will give the Soviets time to bring influence to bear on North Korea if they will.

I want to raise a question about sending a carrier and other aircraft in. Doesn't this raise a challenge to the enemy?

Ambassador Thompson says in his cable that this action seems paradoxical. I think that is worth considering. How will the North Koreans, Soviets, and the Chinese react to the show of force? Won't it lessen our chances of getting the ship and the man out rather than increase them?

What I am asking is this: What's our objective as far as all of this, particularly the action before the UN?

As I see it, our objective is to:

1. Spread out our actions before the UN to show them how serious this matter is and to show them how we have been mistreated.

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2. Give us time to try to work something out and to give the Soviets an opportunity to try to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans.

3. Show the world we are not bellicose.

But there may be a conflict in our doing this before the UN and our sending new planes over there.

Can't the Enterprise take care of the situation for a few days?

Secretary McNamara: We do need more air power in the area if we are attacked.

I see no difference between us having the Enterprise already there with increased air power available and putting in what we need to have to take care of the situation. We already have built up our position with the placement of the Enterprise in the area. To do what Ambassador Thompson has suggested (not putting any additional forces in there) would mean pulling the Enterprise off station.

The President: Secretary McNamara, you look at where you are going to get units and tell me the minimum time that is required to move in an emergency.

Secretary McNamara: I have all of that information now, Mr. President. In addition I have an Executive Order for the President's signature which will authorize the call up of the reserve units (Attachment A).

In addition I have two press releases which I want George Christian to review and change if necessary. The first press release announces the call up. The second press release announces the actual sending of additional units to South Korea.

We can move the USS Kitty Hawk into the area without public knowledge. She is only two days steaming time away.

The Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that they do not want to move the Enterprise. It would be wasted effort to replace it with another ship.

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We propose sending 303 air craft to South Korea. We propose to call up 332 air craft.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would recommend not making public announcement of the call up. I think you should go ahead with the action without public announcement and we will do everything to settle this matter diplomatically. However, the call up will strengthen my position before the UN and will show the seriousness of the situation. I do not see any conflict between the call up and what we will be doing diplomatically. In that I disagree with Ambassador Thompson.

Walt Rostow: As I see it, international law states that the seizure of a ship on the high seas justifies counteraction and equivalent reprisal.

The President: Walt, I do not want to win the argument and lose the sale.

The President then read again the Thompson cable. He stressed the sentence "They (the Communists) always react negatively to a show of force."

Walt Rostow: Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban missile crisis or the Berlin crisis.

Secretary McNamara: The North Korean air force has substantial superiority over the South Korean air force. If we have trouble we need to reenforce.

The President: But when we send out vast armada, won't the Soviets and the Chinese say that they must be ready to protect their little brothers?

Won't this really increase the tension? Is this a move to defer South Korea? What are we going to do after the aircraft are there? Where does all of this lead us?

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Secretary McNamara: I think we will be closer to doing something diplomatically with a call up than without. I would recommend the call up today. I would defer public knowledge of the actual movement of the aircraft. For your information, I ordered diverted 10,000 tons of bombs enroute to South Vietnam. We do not have sufficient bombs in South Korea.

However, we must announce the call up. This will leak. Men have to be called from their homes. There is no way it would hold.

Secretary Rusk: I would announce the call up today. I would go before the Security Council with the matter. By tomorrow evening, we can announce that we are actually sending these squadrons to Korea.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would proceed with stand-by arrangements without announcement. We will parallel these efforts with diplomatic discussions.

Secretary McNamara: The President must sign an Executive Order. There is no way we can do this (make the call up) without public announcement.

George Christian: It would not hold to try to keep from having a public announcement.

Secretary Rusk: The North Koreans may have decided to make a try at South Korea. We must jar the North Koreans loose from the idea of taking South Korea. This call up may do just that (prevent

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the North Koreans from thinking about offensive action against South Korea.

The President: Bob (Secretary McNamara), we must assume they have calculated what our response will be to this. Will this action (calling up reserve units and sending aircraft to South Korea) jeopardize our position elsewhere, particularly in Berlin?

Secretary McNamara: No, we have other units here and a number of units in Europe. In this country we have aircraft we could move to Berlin. In my opinion, we are in very good shape. The 332 aircraft that we are calling up are cats and dogs, but the 303 aircraft which are being sent to South Korea are in very good shape.

The President: What can we do to bring Congress in on this?

We have got to have a good discussion to see if the Fulbrights represent this country. If they do, we are committing a grave error to send men out. You remember how much trouble we got into on the Tonkin Gulf incident.

I think that Senator Dodd, Senator Thurmond and Senator Russell will balance off what might be said by Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and others.

Secretary McNamara: The President has the authority to call the reserves. It would be valuable to ask for legislation extending the tours of duty of those now serving.

The President: That legislation would put the boys (U. S. troops) on their side. We must keep them on our side.

Secretary McNamara: The best action we could ask for in the Congress would be for involuntary extension. It would permit us to keep on active service a sizeable number of highly qualified personnel.

Ambassador Goldberg: Have you consulted with Congressional leaders?

The President: We need to go to the Congress on this matter.

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Secretary Rusk: I do not recognize Senator Church by the statement he made today. He virtually asked for a declaration of war against Korea. He is a hot Korean supporter.

The President: I am sure one of the reasons is that he has a Pocatello, Idaho, boy captured out there.

What concerns me is this. When we get the planes out there and all of the forces you have recommended, what do we do then?

Secretary McNamara: The lowest form of military action is the minding of the coast of North Korea by air. They do have some ports of significant value, but in Wonsan. They do have patrol craft at Wonsan.

Secretary Rusk: What about grabbing some of their ships?

Secretary McNamara: We cannot find any of their ships. They have only 4 small vessels and they aren't of much consequence.

The President: As I see it, these are the steps we should undertake:

1. Take our case to Pakistan and ask them to be with us on this matter.
2. Send a message to Park. Tell him that the North Korean side probably will be heard if the matter is raised before the UN.
3. Bob (Secretary McNamara), sit down with the Joint Chiefs and see what we can ask of the Congress in the way of legislation to get an overt action by them in support of our show of force.
4. Get a letter to Kosygin explaining our position and the need for their doing what they can in this matter.
5. Send a message to Prime Minister Sato of Japan outlining the situation.
6. Put our view before all our ambassadors and attaches. We should meet again about noon (the meeting was scheduled for 1:15 for lunch in the Family Dining Room). I want to get Senator Russell's judgment. He wants the Senate to go back on record in support of

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what we are doing. Let's not let the Congress say we are going to war without consulting them.

Dean (Secretary Rusk), let's get the Cabinet back together to discuss Ambassador Roth's new proposal. It looks as though he has sold the proposal to Mills. I am concerned about financial panic in this country. Roth and Mills think this will stop everything except the textile business.

Secretary Fowler has done a good job. Don't shove him. He is under a terrific strain.

Secretary Trowbridge went to the hospital last night with recurring chest pains. I am afraid he may have another heart situation. He had a heart attack two years ago.

Secretary McNamara then discussed the Executive Order which would call to active duty units of the Air Force Reserve.

The President: I would put in the letter to Kosygin that "I do not know what North Korea has in mind but I do know that neither you or I want to increase world tensions in this area."

The complete text of the message to Chairman Kosygin is attached as Attachment B.

Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler should get the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk moving. Also get your unit Commanders alerted. "Anytime you have a world crisis we must have our tanks loaded, our caps on and our planes ready. Let's not be accused of being unprepared."

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