

Blue House Security Affairs Report for 1975

Date:

January 1976

Source:

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

[...]

F. Situation Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

(1) Changes among Great Powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula

Circumstances and Issues

(a) United States of America

After the Vietnam War, the U.S. defense guarantee to friendly countries wavered for a short while. However, the reaffirmation of a defense commitment by President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, and the Secretary of Defense at the time, Schlesinger, demonstrated that there is no change in the U.S. commitment to defend Korea. The U.S. supported our viewpoint completely regarding Korean issues at the UN. The U.S. also supported [our] détente policy and June 23 Declaration through policy statements and, in effort to solve these issues more quickly, suggested a meeting among countries directly involved in the Korean Peninsula (September 22, 1975). Some officials in the U.S. Congress as well as journalists made attempts to link U.S. policy on Korea to Korea's domestic politics, including human rights issues. However, the U.S. Government assumed the position that they are unable to interrupt in another country's domestic issues, which includes human rights. Due to our significance in assuring [U.S.] security, the U.S. has shown their willingness to maintain their policy towards Korea and reassured their defense commitment on Korea.

(b) Japan

The situation in Indochina has increased Japan's interest in the Korean Peninsula on an unprecedented scale. Due to the circumstances in its constitution, domestic political environment, and historical experience in the Second World War, Japan has no chance in military cooperation with other countries. Thus, Japan has been contributing to the security of Korea in non-military and indirect ways through the U.S. Also, the country is assisting in our security by diplomatic measures such as economic cooperation and other means. Japan is gradually expanding non-political contact with the North Korean puppet state through promoting pragmatic policy and reforming domestic politics. Especially due to recent "Shosei Maru" incident, Japan appears to have recognized the need to establish official and non-official conversation channels with the North Korean puppet.

(i) Soviet Union

To obtain the North Korean puppet's support in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union has been making efforts to compete with Communist China. Thus, such position taken by the Soviet Union is not resulting in much difference in its attitude towards Korea regardless of overall rapprochement

between the East and the West. In regards to military affairs, the Soviet Union strengthened its Pacific fleet, taking advantage of the U.S. exit from the West Pacific. The country has advanced to the area, attempting to expand its military influence to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and ultimately to connect with the Mediterranean Sea. Nonetheless, the Soviets are significantly more flexible than Communist China, which is rather dogmatic in terms of East and West relations. Therefore, the Soviets have allowed [South] Korean delegates' participation in academic, cultural and sports conferences which took place in their territory. Thus, they are expressing some ease in their attitude in some limited areas. Regarding such flexibility in Korean affairs, Communist China extremely criticized [South] Korea-Soviet cooperation (November 9, 1974 and October 28, 1975), drawing the bilateral relationship in Sino-Soviet conflict and attempting to interfere in the improvement of the relationship.

(ii) Communist China

Simply put, the U.S.-Sino relationship in relation to the Korean Peninsula has not improved at all since the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972. To hold the Soviet Union, Communist China unofficially does not appear to be completely against the stationing of U.S. Army in Korea. However, in official statements, China argues for the withdrawal of U.S. Army and it supports the North Korean puppet's [anti] South Korea policy. Furthermore, regarding diplomacy, Communist China vetoed to the West's resolution at the UN and made hard attempts to pass the Communist's resolution. When Communist China opposed the Korea-Japan continental shelf development treaty, we stated that we are willing to have discussions with Communist China regarding the issue (February 6, 1974). However, Communist China did not express any particular response officially.

Outlook

Unless drastic changes in the U.S.-Sino-Soviet relationship or a change in North Korean puppet's attitude result in a guaranteed peace for the Korean Peninsula, U.S. policy on Korea will not change. Japan is likely to expand exchanges in non-political areas as well. However, there will be no dramatic fluctuation in its policy on Korea. The issue in Korean Peninsula is not a primary concern for China or Soviet Union, and therefore, sudden change in their attitude is unlikely. However, we cannot disregard the possibility of improvement as U.S.-Communist China-Soviet relationship improves.

Countermeasures and Suggestions

As long as the North Korean puppets maintain their delusion of communizing the South and as long as Communist China and Soviet Union support such idea, we must attempt to strengthen security and economic cooperation with the U.S., Japan and other alliances. We must also implement our Open Door policy included in June 23rd statement even more actively. As a result, we shall promote improved relationship with non-hostile communist bloc and attempt to ease the North Korean puppets' hostility through China and the Soviets and through the powerful countries in the West, such as the U.S. and Japan.

PORTION(S) THAT REMAIN CLASSIFIED AFTER
ISCAP DECISION ARE BRACKETED IN RED

NLF MR Case No. 94-146

Document No. #42

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, KS, CA, FR
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: A. SEOUL 9928, B. SEOUL 9929, C. SEOUL 9961, D. STATE 382043
E. STATE 299269, F. STATE 325630

SUMMARY: WHILE FULLY COGNIZANT OF CONCERNS SET FORTH REF F,
NEVERTHELESS URGE RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS
IN REF F ON GROUNDS POTENTIAL GAINS ARE NOT COMMENSURATE
WITH RISKS INVOLVED AND POTENTIAL DISRUPTION TO OUR BASIC RE-
LATIONSHIP, NOR ARE TACTICS CONSISTENT WITH OUR LONGER TERM
INTERESTS IN KOREA. I AM CONVINCED THAT USG OBJECTIVE OF DIS-
COURAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BY BLOCKING REPROCESSING FACILITY
IN KOREA CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT FORCING CONFRONTATION AND
HUMILIATING LOSS OF FACE AND PRESTIGE FOR PRESIDENT PARK. END
SUMMARY.

Section 3.4(b)(6) of E.O. 12958

PORTION(S) THAT REMAIN CLASSIFIED AFTER
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Section 3.4 (b)(6) of E.O. 12958

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Section 3.4 (b) (6) of E.O. 12958





Department of State

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Section 3.4 (b) (6) of E.O. 12958

6. I THEREFORE PROPOSE FOLLOWING MODIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH REF E, PARA 4:

A. THE USG APPRECIATES AND WELCOMES ROKG DECISION TO RECONSIDER REPROCESSING ASPECT OF ITS CONTRACT WITH FRANCE;

B. WE ALSO APPRECIATE ROKG RECOGNITION OF SERIOUSNESS OUR CONCERNS AND OF MAJOR BEARING THIS ISSUE HAS ON FUTURE OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP;

C. US PREFERENCE REMAINS FINAL CANCELLATION AT THIS TIME OF REPROCESSING CONTRACT;

D. FAILURE TO CANCEL CONTRACT UNTIL COMPLETION OF DISCUSSIONS WILL FURTHER AROUSE CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUSPICIONS AS DEMONSTRATED BY MONDALE/PASTORE RESOLUTION. (APPRECIATE TEXT OF RESOLUTION SOONEST.) UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, USG WILL NOT SEEK CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF KORT II LOAN UNTIL REPROCESSING CONTRACT CANCELLED.

E. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN ROKG CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT BASED ON MUTUAL TRUST, WE ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH DISCUSSIONS ON NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OBJECTIVE OF REACHING EARLY AGREEMENT ON SCOPE OF COOPERATION WHERE FEASIBLE (E.G. DETAILS ON MULTI-NATIONAL FACILITY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT).

F. WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO SEND AT EARLY DATE QUALIFIED USG PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS WITH GOKG THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF FUTURE US-KOREAN PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AS LISTED PARA 2 REF O. WE DO NOT INTEND, HOWEVER, TO SEEK TO REPLACE NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN ROK AND FRANCE AND CANADA.

SNEIDER

~~SECRET~~

NLF MR Case No. 94-146

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DEPARTMENT PASS OTTAWA

EO 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, KS, FR, CA
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: A. SEOUL 292 B. STATE 08919

1. DURING JANUARY 14 MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NAM ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, HE VERY QUICKLY TURNED CONVERSATION WITH ME TO ROK REPROCESSING PLANT. NAM WELCOMED VISIT OF WASHINGTON GROUP JANUARY 22 ABOUT WHICH HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL KIM CHONG-YOM. NAM SAID ROKG HAD COME "LONG WAY" TOWARD REVERSING ITS POSITION ON PURCHASE OF FRENCH REPROCESSING FACILITY. HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT MORE THAN ONE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE FINAL DECISION ON CANCELLATION. HE URGED THAT WE NOT PUSH THE PROCESS TOO FAST. I RESPONDED THAT IN USG VIEW, DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGH LEVEL WASHINGTON GROUP, INCLUDING VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIALS, SHOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION AND THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS UNTIL DECISION MADE TO CANCEL. NAM EXPRESSED HOPE THIS WOULD BE THE CASE BUT REITERATED HIS CONCERNS AND URGED AGAIN HE GIVE IT A BIT MORE TIME SINCE ROKG HAS COME A LONG DISTANCE ALREADY. HE ADDED THAT MINISTER CHOI NOW RECOGNIZES PROHIBITIVE ECONOMIC COST OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING, BUT ROKG STILL NEEDS ASSURANCES ON US POSITIVE ACTIONS.

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FOR CANCELLING FRENCH CONTRACT ONCE THEY MET WITH
WASHINGTON GROUP,
SNEIDER

EYES ONLY-DIRECT

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PAGE 02 STATE 008919

2. REPLY TO MACEACHEN LETTER AUTHORIZED BY SECRETARY AND PASSED TO CANADIAN EMBASSY JAN. 10 STATED THAT USG SHARES GOC LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF NOT WISHING TO SEE ROK ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. REPLY ASSURES GOC THAT USG WILL CONTINUE TO USE ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS TO DISSUADE ROK FROM ACQUIRING REPROCESSING PLANT FROM FRANCE OR ELSEWHERE AND THAT NO CHANGE IN THIS POLICY IS ANTICIPATED.





Department of State

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PAGE 03 STATE 008919

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Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date:
16 February
1976

Source:
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 83. doboz, 6, 002134/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai

Before the Hungarian health delegation headed by Comrade Medev visited Korea, I received Oh Song-gweon, the third secretary of the Korean Embassy, and Lee Eun-ki, the Korean deputy military attaché, and asked them for information about the situation in Korea. At that time we agreed to meet again after the visit of the delegation. This occurred on 13 February 1976.

[...]

In their opinion, Korea cannot be unified in a peaceful way. [The North Koreans] are prepared for war. If a war occurs in Korea, it will be waged with nuclear weapons, rather than conventional ones. The DPRK is prepared for such a contingency: the country has been turned into a system of fortifications, important factories have been moved underground (for instance, recently they relocated the steelworks in Kangseon), and airfields, harbors, and other military facilities have been established in the subterranean cave networks. The Pyongyang subway is connected with several branch tunnels, which are currently closed, but, in case of emergency, they are able to place the population of Pyongyang there.

By now, the DPRK also has nuclear warheads and carrier missiles, which are targeted at the big cities of South Korea and Japan, such as Seoul, Tokyo, and Nagasaki, as well as local military bases such as Okinawa. When I asked whether the Korean People's Army had received the nuclear warheads from China, they replied that they had developed them unaided through experimentation, and they had manufactured them by themselves.

[...]

István Garajszki

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date:
18 February
1976

Source:
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 4, 001570/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

Jewdoszczuk, the second highest ranking diplomat of the Polish Embassy, told the heads of the fraternal eight [embassies] the information that they had received from the Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. That information summarizes the opinion of the South Korean regime about the military situation and the intentions of the DPRK.

[...]

According to the data of the Far Eastern Institute in Seoul, the DPRK spent 60, 165, 135, and 140 million dollars on the purchase of arms in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973 respectively. During this time the manpower of the army underwent the following changes: 438,000 in 1970, 450,000 in 1971, 460,000 in 1972, and 470,000 in 1973. That is, military preparations continued in the period of [North-South] dialogue as well. The army of the DPRK has 1,100 T-55 tanks and a substantial number of surface-to-surface missiles. The DPRK ordered a substantial amount of diving suits and facilities in Japan. [...]. The number of MiG jet fighters is 200, but they also have Su-7 [fighter-] bombers.

At present the DPRK wants to construct nuclear reactors, and is holding talks about this issue in order to become capable of producing atomic weapons in the future.

[...]

Ferenc Szabó
Ambassador

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.043

Date: 28 February 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 28.02.1976/02:00

No.: 067.043

To: the Press and Culture Direction; the 1st Direction - Relations

With respect to the introduction of F-111 bombers in South Korea on February 24th, 1976, the Press Department in the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a press conference on February 27th, 1976, which was attended by Korean journalists, foreign press correspondents and press attaches in Pyongyang.

On this occasion a declaration of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs was presented on the issue mentioned above, in which, amongst other things, it was shown that the DPRK government condemns the provocative act of the United States, which is threatening peace in Asia and in the entire world.

"The American imperialists are the main instigators to the rise of tensions and the unleashing of a war of aggression in Korea." "Facts show," the declaration underlines, "that as long as the US troops are stationed in South Korea, it is impossible to get rid of the state of tension and to achieve the unification of the homeland."

The declaration reiterates arguments and observations already known in respect to the Korean problem.

Signed: Ambassador Dumitru Popa

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.046

Date: 6 March 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 06.03.1976/03:00

No.: 067.046

To: Comrade Deputy Minister, Constantin Oancea

On March 4, Ambassador Dumitru Popa was invited by Li Jongmok, the Deputy Foreign Minister, to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the latter informed Ambassador Popa that the Permanent Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would send a letter to all peace-loving parliaments and governments, on issues dealing with the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula.

In Romania's case, the letter addressed to comrade Nicolae Giosan, the President of the Great National Assembly, will be handed out to our embassy later on.

While presenting the contents of the aforementioned letter, comrade Li Jongmok underlined that the United States of America and the South Korean governments kept trying to introduce large quantities of modern weapons, including nuclear weapons, they commit numerous acts of aggression and provocations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, posing a threat to peace in Asia and in the entire world.

The permanent committee of the Supreme People's Assembly in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expresses its conviction that the parliaments and governments of peace-loving countries will take appropriate measures to condemn the provocative and risqué acts committed by the United States of America and by the South Korean authorities, that they will undertake efforts to translate into practice the resolution adopted at the 30th session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Korean matter.

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.051

Date: 11 March 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 11.03.1976/03:00
No.: 067.051
To: Comrade Deputy Minister, Constantin Oancea

Regarding: the Situation in South Korea

On March 9th, 1976, on the occasion of the reception offered by Ambassador Dumitru Popa in honor of the Korean Ambassador to Bucharest, Pak Jungguk, the latter said that presently, more than ever before, the situation in South Korea is becoming increasingly tense. The United States of America is introducing increasing quantities of weapons, which aggravates the danger of a conflict breaking out in the peninsula.

The struggle of the popular masses in South Korea is intensifying, rising against the anti-popular regime of Park Cheung Hee and in favor of a democratic society and the acceleration of the process for the reunification of the homeland.

It can be seen, the Korean diplomat said, that currently, the danger of a war breaking out is becoming more and more obvious. Given the active American presence in the Peninsula, the Korean matter is no longer a regional problem, but an international problem on whose resolution peace in Asia and in the entire world depends.

In this context, it is necessary for all the peoples of the world to intensify their efforts to condemn the interference of the United States of America in the internal affairs of Korea, to follow closely and to actively support the just struggle of the Korean people, to take decisive actions with a view to turning the UN resolution on the Korean matter into reality.

Signature: illegible

Telegram from Dacca to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 030.602

Date: 20 March 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Dacca

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Regular

Date: 20.03.1976/-10

No.: 030.602

To: Comrade Marcel Dinu, Second Direction – Relations

To Comrades Negrea/Bobocea [in handwriting]

Regarding: Certain Aspects of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

North Korean diplomats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy in Dacca showed that out of all the countries which are divided, only the Korean matter remained completely unsolved and without the prospects of reaching a peaceful resolution.

The absence of any sort of progress in the talks on unification, combined with the approach of the Americans, generated a serious situation which can at any given moment trigger a war.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is very concerned with the fact that the Americans are providing South Korea with weapons, including nuclear weapons, which, according to some Western military experts, can guarantee the occupation of North Korea in 5-7 days. In these conditions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is trying to find someone to resort to in case of emergency. From amongst the two big socialist countries, not that much aid is expected from China, which keeps changing its attitude towards the Korean matter according to its own interests in its relations with the United States. The death of Zhou Enlai intensified the oscillatory position of China and even if Mao Zedong would like to adopt a position that would be more favorable to North Korea, he no longer has the necessary power to do so.

The North Korean diplomats insinuated that [they] could have much more faith in the USSR.

(This conversation occurred between the North Korean diplomats and Valeriu Simion, second secretary).

Signed: Ambassador Iosif Chivu

Trends in North Korea

Date: 23 March 1976	Source: <i>South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.</i>
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Increase of North Korean Puppets Mission [Overseas] March 23, 1976 (Information 2nd Division)

1. As of March 5 [1976], the North Korean puppet state has dispatched twenty missions for economy, trade, culture, sports, political party (The Korean Workers' Party) and social groups to fifteen non-communist countries. There were only three diplomatic missions. The diplomatic missions were sent only to Sri Lanka, twice, and to Algeria, once.

2. In addition, the dispatched missions are primarily Korean Workers' Party delegations to Western countries and missions in economy and trade. However, since March, diplomatic missions have been increasing, including the dispatch of special envoys. Diplomatic officials such as Gong Jintae and Deputy Prime Minister Pak Seongcheol are mentioned. Also, there are rumors surrounding the overseas travel of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heo Dam.

3. The statuses of the North Korean puppets' missions from March 5 to March 22 are listed below.

Country Name	Mission Type	Duration	Notes
Europe Luxemburg	Korean Workers' Party delegation (Head: Kim Gwanseob, Overseas Cultural Contact Committee Chair)	March 7-March 9	
Austria	Korean Workers' Party delegation (Head: Kim Gwanseob, Overseas Cultural Contact Committee Chair)	March 10-March 17	Meeting with Austrian Communist Party leader on March 11.
West Germany	[same as above]	March 18-	Attended the Fourth Convention of the West German Communist Party
Norway	Korean Workers' Party delegation (Head: Son Seongpil, Director of Higher Education)	March 15-March 18	Meeting with Minister of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Africa Senegal (and other African countries)	Kim Il Sung Special Envoy (Han Sihae, Deputy Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	March 16-	
Mauritius	Ambassador to Tanzania Jang Ilman (serves for Mauritius as well)	March 12-March 14	Attend the Eighth Anniversary Celebration of the Independence of Mauritius
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)	Economy delegation (Head: External Economy Affairs, Officer Kim Namgyu)	February 24-March 13	Contract treaty on economy and technology
Uganda	* Kim Il Sung Special Envoy (Deputy Prime Minister Pak Seongcheol)	April 20 (Scheduled)	
Zaire	Special Envoy Kim Il Sung (?)	April 7 (Scheduled)	

Middle East Egypt	Labor union delegation (Head: Central Labor Union Committee, Executive Member Pak Gonchan)	March 17-	Attend the Sixth Meeting of Arab Labor Union Alliance
Tunisia	Government delegation (Head: Deputy Prime Minister Gong Jintae)	March 18-	Attend Tunisian national holiday celebration

Central & South America Peru	Cultural delegation (Head: Ministry of Culture and Arts, Director Li Changseon)	End of March (Scheduled)	
Honduras	*Supreme People's Assembly, Chair Hwang Jang-yeop	During March (Scheduled)	
Ecuador	* Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kwon Huiggyeong	April 10-April 14 (Scheduled)	
Nicaragua Costa Rica Guyana		Negotiating	

Others [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
Nepal [illegible]	Deputy Prime Minister and Director of Foreign Affairs Heo Dam	Scheduled	
[illegible]			
India & Pakistan	Trade delegation (Head: Deputy Director of Trade, Li Taebaek)	March 13-	Contract treaty on trade

4. Analysis

A. Frequency of national holiday celebration missions and special envoys to Africa are increasing. In addition, the Korean Workers' Party delegations are continuously making visits to European countries.

B. Foreign affairs officials and prominent figures including Deputy Prime Ministers Gong Jintae and Pak Seongcheol and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Heo Dam, are supporting these diplomatic missions.

C. Negotiations to dispatch diplomatic missions are currently taking place for Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guyana, and Ecuador. [North Korea] is striving to penetrate into South America.

D. We observe that the increase in the missions of the North Korean puppets since March is evidence that the North Korean puppets have begun their diplomatic offensive,

which we predicted after the diplomatic strategy meeting (delegation heads meeting) in Pyongyang at the beginning of February. Also, for Western countries where North Korean puppets have difficulty in penetrating, they have dispatched party delegations instead of government delegations. They are attempting to indirectly penetrate [these western countries] by promoting contact with the visiting countries' Communist Party or Socialist Party as well as bonding with leftist groups and urging the governments to improve relationship with North Korea.

Summary of reports from embassies abroad on Kim Il Sung's possible visit to foreign countries
 March 23, 1976 (Information 2nd Division)

Regarding the rumor of Kim Il Sung visiting foreign countries around the time of the Non-Aligned Movement conference, below are reports from embassies abroad, obtained as a result of the headquarters order.

<u>Reporting official</u>	<u>Reported date</u>	<u>Report details</u>
Ambassador to Iran	March 14, 1976	Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs has heard similar information on Kim Il Sung's visit to some specific countries. No detailed movement observed on Kim's visit to Iran.
Ambassador to Senegal	March 15, 1976	[North's] visit to the country not yet mentioned.
Ambassador to [illegible]	March 15, 1976	[North's] visit to the country not mentioned.
Ambassador to Germany	March 16, 1976	West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs is aware of the rumor of Kim Il Sung's visit to foreign countries. However, no detailed information is available. [We have] instructed the embassy to collect information, [it] will inform [us] of the results.
Ambassador to Burma	March 17, 1976 March 22, 1976	Kim Il Sung's visit to Burma will be a follow up to President [illegible]'s visit to North Korea. However, there is no confirmation from the North Korean puppets yet. [We] observe he will visit Burma before or after the Non-Aligned Movement conference. North Korean puppets' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heo Dam, is scheduled to visit Burma on March 28. He is expected to discuss [president] [illegible]'s visit to North Korea and Kim Il Sung's visit to Burma (August).
Ambassador to Austria	March 17, 1976	No information available.
Ambassador to Sierra Leone	March 17, 1976	No plans so far, to receive Kim Il Sung and the North Korean puppet's mission.
Ambassador to [illegible]	March [illegible], 1976	No information available.

Ambassador to Ethiopia	March 22, 1976	No discussion on the North Korean puppet delegation visit as of today, March 19, 1976.
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Elevation of Kim Jong Il's Close Associates

Lim Chunchu Taught Kim Jong Il since his childhood, Central People's Committee Secretary-General (from ranking 32nd to 9th)

Jeon Munseob In charge of Kim Il Sung's guard (senior rank) ([illegible] from ranking 24th to 10th)

Heo Cheol Kim Il Sung's cousin's brother-in-law, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (from ranking 26th to 18th)

Oh Baek-ryong Chief commander of Worker and Peasant Red Guard (General) (from ranking 36th to 19th)

3. Expanded entry of military to the center of authority (political committee)

Previously, there were 5 military personnel (Choe Hyeon, Oh Jinwoo, Li Yongmu, Han Iksu, Jeon Munseob) among twenty-[illegible] members of the party's political committee. Currently, there are seven military personnel including Oh Baek-ryong and Kim Cheolman.

4. Due to failure in the operations, personnel in North Korea operations and economy sector, known as Kim Yeongju's clique, were removed. (Kim Jung-lin, Secretary for South Korea Operations, Yoo Jangsik, Director for Party's External Affairs, Pak Sudong, Director for the Party Organization and Guidance, Hong Seongnam, Committee Chair for National Planning, Oh Taebong [? illegible], Party Secretary)

5. Death of Deputy Prime Minister Hong Wongil (March 16)

6. Conclusion

The current North Korean puppets' power structure is changing into a Kim Jong Il-dominated system. The current Kim Jong Il system contains military seniors in the core and in the middle and lower base, new line of authority is changing generations into new line of power. Especially, the retreat of Kim Il and Choe Hyeon from the working-level and the advancement of Pak Seongcheol and Oh Jinwoo do not signify [illegible] change as the personnel are both close to Kim Il Sung and also that the movement was among the heads, which considered the order among the group. However, it signals that natural retreat of senior groups and change of generations are taking place.

Nonetheless, such retreat of the seniors, especially a gradual retreat of the military seniors will bring in the advancement of young military power. Therefore, it will eventually result in an increased influence of the military.

In this perspective, North Korean puppet state will expand its shift in generations in the future and the fluctuation of power structure will continue as well. Such circumstances could lead to the North Korean puppets being led by hard liners in their policy decisions. We evaluate safe adaptation of Kim Jong Il system should be settled by the 6th Congress of the Party.

(Ah-seo)

Telegram from Belgrade to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 017.807

Date: 1 April 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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[... part missing] TELEGRAM
Sender: Belgrade
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Regular traffic
Date: 01.04.1976/18:30
No.: 017.807
To: Comrade Ion Ciubotaru

The North Korean ambassador to Belgrade told me that the situation in Korea is extraordinarily tense, there being the danger of a war breaking out at any given moment in time. In the past month and a half, provocations along the DMZ intensified and a large volume of military equipment and weapons were concentrated in the area.

As usually, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government showed a maximum of patience and calm, but the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to face any situation imaginable.

The North Korean ambassador made a point out of underlining that Romania supported and continues to support, with all the means available, the just cause of the Korean people, its aspiration for reunification, but the same thing cannot be said of other socialist countries.

Signed: Virgil Cazacu

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.088

Date: 11 April 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 11.04.1976/-01:00

No.: 067.088

To: Comrade Deputy Minister, Constantin Oancea

Comrade Ion Ciubotaru, Head of the First Direction – Relations

On April 8th, comrade Ambassador Dumitru Popa organized a dinner for comrade Kim Yeongnam, the Deputy Member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the head of the International Section of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and for other activists within the aforementioned section.

On this occasion, Kim Yeongnam, referring to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, said that recently the South Korean puppet [government], instigated by the reactionary forces in the United States of America and in Japan, are continuously intensifying the provocative and aggressive acts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, therefore generating a rise in the tension in the region, and increasing the danger of a military conflict bursting out. "Such reckless acts – said the North Korean interlocutor – are meant to prepare a new war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

On a critical tone, Kim Yeongnam said that some political and military personalities in various countries believe that the United States would not intervene in case a new war breaks out in Korea. Such statements are founded on the fact that lately, the United States talk more and more about a policy of 'rapprochement' and of 'peace.' But such assumptions are groundless and they stem from not knowing exactly the reality in the region, the manner in which the American imperialists act. When analyzing the situation in the Korean Peninsula, one must always take into account the big interests that the United States and Japan have in the region. Against this background, pointed out Kim Yeongnam, the Tanaka government in Japan, supported by reactionary militarist elements in Japan, promoted an unfriendly, even enemy-like approach towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Prime Minister Takeo Miki, said our interlocutor, brought, to a certain extent, some new elements in Japan's approach towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, showing a more understanding attitude, and evidencing some flexibility. But such positive elements are little sensed, they are unconvincing. The support given by Prime Minister Takeo Miki is not sufficiently solid and therefore he is adopting an unstable, oscillating position. Militarist circles, reactionary elements in Japan continue their hostile propaganda towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, stating that in case of the breakout of a war, if American troops are withdrawn from South Korea, Japan is ready to intervene in Korea with its naval and air armed forces. Japan continues to transfer naval forces from Okinawa to American bases in South Korea, with the consent of the Park Cheung Hee clique. American-Japanese-South Korean joint military drills are intensifying. At their turn, the South Korean puppets assert that their armed forces are capable of facing off the North Koreans in a military confrontation on their own, which is why they are preparing [so much].

The struggle of the popular masses in South Korea for the democratization of society, for the peaceful and independent unification of the homeland is intensifying every day, integrating various social layers and adopting ever more well organized forms, so that they adopt documents like "the Declaration for Democracy and Saving the Homeland" (March 1st, 1976).

Peace-loving peoples in the entire world support the struggle of the Korean people. In Europe and in other parts of the world, solidarity committees are formed, which support the just cause of the Korean people, condemning the anti-popular regime of the South Korean puppets. Numerous youth, women's, community, religious organizations in Japan, in other countries, criticize the position of those respective countries towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through organized efforts—rallies, conferences, etc.—to show their support for the struggle of the Korean people.

Signed: Charge d'Affaires V. Nanu

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 083.895

Date: 14 April 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Washington

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Regular Traffic

Date: 14.04.1976/00:15

No.: 083.895

To: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Second Direction – Relations

Regarding: the Korean Matter

Robert Martens, Head of Regional Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from the Department of State, told comrade Petre Anghel, third secretary, the following things:

1. The situation in the Korean Peninsula remains possibly the most explosive one in Asia, with real possibilities to get the big powers involved in the eventuality of a conflict breaking out.
2. Lately the political tensions in South Korea are rising. The intensification of anti-government demonstrations contributes to maintain this state of tension and the possibility to have the South Korean administration lose control over the situation, which would bring about an even tougher attitude towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, descending into an armed conflict. In addition to the fact that Seoul has a better economic situation, a better trained and better equipped army (the rapport would be 2 to 1 compared to the North Korean army), South Korea is amongst those countries which are capable of producing nuclear weapons, with all the restrictions and preventive measures imposed by the United States of America. All these could compel the Seoul authorities to undertake a military venture.
3. Judging from the data of the Department of State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea asked for a postponement of its foreign debt repayment, which indicates a bad economic situation. That, combined with an inaccurate understanding of the situation in South Korea (where anti-government demonstrations could be interpreted as a sign of the administration's weakness), could be a reason to accelerate [North Korea's] attacks on South Korea.
4. The Department of State believes that action must be taken with respect to both states to make them abstain from measures or actions which would lead to an increase in the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, they believe that if the Korean matter cannot be taken off the agenda of the UN General Assembly session, debates should in any case be limited to realities, and sensitive areas which may trigger undesired effects should not be exacerbated.

Signed: Corneliu Bogdan

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date: 15 April 1976	Source: <i>XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00854/2/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.</i>
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Comrade György Kuti was given detailed information by his Soviet colleague [...] about one of the most important items on the agenda of the Soviet-Korean intergovernmental economic negotiations that took place in Moscow in late January and early February 1976, namely, the utilization of the new Soviet investment and development loan between 1976 and 1980, and also about the repayment of the accumulated [North Korean] debts, the conduct of the DPRK negotiating delegation, and other related issues.

[...]

The DPRK side also made a request for the construction of a nuclear power plant. For various reasons – primarily military considerations and the amount of the investment – the Soviet side declared that this [request] was now inopportune and proposed to come back to it only in the course of the next [five-year] plan. The Korean side was very reluctant to accept this Soviet decision and the rejection of a few other investment demands.

Particularly in the course of the negotiations over credit, but also on other issues, [...] the head of the Korean delegation – Deputy Premier Kang Jin-tae – behaved in an extremely aggressive way, definitely crude and insulting in certain statements vis-à-vis his Soviet counterpart, Deputy Premier Arkhipov. He declared several times that if the Soviet Union was unwilling to make “appropriate” allowances for the “front-line situation” of the DPRK and did not comply entirely with the Korean requests the DPRK would be compelled to suspend its economic relations with the Soviet Union.

It was only after his visit to Comrade Kosygin that Kang Jin-tae changed his conduct, and thus it became possible to sign the agreements. Comrade Kosygin, among others, firmly rebuked him, declaring that the Soviet Union did not accept ultimatums.

Ferenc Szabó
Ambassador

Message Text

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01683 211941Z

61

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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R 211649Z APR 76

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7021

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

S E C R E T USUN 1683

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, KN, US, UN

SUBJ: NORTH KOREAN NOTE TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. NORTH KOREAN FIRST SECRETARY KIM VISITED USUN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTACT OFFICER (MISOFF) TO DELIVER A NOTE, DATED MARCH 11, 1976 FROM NORTH KOREA'S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. KIM REQUESTED MISOFF TO CONVEY ANY US COMMENTS OR REPLY TO HIM FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HIS OBSERVER OFFICE AND THENCE TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN PYONGYANG. TEXT OF NORTH KOREAN TRANSLATION OF NOTE FOLLOWS (ORIGINAL BY POUCH TO IO/UNP MR. HELLMAN.):

NO. 907

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SENDS THIS NOTE TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF US OF AMERICA FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RES 3390 B (XXX) ON KOREA ADOPTED AT 30TH SESSION OF UNGA.

THIS RES ON KOREA ADOPTED AT UNGA LAST YEAR DEMANDS DISSOLUTION OF "UN COMMAND", THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER FLAG OF UN, REPLACEMENT OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ADOPTION OF PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR REMOVING MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH OF KOREA AND

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01683 211941Z

GUARANTEEING A DURABLE PEACE.

THIS RES CORRECTLY REFLECTS SITUATION CREATED IN KOREA AND REQUIREMENTS OF TIMES AND CLEARLY INDICATES RIGHT WAYS AND MEANS FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO QUESTION OF KOREA'S REUNIFICATION.

TRANSLATION OF THIS RESOLUTION INTO PRACTICE WILL BE GREATLY CONDUCIVE TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF QUESTION OF KOREA'S REUNIFICATION AND PRESERVATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN ASIA AND WORLD.

KOREAN PEOPLE AND PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE OF WORLD HOLD THAT THIS JUST RES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

BUT US HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO INTENTION WHATSOEVER TO PUT THIS RES OF UNGA INTO PRACTICE.

CONTRARY TO UN RES US IS INCREASING ITS ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA, STEPPING UP WAR PREPARATIONS AND EGGING SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES ON TO CONFRONTATION WITH US, THEREBY FURTHER STRAINING SITUATION IN KOREA, AND IS SEEKING TO PERPETUATE DIVISION OF KOREA BY FABRICATING "TWO KOREAS".

THIS CAUSES CONCERN TO WORLD PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE.

ALREADY ON MARCH 25, 1974, THIRD SESSION OF FIFTH SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TOO, CLARIFIED ITS STAND ON REPLACING KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND US OF AMERICA, PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, IN ORDER TO CREATE A PREREQUISIT TO REMOVAL OF TENSION IN KOREA AND ACCELERATION OF HER INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, AND PROPOSED TO HOLD TALKS IN THIS CONNECTION.

AT THAT TIME, TOO, US DID NOT RESPOND AT ALL TO THIS NEW PEACE INITIATIVE OF OURS.

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PAGE 03 USUN N 01683 211941Z

GOVT OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA HOLDS THAT IF GOVT OF US OF AMERICA SHOULD TRULY DESIRE PEACE IN KOREA AND ASIA AND WISH INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, IT SHOULD STOP AT ONCE ALL ACTS OF AGGRAVATING TENSION IN KOREA AND INCREASING DANGER OF WAR, TAKE MEASURES OF DISSOLVING THE "UN COMMAND" AND WITHDRAWING ALL FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER UN FLAG, AS DEMANDED BY UN RES, AND AGREE TO REPLACING ARMISTICE

AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT.

IN THIS CONTEXT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA STATES ITS READINESS
TO HOLD TALKS WITH DEPT OF STATE OF US OF AMERICA AT
PANMUNJOM OR IN A THIRD COUNTRY AT ANY TIME.

GOVT OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA EXPRESSES
THE HOPE THAT GOVT OF US OF AMERICA WILL DIRECT SERIOUS
ATTENTION TO THIS PROPOSAL OF OURS AND SHOW AN AFFIRMATIVE
RESPONSE.

WORLD WILL WATCH HOW RES ADOPTED AT UNGA LAST YEAR
WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AND ACCORDINGLY, JUDGE WHO IS REALLY
ENDEAVOURING TO REMOVE TENSION AND SECURE A DURABLE
PEACE IN KOREA AND WHO IS AGGRAVATING TENSION AND LEADING
SITUATION TO BRINK OF WAR.

GOVT OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA CONSIDERS
THAT IF ABOVE-MENTIONED UN RES FAILS TO BE IMPLEMENTED
GOVT OF US OF AMERICA SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL
CONSEQUENCES ARISING THEREFROM.

PYONGYANG, MARCH 11, 1976

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NNN

Report from the GDR Embassy in the DPRK, "Note about a Conversation with the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Comrade Le Quang Khai, on 5 May 1976 in the GDR Embassy."

Date:
6 May 1976

Source:
PoIA, MfAA, C 6857. *Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.*

GDR Embassy to the DPRK
Pyongyang, 6 May 1976

N o t e

Concerning a Conversation with the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Comrade Le Quang Khai, on 5 May 1976 in the GDR Embassy

During the course of the conversation, Comrade Le Quang Khai informed [the discussants] about an article published in the October 1975 issue of the Hong Kong journal from "China" and Taiwan's central newspaper, "*New China*." This article reported extensively on remarks made by Chinese Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua, on August 20, 1975, in the club of the military committee in Tianjin Province. (The Vietnamese Ambassador had a Vietnamese translation of this article with him. We recommend finding out whether we can obtain the abovementioned journal from Hong Kong).

According to this article, Qiao Guanhua also talked about relations between China and the DPRK. When he mentioned the name "Kim Il Sung," there were jeers and heckles in the room. Kim Il Sung was said to have been accused of being a revisionist. Qiao Guanhua commented and said that Kim Il Sung conducted a revisionist policy in earlier years and also worked closely with revisionists. Yet today this charge no longer holds true. The DPRK follows its own independent path on the issue of Korean reunification and does not want any foreign interference. The PR China, Qiao Guanhua stressed, is supporting this policy. If an armed conflict breaks out in Korea, the PR China would only send troops if the United States directly interfered. In the case of U.S. non-interference, the PRC would only morally support the DPRK. Ultimately, the level of assistance depends on the respective existing situation. Overall, China is guided by the policy that there is no fight against imperialism without simultaneously conducting the struggle against revisionism.

According to the opinion of the Vietnamese Ambassador, the PR China attempts by all means, and with an emphasis on increased struggle against revisionism, to influence the Korean side to break its friendly relationship with the Soviet Union.

Overall, Comrade Le Quang Khai rated relations between the DPRK and the PRC as stable. Yet it is hard to overlook that there is a mutual sense of mistrust between them. The DPRK needs the political, moral, and economic support of the PRC in its struggle for the reunification of its country. On the other hand, the PR China is eager to showcase a friendly relationship with the DPRK to the outside world, since China's policies have moved it into a state of isolation from more and more states. The alliance with the DPRK is important to China particularly in Asia, but also in the context of the Third World.

Comrade Le Quang Khai has gained the impression that the DPRK, in its pragmatic policy, is guided by the intention to receive, in case of a military conflict with the South, arms from the Soviet Union and soldiers from the PR China.

According to information held by Comrade Le Quang Khai, economic relations between the DPRK and the PRC in 1975 grew by an additional 40 million dollars compared to the previous year. Overall, the trade volume is said to have reached 240 million dollars.

In 1975 the DPRK imported from the PR China:

1 million tons of coal
1 million tons of oil
50,000 tons of cotton
and other agricultural products like grain, rice (or corn as a substitute), and beans.

In return the DPRK delivered machine tools, ores, and, in part, also non-ferrous metals and cement to the PRC.

In the military field, there was notably closer collaboration between the DPRK and the PRC over the last year (apparently as a result of the Kim Il Sung's visit to the PRC).

The fact that Deng Xiaoping was removed from power was a hard blow for the Korean comrades. Kim Il Sung's visit to the PRC in 1975 and its results were featured in the DPRK [media] with large propagandistic efforts over a long period of time. Even when the campaign against Deng Xiaoping was in full swing in China, Korean television still repeatedly showed images from Kim Il Sung's visit to the PR China. The Korean comrades consider it as most discomforting that the agreements signed between DPRK and PRC during the visit bear the signatures of Kim Il Sung and Deng Xiaoping.

In the context of the campaign against Deng Xiaoping, Chinese politicians who have moved closer towards the top leadership positions were also major protagonists of the Cultural Revolution and also contributed to the confrontation with Kim Il Sung [during the Cultural Revolution].

It is still too early to come to a final conclusion about the course of relations between the PR China and the DPRK. Yet all indications point to the direction that, to a certain degree, relations between the PRC and the DPRK will become colder.

Note:

In general, we agree with the assessment by the Vietnamese Ambassador. Our opinions diverge with regard to his statement that relations will cool down to a certain degree.

As long as Mao Zedong is alive, and for a considerable time thereafter until changes are made to China's top leadership, both sides will be eager to make the relationship closer based on their specific interests.

The Vietnamese Ambassador, Comrade Le Quang Khai, also expressed his thanks and joy about the dignified celebration of the 1st anniversary of the Vietnamese people's victory in the GDR.

He informed [us] how the DPRK declined the request by the Vietnamese Ambassador to speak on this occasion about Korean television. Overall, the Vietnamese comrades are very disappointed about the insufficient reports on Vietnam in the DPRK press, as well as regarding the elections in Vietnam. They explain this fact as such: The Korean comrades are uncomfortable to talk widely about the success of the Vietnamese people, its victory, and the reunification. Apparently they are afraid of negative reactions and doubts about the correctness of their [Korean reunification] policy among their own population.

[Signed]
Everhartz
Ambassador

CC:
Comrade Berthold – Foreign Ministry, Far East Department
Central Committee – Department IV
Ambassador

Report from the GDR Embassy in the DPRK, "Note about a Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Kryulin, on 5 May 1976 in his Residence."

Date:
6 May 1976

Source:
PolA, MfAA, C 6854. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.

GDR Embassy to the DPRK
Pyongyang, 6 May 1976

N o t e
About a Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Kryulin,
on 5 May 1976 in his Residence

The meeting was arranged according to the mutually agreed weekly exchange of information.

Comrade Kryulin informed [me] that his political analysts have reviewed the state of relations between the DPRK and the PRC based on the current new situation in the PRC.

He said his comrades noted that there was no information whatsoever in the Korean press or in the confidential bulletin about the entire campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the events in Tiananmen Square.

Apparently the Korean comrades are very uncomfortable about all the issues surrounding Deng Xiaoping. Events like that lead to reactions with individual Korean comrades which, even if hidden, show that there are no sincere feelings of friendship between the Koreans and Chinese.

About the Koreans, you can say they are afraid of the Chinese since the latter have already tried once in 1956 to depose Kim Il Sung.

The Chinese attitudes towards Kim Il Sung during the Cultural Revolution have created mistrust of Chinese policy [among the Koreans] as well. In addition, the dubious Chinese policy regarding the issue of Korea's reunification and the related demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea have frightened the Korean comrades. Overall, the DPRK is currently in a very tense political situation.

In their endeavor to make gains with the so-called "Third World," a reliable partner for their reunification policy, the Koreans have moved away from us [Soviet Union and allies] without getting closer to the Chinese side.

Actually, due to their own making, the DPRK has no true friends anymore. It is difficult and complicated to live through such a situation. There is only one way left: We (he referred to the states of the socialist community) must close ranks and help the Korean comrades in their search for a way out in order to have them realize who their real and true friends are. Yet, we have to seize the opportunity in cooperation with the closest friends. With this impression he has returned from his [CPSU] Party Congress [in Moscow].

Also, all multilateral and bilateral meetings on the levels of ministers and deputy ministers have to be used to influence the Korean comrades with patience and persistence.

Comrade Kryulin noted that among the closest fraternal friends only Bulgaria has had the opportunity—twice within a short period—to have a meeting [with Kim Il Sung] on the highest level. He voiced his great hopes that towards the end of the year, maybe in October, Kim Il Sung will come for his visit to Moscow. He was convinced that such a visit alone will be a major step forward for us.

My own assessment about the relations between the DPRK and the PRC was confirmed by Comrade Kryulin. He emphasized the following facts as being especially relevant:

The Chinese have always supported the Korean policy of "self-reliance," which now turns itself more and more against the Chinese themselves. Examples for this are DPRK positions on Chile and Angola. The recall of the Korean advisers [from Zaire] also must be seen as a move directed right against Chinese interests and the policy of DPRK military support for Zaire, as it was previously agreed by China, Korea, and Zaire.

Also, demonstrative participation by high-ranking DPRK delegations in party congresses of fraternal parties (Soviet Union, Hungary, Cuba, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, DKP [West German communist party], GDR) is against Chinese policy and furthers Chinese isolation in the international communist world movement.

The DPRK policy towards India does not correspond to Chinese interests as well.

According to information by the Soviet Embassy in the PR China, the Chinese have not published much about the DPRK recently. The Korean comrades take note of this and it makes them overall insecure.

Otherwise you cannot explain the huge propagandistic efforts currently made for the Chinese military ensemble visiting [Pyongyang] right now. Apparently there is a kind of "ajolery" involved here.

Regarding my statement that economic relations between the PR China and the DPRK improved last year, Comrade Kryulin opined one cannot state such in absolute terms. It is correct that with the oil pipeline the Chinese have created a substantial factor to further economic cooperation. Yet this factor will only become effective when they build this year the agreed chemical factory for oil refinery. The oil pipeline the DPRK took over with much propagandistic effort will not resume production for now. Such is due to substantial deficits in technical quality, as Soviet experts have assessed. In general, the Soviet economic experts came to the conclusion that economic relations between the PR China and the DPRK have made no relevant progress during the last two years. What the DPRK really needs for its economic development, the Chinese cannot deliver. The Chinese no longer deserve the reputation they had acquired in previous times, namely the exact fulfillment of contract requirements. The Soviet comrades have obtained information, including from many countries in the Third World and accordingly from the DPRK, that the Chinese comply insufficiently with their previously agreed trade obligations. This situation can be explained by the domestic situation in the PR China. There was economic chaos and no clear foreign trade concepts.

This gets further confirmed by the power struggle in the PRC during recent months. However, Comrade Kryulin stressed, a similar such situation existed in the DPRK.

Kim Il Sung was foremost concerned about political issues and evidently neglected the economic development of the country. The recent changes made, namely the dismissal of Comrade Kim Il as Prime Minister and his replacement by Park Song-cheol, might also turn many things towards the better in the DPRK's economic policy. Kim Il was a sick man and did not show up any more over the last two years. Park Song-cheol, in contrast, is a very energetic politician who also understands a lot about the economy.

Comrade Kryulin called Park Song-cheol a person who always committed to friendship with the Soviet Union. However, it will be important for future developments which role will be played by Kim Il Sung's son and what his relationship with the Soviet Union will be. At this moment, nobody is in a position to make an assessment here.

Note:

Comrade Kryulin's remark on Korean coverage of events surrounding Deng Xiaoping referred to the period until the removal of Deng. Extensive information was provided on 9 April in "Nong Sinmun" (see our telex 55/76 of 9 April).

Regarding his remark on Park Song-cheol: There are very different opinions on this issue among the fraternal ambassadors [here in Pyongyang]. We think there are no relevant indications to characterize Park Song-cheol as a close friend.

[Signed]
Everhartz
Ambassador

CC:
Comrade Mahlow – Central Committee
Comrade Moldt – Foreign Ministry
Comrade Berthold – Foreign Ministry
Ambassador

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03337 052244Z

64

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 050832Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6961

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SEOUL 3337

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNGA KS KN

SUBJECT: KOREA AT THE 31ST UNGA

BEGIN SUMMARY: BLUE HOUSE PROTOCOL OFFICIALS HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN INFORMAL INDICATIONS THAT ROKG APPROACH TO 31ST UNGA MAY SHIFT IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DOD DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMOWITZ AND POLCONS, BLUE HOUSE SENIOR PROTOCOL SECRETARY CHOI KWON-SOO REITERATED BASIC ROK LINE ON 31ST UNGA THAT TAKING INITIATIVE BY INTRODUCING FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND GOING THROUGH EXERCISE SIMILAR TO LAST YEARS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ROKG. CHOI WENT ON TO SAY HOWEVER, THAT TIME FOR ROK TO REVERSE ITSELF AND ANNOUNCE NEW COURSE IN UNGA WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER 30TH UNGA. CHOI INFERRED THAT ROKS COULD NOT NOW BACK AWAY FROM TOUCH FIGHT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL MOREOVER, CHOI THOUGHT, THAT AGREEMENT WITH OTHER CORE MEMBERS ON TACTICS BE REACHED VERY SOON; HE INDICATED THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REVIEWING THIS MATTER AROUND THE MIDDLE OF MAY. FURTHER DLAY IN AGREEMENT ON TACTICS WOULD UNDERMINE FUTURE EFFORTS OF FRIENDLY SIDE.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH POLCONS BLUE HOUSE PROTOCOL SECRETARY PHILIP CHOI REITERATED ABOVE POINTS, THEN WENT FURTHER RHETORICALLY ASKING: WHAT ELSE COULD ROKG DO THAT TAKE INITIATIVE ON KOREAN ISSUE AND ADOPT SAME POSITION AS U.S. AND OTHER CORE MEMBERS, IF LATTER WERE INSISTENT. PHILIP CHOI BELIEVED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 03337 052244Z

ROKG MIGHT CONTINUE FOR A TIME PUBLICLY ON ITS PRESENT COURSE OF

INSISTING ON NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND DOUBTING VALUE OF RE-ENACTMENT LAST UNGA, BUT WOULD WORK IN ACCORD WITH OTHER CORE MEMBERS VIEWS BEHIND THE SCENES. HE ADDED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TONG-CHIN HAD VERY DEFINITELY BEEN LEADING PROPONENT ALONG WITH PRIME MINISTER CHOI KYU-HA OF CURRENT ROK TACTICAL APPROACH AND THAT PARK HAD ADVOCATED SUCH AN APPROACH WHEN STILL ROK AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK. CHOI SAID RECENT APPOINTMENT OF KIM DONG-JO, KNOWN FOR HIS HARD-LINE STANCE AGAINST THE NORTH AT LAST YEARS UNGA, AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSISTANT IN THE BLUE HOUSE, WAS A WARNING BY PRESIDENT PARK TO PRIME MINISTER CHOI AND FOREIGN MINISTER PARK THAT THEIR RECOMMENDED APPROACH MAY BE IN PROCESS OF REVERSAL.
SNEIDER

SECRET

NNN

Report from the GDR Embassy in the USSR, "Note about a Conversation between Comrade Bauer and Comrade Basmanov, Deputy Head of the 1st Far Eastern Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, on 10 May, 1976."

Date:
13 May, 1976

Source:
PoIA, MfAA, C 6857. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.

GDR Embassy to the USSR
Political Department
Moscow, 13 May, 1976

N o t e

About a Conversation between Comrade Bauer and Comrade Basmanov,
Deputy Head of the 1st Far Eastern Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, on 10 May 1976

Comrade Heidenreich [female] was an additional participant for the GDR Embassy.

At the beginning [of the conversation], Comrade Bauer informed [Comrade Basmanov] about the state of relations between the GDR and the DPRK (based on the information sent by the Soviet Union Department of the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 14 April 1976).

Comrade Basmanov thanked Comrade Bauer for the information and made the following remarks in response to the questions from the letter by [GDR Deputy Foreign Minister] Comrade [Werner] Krolikowski from 26 April 1976:

1. On Assessing the Socialist Development in the DPRK

The DPRK is on the path of socialist construction and has had "certain successes" along the way. Obviously there are also a couple of things "which we do not like." This entails, in particular, their emphasis on a "special course" and, correspondingly, the failing acknowledgement of general determinants for a socialist development. There are various mistakes and deficits. They would not occur if the Korean comrades would consequently follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism and be mindful of experiences made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. However, in recent years there is a certain positive trend noteworthy in this respect. Experiences by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are being taken more into account. For instance, they now devote major attention to the planned development of the economy, to material stimuli, and to the living standard of the population.

These developments came about without anybody mentioning them anywhere. The Korean comrades continue to emphasize their self-reliance and their ideas of *juche*. Here, obviously the increasing cult of personality comes into play along with all those mistakes associated with such a phenomenon.

2. On Relations between the USSR and the DPRK

Traditionally the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations with the socialist DPRK. The USSR avoids highlighting differences of positions on certain issues between both countries. The Soviet Union also avoids criticizing the negative aspects in the DPRK, mentioned above, in order not to burden relations, "which are overall more or less on a normal track."

Since the problems in 1965, the relationship has been on the upswing for the last ten years. "It is expanding and improving from year to year."

Exchange of delegations has unfolded on various levels (party, government, parliament, mass organizations). Obviously these exchanges are not characterized by the same openness of exchange in opinions as the cooperation between the USSR and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union understands this. The Soviet Union thinks this kind of exchange is still useful. We have to continue to use it to its maximum extent in order to influence the Korean comrades in our direction and pull them away from the PR China.

In recent years, cultural cooperation has also developed. The Soviet Union is eager to deepen it. Obviously here as well, the typical open atmosphere, so common in relations with other socialist countries, is missing.

As far as the press is concerned, the Soviet Union has so far not succeeded in achieving coverage of Korean publications concerning Soviet reality and Soviet experiences in communist construction. The Korean side limits its media to brief information, protocolary reports, and superficialities. It does not make any qualitative assessments of the domestic as well as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. On matters of foreign affairs the Koreans restrain themselves to report Soviet positions

on issues related to the Korea problem and their discussions in international settings. Yet on basic issues of international policy like disarmament and collective security in Europe and Asia, the Soviet Union does not receive any support whatsoever from the Korean press. In individual cases the latter even prints material of Chinese origin with anti-Soviet contents. For instance, the materials from the X Party Congress of the CCP were published with all their anti-Soviet passages, but withdrawn after hints of displeasure from the Soviet comrades.

Mechanisms of economic cooperation do function normally. The joint governmental commission on issues of economic and scientific-technological collaboration is meeting for its sessions at regular intervals. During recent years, however, a reduction of the overall trade volume is noteworthy. This is due to the Korean inability to serve its payments. The Korean side is interested in an expansion of trade but overestimates its own actual capacities. An annual pattern has begun where the DPRK attempts to receive a maximum from the Soviet Union on credit basis and then negotiates a deferral of payments due. The DPRK attempts to shoulder its economic problems through an expansion of external economic ties, even with the capitalist states. Thus, it increased the trade volume with capitalist countries. However, the DPRK obviously has to serve its payments right away. There are already discussions in those countries to limit any trade with the DPRK since the latter turns out to be such a weak partner when it comes to payments. The increase of Korean trade with the capitalist countries limits options for trade with the socialist countries. The Soviet Union continues with its technological assistance. With its support, 53 facilities will be constructed. (Currently 30 facilities are in progress.) The overall volume of Soviet technological aid between 1971 and 1975 amounted to 475 million Rubles. It was all given on a credit basis. Overall, Soviet credit to the DPRK amounts to more than one billion Rubles. Here as well, the Koreans are unable to meet their payment obligations on time.

In February 1976, negotiations were held between economic delegations of the USSR and the DPRK. The Korean side requested to credit 400 million Rubles for the payment of debts from the previous period. The payment due date was moved up from 1976 to 1981.

Also, the Soviet Union provided further credit for the expansion of factories originally built with its support.

In 1974, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed a fishing treaty. Furthermore, there are agreements pertaining to logging by Korean workers in the Chabarovsk region. So far, 3.8 million cubic meters of timber were logged annually. Recently a new agreement was signed to increase the volume of logging to 4.4 million cubic meters.

The Soviet Union strives toward further expansion of economic cooperation. It is viewed as an important factor for the continuation of relations in general, as well as for the increase of overall influence on the DPRK. It is noteworthy, however, that DPRK capacities for economic cooperation are limited.

3. On the Proportion of Relations Between DPRK-USSR and DPRK-PRC

In general, the DPRK is eager to maintain a balance between its relations with the Soviet Union and the PR China. Sometimes the scale tips in favor of China, in other cases to the advantage of the USSR.

The DPRK conducts its foreign policy activities based on purely pragmatic considerations. The decisive question is always the following: What will benefit our interests, and what will not. The DPRK develops its relationships with individual states according to this thinking. Notwithstanding the growth of relations with the PRC during the previous year (increase of delegation exchanges and collaboration in the field of the press), it would be wrong to say the DPRK is tilting towards the PR China. There are several issues where DPRK interests do not match China's interests and the American presence in Asia is one example. The DPRK demands the withdrawal of U.S. forces from this region, particularly from South Korea. In spite of heightened Chinese attempts to influence the Koreans in an anti-Soviet way, the latter so far has not followed along: "[Basmanov:] We cannot make the accusation that they have revised their position toward the Soviet Union."

In particular, concerning their postures in the Non-Aligned Movement or towards individual developing countries, there are certainly cases where they use Maoist terminology like "rich and poor countries" or the thesis about the role of the superpowers.

As far as the process of detente in Europe is concerned: They are not coming out in favor of it, but also do not go against it. In talks with the Cuban comrades, they referred to their difficult situation on this issue. They expressed their interest not to end up with contradicting the PRC too strongly. They have a long shared border of 1,340 kilometers with the PRC. Their country is divided, and they need the assistance and support of the Chinese.

Regarding their position on Angola, they have corrected themselves and now agree with our position. They have recognized the MPLA and have come out clearly against the Chinese position. This is a similar situation to both Chile and the Middle East. If one analyzes positions of the DPRK on a couple of international issues, the result is that, to a major extent, they are in agreement with positions of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries or at least come close.

Obviously, there are also other issues where they are closer to PRC positions. This concerns, for instance, issues of peace and security in Asia. The Soviet Union does not receive Korean support for its proposal to create a system of collective

security in Asia. At times, the DPRK even states its rejection of this idea.

4. On Options to Integrate the DPRK More Strongly into the Socialist Community

We have to further continue to undertake all attempts to move the DPRK towards the socialist community of states. However, in the near future a closer rapprochement by the DPRK, in the sense of a close cooperation with Comecon or coordination of foreign policy activities, is not very likely. Unfortunately, the DPRK is still unwilling to coordinate its foreign policy actions with the socialist countries. It is acting separately and does not take into consideration positions of the Soviet Union and the socialist community of states. Sometimes Korean positions are even directed against the latter. The DPRK also joined the Non-Aligned Movement without any previous consultation with the socialist countries.

Collaboration with the DPRK in the international arena is impaired by the pragmatic Korean approach to these issues. Though there are annual consultations between the USSR and the DPRK on the Korea issue and mutual cooperation on this question in the United Nations, the Korean side is avoiding talks on any other international subjects. They also barely comment on the latter in the international arena.

It is our task to move their positions maximally close to ours. Angola and Chile are positive examples in this regard. They demonstrate how Korea does not act jointly with the other socialist states, but proceeds in parallel to them. Maybe in the future we might have to analyze and exploit more effectively the contradictions existing between the DPRK and the PRC. By all means we have to prevent a close alliance between the DPRK and the PR China. Obviously we cannot expect from the Korean side open support in the struggle against Maoism. This is tolerated by the Soviet Union. The DPRK avoids all talk about the danger of Maoism and its essence, which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism. The country is afraid of the Chinese and does not want to be affiliated with the combined efforts of the socialist community of states against Maoism.

5. On the Situation in South Korea and the Issue of Korean Reunification

It is difficult to say something substantial about the internal situation of South Korea. The Soviet Union also does not have any contacts [like the GDR] and gets its information from press reports in South Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as from the assessments by the North Korean comrades.

They have economic problems but also remarkable successes. Here, the extensive Japanese and American aid obviously comes into play. There exists concern in the DPRK about those successes. They do not want to fall behind in the economic competition.

Since imperialism suffered a defeat in Indochina, it now considers South Korea as more important. Imperialism wants to attempt, by all means, to prevent a repeat of Indochinese events there. For this reason they make efforts to bolster the regime in South Korea, to provide maximum support and the presence of U.S. forces, and to suppress all forces that advocate contacts between North and South Korea.

In the DPRK there still exists the opinion that reunification can be achieved. Developments in Vietnam have, no doubt, a stimulating effect here.

For the immediate future, however, no substantial results are to be expected in this regard. The situation is very tense. There is extreme hostility between the North and South. The situation at the demarcation line has become exacerbated. Talks between representatives from the two parts of Korea have fallen apart.

The existing confrontation will further aggravate. Each side will attempt to secure maximum international support for oneself and increase its defense capabilities. Mutual attacks will probably intensify, and from time to time dangerous situations may occur.

You have to analyze the current situation very thoroughly. In particular, the DPRK has to avoid overestimating its own capabilities.

Currently, the DPRK is eager to win new allies in the international arena. In recent years it has succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with additional states. It also achieved, last year, the adoption of a resolution on the Korea issue in the U.N. General Assembly, which in particular demands the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea.

In the context of a recent conference of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Association in Moscow, Korean comrades floated the idea of whether a "Committee to Support Korea" could be formed in the Soviet Union, just as it existed for the support of Vietnam. The Soviet side replied that the Soviet Union always supported the struggle of the DPRK for a peaceful and democratic unification of Korea without foreign interference. It will continue to do so. The USSR does not think there is a need to form a special committee for this purpose.

6. On the Planned Visit of Kim Il Sung in Moscow

The Korean side has proposed to realize the already long-planned and always delayed (from their side) visit of Kim Il Sung to Moscow for the second half of the year.

The Soviet Union has declared its willingness to receive such a delegation at the highest level. When preparations reach a more concrete stage, it will propose the month of October as a date. Whether this plan is realized depends on the Korean side.

[Signed]
Heidenreich
Attache

CC:
3 x Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2 x Moscow Embassy, Political Department

613

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM May 20, 1976

TO : The Honorable Lucian N. Nedzi, Chairman,
Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM : Donald M. Fraser, Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Organizations

SUBJECT: The activities of the Korean Central In-
telligence Agency (KCIA) in the United
States.

The following is a general outline of KCIA activities in the United States which, according to various U.S. laws may be illegal (see Tabs A and B), or which, according to diplomatic understandings are highly improper. This memorandum is based upon a subcommittee investigation which began in June 1975. The subcommittee's interest arises from the testimony of Jai Hyon Lee (see Tab C), a former Korean Embassy officer, in which he discussed an "overall scheme of clandestine operations to mute criticism of (President) Park's totalitarianism and to buy off its supporters in the United States."

KCIA control activities

A main objective of KCIA operations in the U.S. appears to be to silence or isolate critics of the Park regime. This has taken the form of manipulation of Korean residents' associations, covert financing of pro-Park newspapers and broadcasting, and harassment and intimidation of critics of the Park regime in this country.

Donald L. Banard, who was the State Department's director of Korean affairs from 1970 to 1974, has testified under oath that he saw intelligence reports of KCIA efforts to influence elections for Korean residents' associations in the United States. Recently, KCIA involvement in the Korean association elections in Los Angeles and San Francisco were reported. According to one informant, a pro-Park slate in the Los Angeles con-

test was supported by a special fund from Korean businessmen raised "under the direction of the (Korean) consulate."

The subcommittee has received information from a former Korean diplomat that a Washington, D.C. area newspaper and a radio-television broadcaster receive several thousand dollars monthly to engage in propaganda activities. The ex-official knew of the payments because they passed through him. Neither the newspaper or the broadcasting company are registered under the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act.

A number of Korean residents have reported threats and harassment directed at them to either cease criticism of the Park regime or to refrain from activities which might reflect badly on authorities in Seoul. One man, Kim Woon-Ha, editor of a Korean-language newspaper in Los Angeles, has had his life threatened, been labeled a communist, and is now trying to survive a consulate-sponsored advertising boycott against his newspaper. A Los Angeles police office has reported that numerous assaults in the Korean community go unreported or unprosecuted because the victims are afraid to cooperate. The officer also stated that he personally had had witnesses in court cases tell him of warnings not to cooperate with law-enforcement authorities.

Election interference

Perhaps the most serious abuse reported had been attempts to contribute money to federal election campaigns. No firm evidence of an actual contribution has emerged, but Section 613, Title 18 U.S.C. makes it a crime for any foreign national to contribute or offer to contribute funds to any election. At least three such offers have been reported and confirmed.

The first attempt involved Row Chin Hwan, a Korean national assemblyman, who approached a White House official in 1974 with a "blanket offer" of cash support for candidates selected by the White House. The official told Row such contribution would be "highly illegal" and reported the offer to the State Department. Rep. Charles Wiggins, of California, said in a February 29, 1976 Washington Post article that

Row made a similar approach to him "at least two years ago." On April 5, 1976 I asked the State Department what its policy was toward non-diplomatic foreign officials who engage in unlawful behavior, specifically inquiring as to the issuance of visas to such persons. On April 28, 1976 the Department replied "we do not believe we have a basis for denying Mr. Row a visa upon request."


Another attempt occurred in September 1975 when the Korean consulate in Los Angeles organized a fund-raising dinner for Senator John Tunney. By all accounts Senator Tunney, and his staff, were unaware of the consulate's involvement. According to informants, a consulate official, and reputed KCIA agent, Woo Shik Kim contacted members of the Korean community saying that since Senator Tunney was critical of the Park regime "we must try to save him. We must try to give him some money." When those invited tried to back out, noting the \$100 per plate cost, Kim said the consulate would cover the amount. But news of the consulate's role leaked out and Senator Tunney promptly canceled his appearance.

The subcommittee has also received sworn testimony that a member of the International Relations Committee refused an offer of cash. Other reports of election interference are being investigated. The Federal Elections Commission is also looking into various allegations.


WZB

In a letter, dated March 11, 1976, the State Department informed the subcommittee that "foreign

intelligence officers of friendly foreign governments are assigned to the United States to share the analysis of foreign intelligence materials with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies to which they are identified." On several occasions Department spokesmen have publicly stated that "the only reason for the presence of Korean agents in the United States (is) to exchange foreign intelligence information and to maintain liaison with U.S. intelligence agencies." Expert observers have said that, at the most, three ECIA analysts stationed in Washington, D.C. would be necessary for liaison purposes and that had been the case before President Park seized total control of the Korean Government.



Standard operating procedures for intelligence organizations suggest that covert operatives are placed in diplomatic and non-diplomatic positions.



An investigation is underway

Persons and organizations associated with Sun Myung Moon

The subcommittee has received information indicating a cooperative relationship between certain persons and organizations associated with Sun Myung Moon, the spiritual head of the Unification Church. This information shows a pattern of activity which raises serious questions as to the nature and purposes of Moon's various organizations.

According to numerous news reports Pak So Hi, interpreter and special assistant to Moon and president of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation (KCF), has ties with the KCIA. These reports are based mainly

on his service as an assistant military attache with Korea's Washington Embassy in the early 1960's. It is widely assumed that Pak's duties included intelligence work. Pak has said he "just laughs" at such charges and that he has a "clear conscience regarding the KCIA." However, Robert W. Roland, a former friend and neighbor of Pak's, is prepared to testify that around April 1963, in a conversation with Pak he casually asked about the duties of an assistant military attache. "In addition to his routine diplomatic functions," Roland reported in a March 24, 1976 letter, "he said he served as liaison between South Korean and U.S. intelligence services."

U2 B

U2 B

Jai Myon Lee, the former information director for the Korean Embassy who defected in 1973, is willing to testify that he was present when the Korean Ambassador authorized access to the embassy's communications facilities by Pak Bo Hi. Also, according to Lee, the KCIA maintained contact with the Freedom Leadership Foundation, an organization founded by Moon and headed by Neil Salonen, president of the Unification Church. He discovered the link "by sheer accident" when he hired a secretary through newspaper ads. Two KCIA agents visited Lee and "casually told me that three American secretaries working at the embassy at the time had been hired on the recommendations of the Freedom Leadership Foundation."

"As if it were routine procedure for hiring American personnel at the embassy," Lee continued, "they said that whenever they requested the Freedom Leadership Foundation, it would furnish candidates."

It is a general practice of Sun Myung Moon to cooperate with the South Korean Government in every way. Around 1970 or 1971, Allan Wood, a former president of Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation, recalls a fear among Moon's disciples that the KCIA might kill Moon, because his million-plus South Korean followers were viewed with alarm by the Blue House. At a meeting Moon outlined his strategy for placating Park Chung Hee, telling his followers, including Wood, that he "wanted to be as useful as possible, and eventually indispensable to" the South Korean Government and Park.

Anne Gordon, an ex-Moonian public relations worker, has told the subcommittee staff that she was informed by her supervisors that the mission of Moonies on Capitol Hill "was not directed at just gaining support for Moon, but also towards maintaining military and economic aid for South Korea and supporting President Park." By these activities, they hoped to show that Moon was not a threat to Park, but rather, sanally ally.

* * *



Report from the GDR Embassy in the DPRK, "Note concerning a Conversation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow on 12 May, 1976, with the Head of the Far East Department, Comrade Kapitsa, and the Head of the Southeast Asia Department, Comrade Sudarikov."

Date:
27 May, 1976

Source:
PoIA, MfAA, C 6857. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.

Berlin, 27 May, 1976

N o t e

Concerning a Conversation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow on May 12, 1976,
with the Head of the Far East Department, Comrade Kapitsa,
and the Head of the Southeast Asia Department, Comrade Sudarikov

This conversation was held following Comrade Kapitsa's request and served as an exchange of opinions about new aspects of the DPRK's domestic and foreign policies, especially with regard to the PRC

For my own assessment of the situation and the relationship between the DPRK and the PRC, I used the analysis we had crafted and reviewed together with the comrades from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang.

At the same time, I also informed the Soviet comrades about a talk on the situation of the economy in the DPRK I had with Comrade Lee a day ago on the flight from Pyongyang to Moscow.

Other participants at the meeting [in Moscow] were Comrade Doerner, 1st Secretary of the GDR Embassy in the Soviet Union, and at a subsequent meal, the Ambassador, Comrade Goede, also attended. Both Soviet comrades agreed with the assessment I provided and emphasized from their perspective the following issues:

1. The economic situation in the DPRK is indeed extremely difficult and complicated. The main reasons for this are the cult of personality [surrounding Kim Il Sung] and the subjectivism deriving from it.
2. There are new tendencies in Korean foreign policy. They are evident in the relationship with the PRC and in the apparently widely diverging positions of both states on important matters of foreign policy. Due to the uncertain attitudes of Chinese politicians concerning the deployment of American forces in South Korea, the DPRK has become very skeptical and distrustful of China.

The Soviet comrades emphasized that it must have hit the Korean comrades hard when they heard statements by American senators regarding their talks with Chinese politicians on this issue. On the other hand, [when] Deng Xiaoping was chosen as the main negotiating partner during Kim Il Sung's visit to the PR China in early 1975, this also had a very negative impact on relations between the DPRK and the PRC. Next to Kim Il Sung's signature on the agreements signed [between the DPRK and the PRC] is the signature of Deng Xiaoping.

Moreover, the Soviet comrades stressed [Korea's] other political differences with China, namely with regard to positions held by both states towards Chile, Angola, the Sahara question, and the Middle East conflict.

A very important event to gauge the relationship between the DPRK and China was the participation by representatives from the KWP at party congresses of the fraternal parties fraternal party congresses?. These are indicators for the correctness of conclusions drawn from the results of the XXV CPSU Party Congress, according to which all efforts must be undertaken in collaboration with the fraternal parties to draw the DPRK closer to the Soviet Union and the states the USSR has fraternal relationships with. However, one should stay free of illusions and take into account the political dependence of the DPRK from the PR China.

Foreign trade between the DPRK and the PRC amounts to about one million Swiss francs. In light of the difficult economic situation in the DPRK, the Korean leadership will not undertake any step which might lead to a freeze of existing economic and scientific-technological relations with the PRC.

With regard to relations with the states of the Third World, the DPRK also faces increasing problems. They can be summarized by the fact that those states are mostly focused on other hotspots in the world like Angola, Sahara, etc. Thus the DPRK objective to focus their interests on Korean reunification is becoming less important.

Comrades Kapitsa and Sudarikov believe that Kim Il Sung will participate in the Colombo Conference [of the Non-Aligned Movement]. Like the Cuban comrades and the DR Vietnam, Kim will also position himself as a strong anti-imperialist. You can already say at this point that Kim Il Sung desires to play an important role at this conference.

Of the ten million dollars needed to fund this conference in Colombo, the DPRK alone contributed 500,000 dollars. The USSR will place major importance on this conference and is already active working to prepare for it. The most important Soviet goal is to move a qualitative step forward towards the formation of an Asian security system.

In summary, Comrade Kapitsa reiterated the position of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that every close fraternal state should use all opportunities and contacts at the minister and deputy minister level, as well as through mass organizations, parliaments, etc., to work with the respective organs of the DPRK. We have to explain our policy patiently and persistently and exert influence on the progressive development of the DPRK, especially to achieve that country's closer relationship with the fraternal states.

The Soviet comrades informed [me] that in all likelihood Kim Il Sung will visit the Soviet Union in October. Such a visit would generate many positive impulses for sincere and friendly relations between the DPRK and the socialist fraternal countries.

The Soviet comrades underlined the close fraternal collaboration between the comrades from the GDR (German Democratic Republic) Embassy in the USSR, and the Foreign Ministry. They repeatedly expressed their thanks for the same cordial relationship in place between the GDR Embassy and the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK.

[Signed]
Everhartz

CC:
1 x Comrade Mahlow
1 x Comrade Moldt
1 x Comrade Berthold
1 x Comrade Everhartz, Ambassador Pyongyang



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PAGE 01 STATE 149193

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TAGS: PFOR, TECH, KS, US

SUBJECT: US-ROK DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION

1. FOLLOWING IS AGREED SUMMARY RECORD OF US-ROK DISCUSSION JUNE 15 AND 16 ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

2. QUOTE: 1) PURSUANT TO THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN SEOUL IN JANUARY 1976 BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION FOR COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES (US) AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) WAS CONDUCTED ON JUNE 15 AND 16, 1976 AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THE KOREAN SIDE WAS HEADED BY DR. HYUNG SUP CHOI, MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THE US SIDE BY AMBASSADOR FREDERICK IRVING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF OCEANS AND

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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WERE CHAIRED BY DR. BYOUNG WHIE LEE, COMMISSIONER, KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, FOR ROK, AND BY MR. MYRON KRATZER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGY AFFAIRS OF THE BUREAU OF OCEANS AND

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, FOR THE UNITED STATES. A LIST OF THE PARTICIPANTS FROM EACH SIDE IS ATTACHED.

3. THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS BEGUN IN SEOUL AND REITERATED THEIR DESIRE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS LEAD TO CLOSER AND MORE FRUITFUL COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGY.

4. 2) THE LIST OF MAJOR AGREED AGENDA ITEMS FOLLOWS, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION:

A) SISTER LABORATORY ARRANGEMENT -

THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED THE RENEWAL OF THE ARRANGEMENT FOR A SISTER LABORATORY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (KAERI) AND THE ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY (ANL). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DISCUSSIONS IN SEOUL ON JANUARY 22-23, 1976, THE US SIDE SUBMITTED A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR CONSIDERATION. THE MEMORANDUM INCLUDES, INTER ALIA, PROVISIONS FOR INTERCHANGE OF PERSONNEL, ADVICE AND CONSULTATION, SUPPLY OF REPORTS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, AND NAMING OF COORDINATORS FROM ANL AND KAERI WHO WOULD SERVE AS THE POINT OF CONTACT TO EFFICIENTLY IMPLEMENT THIS ARRANGEMENT. WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS, THE TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE KOREAN SIDE AND WAS DULY SIGNED AT THE CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS BY DR. BYOUNG WHIE LEE, COMMISSIONER, KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AND BY MR. NELSON SIEVERING, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINIS-

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TSATION.

5. B) AN AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION -
IN RESPONSE TO A PROPOSAL FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THAT AN AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE US SIDE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION ITS DRAFT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE US AND ROK SIDES CONFERRED ON THE TEXT OF THIS DRAFT AND AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, AG REPERENDUM, ON A TEXT FOR SIGNATURE FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE CLEARANCES BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS. THE US REPRESENTATIVE SUGGESTED AS A TARGET THAT THE AGREEMENT

BE SIGNED ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE KOREA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1976, AT SEOUL. THE KOREAN SIDE AGREED THAT THIS ANNIVERSARY MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION.

5. C) JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER ENERGY TECHNOLOGY MATTERS -

NOTING THAT IN THE JANUARY 22-23, 1976 DISCUSSIONS WITH ROK REPRESENTATIVES IN SEOUL, THE US SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER ENERGY TECHNOLOGY MATTERS, THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED A DRAFT LETTER ESTABLISHING SUCH A COMMITTEE WHICH COULD BE EXCHANGED THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS. THE COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE FOUR PRIMARY FUNCTIONS:

1) TO IDENTIFY FUTURE PROGRAM DIRECTIONS AND NEW AREAS OF INTEREST,

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONCRETE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS,

PROGRAMS IN PROGRESS, AND

INTEREST.

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7. THE US REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT MEMBERSHIP ON THE US SIDE WOULD BE LIKELY TO INCLUDE A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A SENIOR OFFICIAL FROM ERD, AND A THIRD TECHNICAL MEMBER. THE ROK REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTING THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE KAERI. THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT A MAJOR ROLE FOR THIS COMMITTEE WOULD BE THE IDENTIFICATION OF FUTURE PROGRAM DIRECTIONS AND NEW AREAS OF INTEREST. FURTHER, IT WAS AGREED THAT UPON AFFIRMATIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE ROK OF THE LETTER FROM THE US SIDE, THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE WOULD COME INTO BEING.

8. 3) OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED -

THE ROK GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO KOREA OF ITS MAJOR PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER TO MEET ITS ENERGY REQUIREMENTS.

A) SAFETY, LICENSING, AND SAFEGUARDS -

THE ROK SIDE INFORMED THE US SIDE OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TAKEN SINCE THE RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BY THE ROK IN 1975. WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, THE ROK SIDE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE US SIDE TO, INTER ALIA, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECTORATE FOR SAFEGUARDS IN THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND CONCLUSION OF A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NPT. IN REGARD TO SAFETY AND LICENSING, THE US AND ROK SIDES AGREED THAT PURSUANT TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY BUREAU/MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON REGULATORY AND SAFETY RESEARCH MATTERS AND COOPERATION IN DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS, TWO TO THREE ENGINEERS FROM ROK WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE US

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HEADQUARTERS FOR PERIODS OF ONE TO TWO MONTHS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE ASSIGNMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS, THESE ENGINEERS WILL VISIT NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONAL OFFICES, WHERE THEY WILL ACCOMPANY NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY INSPECTORS, IN OBSERVER STATUS.

9. B) NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY -

THE ROK EXPRESSED ITS GREAT INTEREST IN EXPANSION OF THE TRAINING CAPABILITIES OF THE KOREAN ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MAXIMIZING DOMESTIC CAPABILITIES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, COMPONENT MANUFACTURE, AND NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION.

10. IN REGARD TO THE EXPANSION OF TRAINING CAPABILITIES AT KAERI, THE US SIDE SAID THAT ADVICE IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE AVAILABLE UNDER THE SISTER LABORATORY ARRANGEMENT WITH ANL, WHICH WOULD ALSO DRAW ON OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AS APPROPRIATE.

11. IN REGARD TO THE EXTENSION OF CREDITS FOR THE PURCHASE OF SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT ITEMS, SUCH AS A REACTOR SIMULATOR, THE US SIDE STATED THAT US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WOULD ACTIVELY EXPLORE WITH THE US EXPORT-IMPORT BANK POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN APPROPRIATE CASES.

12. CONCERNING THE LOCALIZATION OF MANUFACTURE OF REACTOR COMPONENTS, INCLUDING FUEL FABRICATION, THE US SIDE CONFIRMED ITS READINESS TO ENDORSE AND ENCOURAGE COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REPORTED THAT STEPS TOWARD THIS END HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN WITH PRINCIPAL US REACTOR MANUFACTURERS.

13. C) OVERALL FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGY -

THE KOREAN SIDE STATED THE IMPORTANCE TO NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT OF FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGY, AND EXPRESSED ITS INTEREST IN FUEL CYCLE MANAGEMENT TRAINING. IN THIS

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CONNECTION, THE US SIDE REEMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH REPROCESSING FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY. THE US SIDE SUGGESTED THAT KOREA SEEK TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE IAEA GENERIC STUDY OF REGIONAL FUEL CYCLE CENTERS (RFCC). THE US REPRESENTATIVE REITERATED THAT TRAINING ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED TO ENSURE RESPONSIBLE ROK PARTICIPATION IN ANY FUTURE REGIONAL FACILITY COULD BEST BE EVALUATED AND UNDERTAKEN AS CONCRETE PLANS FOR SUCH A FACILITY EVOLVE. THE US SIDE ALSO INDICATED THAT IN THE FUTURE, REGIONAL STUDIES, PARTICULARLY IDENTIFIED WITH EAST ASIA, MAY BECOME ACTIVE AND THAT A JOINT INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH A STUDY BETWEEN THE US AND ROK, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS, MIGHT ENSUE.

14. D) US SCIENCE ATTACHE IN SEOUL -

ASSIGN A SCIENCE ATTACHE TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SEOUL.

15. E) TOLL ENRICHMENT SERVICES -

THE ROK SIDE REQUESTED US ASSURANCES THAT US ENRICHMENT SERVICES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE EXPECTED NEEDS OF THE ROK NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. THE US SIDE EXPLAINED THE CURRENT STATUS OF CONSIDERATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT BY THE CONGRESS, AND REITERATED THAT THE US INTENDED TO FULFILL BOTH ITS CONDITIONAL AND FIRM ENRICHMENT SUPPLY CONTRACTS. THEY STRESSED THAT THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF EXPANDING US ENRICHMENT CAPACITY, AND THAT THIS EXPANSION WOULD ALLOW THE US TO MEET ADDITIONAL ENRICHMENT REQUIREMENTS BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ABROAD.

16. F) KORI II LOAN APPLICATION -

IN REGARD TO THE KORI II LOAN WILL BE COMPLETED JUNE 16.

17. G) KOREA NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION -

THE ROK REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED THE ROK'S LONG-STANDING DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION IN KOREA AND INVITED US SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION.

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TION. THE US REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED THAT THE US NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ADVICE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

18. H) FUTURE MEETINGS -

THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE NEXT DISCUSSIONS ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND OTHER ENERGY MATTERS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE US AND THE ROK AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENT MEETING, AND THAT THE JOINT COMMITTEE SHOULD MEET IN SEOUL IN THE SPRING OF 1977 AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ROK. END QUOTE KISSINGER

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Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date:

25 June
1976

Source:

XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00854/5/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai

At the 13th session of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Economic Commission, held in Moscow in the first half of June, Comrade Novikov asked Kang Jin-tae to ensure that the DPRK put an end to the delay that once again occurred in its commercial deliveries (approx. 20%).

[...]

The Soviet Union cannot deliver a nuclear power plant to the DPRK in the new five-year plan [1976-80] either, for it has long-term commitments [to construct such plants elsewhere]. For the time being, the Soviet Union, also, failed to give its consent to the extension of the agreement on lumbering in Siberia by 3 years, because there are ecological surveys in progress [in these areas].

Ferenc Szabó
Ambassador



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 160566

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APPROVED BY EA - MR GLEYSTEN
IO - MR BAKER
P - MR. HABIB
S/S -D:LRMACFARLANE
S/P - MR ARMACOST

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E.O. 11652: GOS

TAGS:PFDR, UNGA, KS

SUBJECT:KOREA AT 31ST UNGA

REF: (A) STATE 158112; (B) STATE 159512; (C) USUN 2664;
(D) SEOUL 4876; (E) STATE 152265; (F) SEOUL 4829

1. IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN PARK SOME BACKGROUND ON OUR THINKING ON CORE GROUP ACTIVITIES MAY BE USEFUL. REF A (CORRECTED BY REF B) SET OUT LIMITED FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING "POLITICAL INITIATIVE." CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN AT THIS TIME ONLY TO WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL MAKE FAIRLY STRAIGHTFORWARD REITERATION OF SEPTEMBER 22 PROPOSALS, PERHAPS WITH ADDITION OF SPECIFIC INVITATION. WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDERING REFERENCE TO CANADIAN IDEA OF PEACEKEEPING FORCE, CALL FOR "PEACE AGREEMENT", OR OTHER IDEAS SUMMARIZED REF C.



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PAGE 02 STATE 160566

2. FOR MOST PART, CORE GROUP IDEAS APPEAR TO US TO BE OF DOUBTFUL UTILITY AS TACTICAL MANEUVERS, AND SOME ARE COMPLEX AND POSSIBLY CONTRARY TO OUR INTEREST (FOR EXAMPLE, CANADIAN IDEAS, REF E). IN DEPARTMENT'S VIEW CORE GROUP DISCUSSIONS HAVE SERVED THEIR MAJOR PURPOSE OF KEEPING

OUR ALLIES ON KOREAN QUESTION WITH US; HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON NATURE OF OUR INITIATIVE HAVE TENDED TO GET INTO MORE DETAIL THAN WOULD BE USEFUL FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THEY HAVE DRIFTED SOMEWHAT AND SHOULD BE REFOCUSED ALONG LINES PARAGRAPHS 2B AND C OF REF A. WE WOULD NOT WISH CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF CORE GROUP IDEAS (AND REVIEW IN CAPITALS) TO ALLOW DEVELOPMENT OF ASSUMPTION THAT SOME OR ALL WILL BE INCORPORATED IN ANY RESTATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 22 PROPOSALS WHICH WE MAY MAKE. IN FACT CONTINUED ELABORATION OF IDEAS WITHOUT CORRECTIVE FROM US SEEMS LIKELY TO CREATE SITUATION IN WHICH OUR FINAL DECISION MAY DISAPPOINT EXPECTATIONS OF CORE GROUP.

3. YOU SHOULD INFORM FONMIN PARK THAT ANY REITERATION OF OUR SEPTEMBER 22, 1975 PROPOSALS SHOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE QUITE SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL FONMIN THAT WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW MOVE CORE GROUP ON TO DISCUSSIONS OF RESOLUTIONS, LOBBYING IN ADVANCE OF NAM, AND GAINING SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER RESOLUTION IS DECIDED UPON. IN THIS ENDEAVOR WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ROK AND US TO AGREE TO TAKE LINE IN CORE GROUP THAT WE APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, WILL CONSIDER THEM AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW MOVE ON TO CONSIDERATION OF RESOLUTIONS AND OUR GENERAL POSTURE. FOR OUR PART WE WOULD PLAN TO REEMPHASIZE LIMITS OF OUR CONSIDERATION OF "INITIATIVE" IN NEXT CORE GROUP MEETING.

4. IN REGARD DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED REF C, YOU MAY WISH TO NOTE TO FONMIN THAT, WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO REVIEW RESOLUTION CLOSELY, OUR INITIAL REACTION IS THAT RESOLUTION CONTAINS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AND WARRANTS FURTHER CORE GROUP DISCUSSION. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ROK'S REACTION TO IT.

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PAGE 03 STATE 160566

5. SHOULD FONMIN RAISE ISSUE OF GENERAL COMMITTEE COMPOSITION (REF F), YOU MAY SAY THAT AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE ARE RELUCTANT TO PUSH STRONGLY FOR PARTICULAR CANDIDATES AS SUCH MOVES ARE LIKELY TO BE RESENTED AND THEREFORE COULD WORK AGAINST US. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF NARROW VICTORY IN GENERAL COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, WE AGREE THAT EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MINIMIZE RISK OF NOT GETTING FRIENDLY KOREAN ITEM INSCRIBED ON UNGA AGENDA. THUS, EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE RESERVATIONS, WE WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER ROKG RECOMMENDATIONS AND WILL RAISE QUESTION IN CORE GROUP IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHICH COUNTRIES IF ANY IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO APPROACH.

6. FOR USUN: FOR REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE, DEPARTMENT DISTURBED BY CORE GROUP'S ACTION IN REFERRING UK'S OMNIBUS DRAFT INVITATION TO CAPITALS FOR REVIEW EVEN THOUGH USUN HAD POINTED OUT OUR LIMITED VIEW OF "INITIATIVE". WE REALIZE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED BECAUSE OF CORE GROUP STRUCTURE AND MANDATE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS. HOWEVER, REFERENCE OF UK DRAFT TO CAPITALS IMPLIES A SENSE OF CONSENSUS WHICH WE (AND WE ASSUME OTHERS, SUCH AS JAPANESE) ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCORD IT.

7. IT IS ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT USUN MAKE VERY CLEAR TO JULY 1 CORE GROUP OUR THINKING ON NATURE (PARA 1 ABOVE), OF POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND TOGETHER WITH ROK, MOVE GROUP ON TO CONSIDER OTHER ISSUES WE BELIEVE MEMBERS SHOULD NOW BE WORKING ON. USUN SHOULD THEREFORE EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR CORE GROUP'S IDEAS, AND SUGGEST STRONGLY THAT WE MOVE FORWARD ALONG LINES OF PARAS 2B AND 2C OF REF A. USUN SHOULD ALSO RAISE QUESTION OF GENERAL COMMITTEE COMPOSITION ALONG LINES PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE, AND ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT COMMITMENTS, IF NECESSARY AND ADVISABLE, TO LOBBY ON COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP.

ROBINSON

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Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.190

Date: 6 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 06.08.1976/00:00
No.: 067.190
To: Comrade C. Oancea

On August 5th, the heads of diplomatic missions from socialist countries, accredited to Pyongyang, including Ambassador Dumitru Popa, were summoned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs where Jeon Myeongsu, Deputy Foreign Minister, where they were presented with and given a "declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government."

The text of the abovementioned declaration was presented to and given to the heads of diplomatic missions from non-socialist countries as well, in the subsequent meeting.

In the text of the declaration, it is underlined that the state of tension, existing for a long time in Korea, has presently become more acute than ever. The Korean people is experiencing a critical situation. War can break out at any point in time.

The United States of America and the rulers of South Korea are currently done with war preparations and moved on to adventurist schemes, trying to trigger the war. American and [South] Korean military units are deployed close to the demilitarized zone and are ready to fight. All military units have been ordered to be in a permanent state of war readiness.

The state of emergency has been declared on the entire territory of South Korea. In the United States and Japan, in military bases in the Pacific and Okinawa, strategic bombers, carrying nuclear weapons, transport aircraft, etc., are ready for a war on the Korean front, at any point in time. The current situation resembles the one in 1950, when the United States waged a war on Korea. Amongst other things being mentioned, it is shown that after the defeat suffered in Indochina by the United States, the main target for the US now is Korea.

After talking about the concentration of forces in South Korea, war preparations and military maneuvers which are taking place, the declaration mentions that all these things demonstrate that the United States, after intensively preparing for a war, is now moving to the direct provocation of the war.

If the United States does not cease its war threats, it will be impossible to prevent a war on the Korean Peninsula, which may easily turn into a world war.

"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea government and the Korean people vehemently condemn the provocative schemes, the hostile, criminal, mindless actions of the United States and the South Korean rulers, which are a serious threat to peace in the entire world, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is asking peace-loving countries' governments and peoples to follow extremely closely on the dangerous schemes of the United States [meant] to trigger a war in Korea and to decisively condemn them." It is also mentioned that on the one hand, the United States aggravates the situation to the verge of war, but on the other hand, it blabbers about 'negotiations' between interested parties.

The declaration also underlines that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government asks the United States to immediately cease all of its new warmongering schemes and all acts of aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to immediately withdraw its nuclear weapons and all the other weapons it introduced in

South Korea, to end its attempts to perpetuate two Koreas and to apply the resolution (put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) at the 30th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

In conclusion, the document expresses the conviction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government and of the Korean people that the governments and peoples of all peace-loving countries will channel their attention towards the critical situation that was created in Korea, and that they will actively support the just position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

After reading the declaration, Jeon Myeongsu said that this document is a product of the current situation when American imperialists finished their war preparations and are on the point of directly provoking the war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

At the same time, he expressed his conviction that the governments of countries [present at the meeting] will take appropriate measures to support the declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government, to support the struggle of the Korean people for reunification of the country.

The Korean deputy minister expressed his desire that the mass information apparatuses in those countries [present at the meeting] would extensively broadcast about this declaration. He wanted them to publish, respectively to broadcast, articles through which they would condemn the actions meant to provoke a new war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, undertaken by the United States of America and the South Korean leaders.

In conclusion, Jeon Myeongsu informed [us] that a memorandum of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government will be released to the public, on the current situation in the Korean Peninsula.

On the same day, the aforementioned declaration and the memorandum of the North Korean government were presented at a press conference held at the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attended by press attaches and press correspondents from foreign press agencies in Pyongyang.

The memorandum comprises the main ideas presented in the declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government dated August 5th: the very serious situation, the intense war preparations, the danger of another war breaking out, etc. At the same time, the memorandum includes several analyses and opinions offered by American officials, briefs and news published and broadcasted in the interval January 1975 – July 1976, by the press in the United States, Japan, South Korea, by press agencies and radio broadcasting stations, on the position of the United States towards Korea and towards war preparations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

About the two documents, the Embassy does not possess information that any new significant elements have recently emerged, which could certify the assessment that the situation in the region has rapidly and significantly deteriorated.

We believe the aforementioned declaration and memorandum are circumscribed in the well-known propaganda campaign undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Korean matter, they are a response, a reaction to Kissinger's most recent proposals to summon a four-party conference and to prepare an appropriate atmosphere to discuss the situation in the Korean Peninsula at the high-level meeting in Colombo.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

Memorandum, Branch Office of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade in Pyongyang to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade

Date:
9 August
1976

Source:
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00170/7/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai.

Comrade Gnidenko [the Soviet deputy commercial counselor] gave the following information:

1. Preliminary information about the 13th session of the Intergovernmental Consultative Commission:

The 13th session of the Commission was held 8-11 June 1976 in Moscow. The minutes of the session were signed by Deputy Premiers I.T. Novikov on the Soviet side and Kang Jin-tae the Korean side.

At the session the Korean side attempted to evade the questions related to foreign trade, for that was a sensitive issue for it. However, the Soviet side [...] managed to ensure that due emphasis was laid at this session of the Commission on the discussion of the commercial relations between the two countries.

Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Grishin, as well as the sectoral ministers, who made speeches at the session, raised the issue that in 1976 Korean shipments had substantially decreased in comparison with the same period of earlier years; the [DPRK's] failure to deliver the raw materials that were planned to be imported from Korea caused stoppages in the operation of important Soviet industrial plants, seriously jeopardizing the continuity of production.

In response to these questions by the Soviets, the Korean side made promises to make up for its under-fulfillments in the second half of the year [...] The Korean side stated its demand for a nuclear power plant [...].

The Soviet side declared that it was unable to deliver a nuclear power plant in the near future, for its production capacity was already being utilized to fulfill other demands on which a decision had been made earlier.

[...]

The situation that has developed [in the DPRK] prompted the Branch Office of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in Pyongyang to make more thorough inquiries. [...]

– The shortage of rainfall [in 1975 and 1976] produced a substantial effect on the production of electrical energy (in the estimation of the Soviets, hydroelectric power plants constitute 50% of the present power generation capacity), that is, there was no way to utilize the capacity of the hydroelectric power stations, and they could not generate as much energy as planned.

[...]

István Suhajda
Commercial Counselor

U.S., DPRK DMZ GUARDS CLASH AT PANMUNJOM 18 AUG

Pyongyang KCNA in English 1048 GMT 18 Aug 76 OW

[Text] Pyongyang, August 18 (KCNA)--The U.S. imperialist aggressors who are hard at work to start a new war of aggression in Korea committed a grave provocation against our side on August 18 in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom.

Around 10 hours 45 minutes on the morning of August 18 the U.S. imperialist aggression troops drove out 14 hooligans carrying axes to fell trees in the Joint Security Area.

In connection with this act of the enemy, four personnel of our side went to the scene and repeatedly told the enemy that as the trees are standing in the Joint Security Area under our control, trees must not be felled arbitrarily but an agreement must be reached between the two sides before felling them.

Nevertheless, the rascals, far from complying with our just demand, collectively pounced, brandishing lethal weapons, upon security personnel of our side and committed the outrageous, provocative act of beating them, counting on their numerical superiority.

Security personnel of our side were compelled to take a step in self-defence to counter the reckless provocation of the scoundrels.

This provocation of the scoundrels in broad daylight in the area of the meeting place of the two sides was one planned by the U.S. imperialist aggressors to further aggravate the prevailing situation.

This was proved also by the fact that the enemy side had kept ready some 100 arms personnel near the spot of the incident.

The U.S. imperialist aggressors must stop such provocative act aggravating the situation in the Joint Security Area in future and punish those who committed the provocative act. If the U.S. imperialist aggressors persist in such provocation, they will have to bear full responsibility for the consequences arising therefrom.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

August 18, 1976

Time and Place: 3:47 pm - White House Situation Room

Subject: Korea

Participants:

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger

State: Charles Robinson
Philip Habib

Defense: William Clements
Morton Abramowitz

JCS: Admiral James L. Holloway
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA:
.....
.....

NSC: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
Michael Hornblow

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

SECRET

Secretary Kissinger: There is a practical problem I would like to point out. The attack occurred at 9:43 last night and I was not notified until 9:00 this morning.

.....
..... That was poor performance on our part and we will take the blame.

Mr. Clements: There is no reason for CIA to take the blame - why not DOD and State who also received messages in these channels.

Mr. Habib: The information came in at midnight last night but I did not learn about it till this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: It was in my take this morning along with some fifty other cables.

Mr. Habib: It was 8:30 this morning when I first knew about it.

Mr. Abramowitz: ISA did not learn about it until 9:30 this morning.

.....
..... There was discussion between the operation centers but nobody alerted the principals.

Secretary Kissinger: Wasn't there another incident where this sort of thing happened recently? Of course, there was the Mayaguez.

Mr. Habib: We should of been informed at 12:01 am. The machinery did not work properly.

..... The various operation centers talked with each other but did not send it up to the principals.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not blaming CIA. Each department should be organized to inform its principals. Let's begin the briefing.

.....begins briefing. Attached)

Secretary Kissinger: were photographers taking pictures
Why don't we see any North Koreans' dead bodies.

Adm. Holloway: Stilwell doesn't believe that there were any North Korean casualties.

Mr. Robinson: Did the North Koreans report on the incident?

.....
..... Yes, but there was not mention of casualties.
.....continues and finishes briefing).

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

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Secretary Kissinger: What does the South have in terms of manpower?

..... They have 523,000 men in their army, 280 jet fighters, 175 patrol craft and no submarines. In our judgment a military action by the North to be effective would have to be a surprise attack. We, therefore, do not believe that the North had a major attack in mind.

Secretary Kissinger: Can somebody provide me with an analysis of how the two sides balance forces?

Admiral Holloway: The North Korean ground forces have good hitting power, but the South Korean army is well lead and backed by the U.S. The North Korean air force is larger, but the South Koreans are better trained. There is also the confidence factor. The South Koreans are confident because the U.S. backs them up. The North Korean submarines are not worth very much. Each country has a military force which is well designed to support its own strategy and position. In my judgment, it is a military stand-off. I do not think that at the present time that the North Koreans could mount an effective military invasion.

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..... Were you factoring in the US forces?

..... That is a key judgment. We believe there are two key elements. One is the US-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and the other is the presence of US forces. If the US forces withdraw then the North Koreans would have the military advantage.

Kissinger: Why was the reaction force so late in getting into the area?

Holloway: Stillwell has avoided answering that.

Kissinger: We sure mentioned the photo coverage. Why was it necessary to prune that tree?

Holloway: It obstructed the line of view between the observation post and the tower. On t his chart I can only find one of the two positions cited.

Clements: Wasn't that a routing operation - keeping the area clear?

Kissinger: This cable which was just handed to me makes it sound as though there was a lot of backing and forthing about this.

Hyland: They told us not to do it. (The North Koreans)

Holloway: Stillwell's report says that the original plan was to cut the tree down but the North Koreans said no. We then decided to prune it. An eyewitness account says that when the North Korean Officer arrived on the scene he asked what they were doing. He was told "Pruning" and answered "good.")

Habib: There are some differences in the reporting of that.

Kissinger: Why do the North Koreans have the right to object to our cutting down or pruning a tree?

Habib: The whole area is a joint area.

Kissinger: If the North Koreans decide to prune a tree do they ask our permission.

Habib: no. We don't care. Each side has its its own area within the joint area.

Kissinger: Can each side order the other side around?

Habib: They can't force each other but there is a lot of argumentation.

Kissinger: Well there are two problems as I see it. ~~1st~~ The first problem is that two American officers have been beaten to death. The second problem is to review the procedures we are following in the WZ. Now regarding the first issue I agree with the CIA analysis. My impression is that it was a premeditated attack. There were some fifty other things they could have done to stop us from pruning the tree.

Now this letter Stillwell wants to send to Kim. Why should he send a letter to Kim? What standing does he have?

Habib: Well Stillwell is the Commander of the UN Forces and Kim is the Commander of the North Korean Army. Kim also signed the original Peace agreement.

Kissinger: There have already been White House and State Department statements deploring these murders. Why do we now also need a Stillwell statement. Does he have the authority to make a statement?

Abromovitz: no. He needs Washington approval.

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Kissinger: Well lets put that into abeyance. I have talked to the President today about this. He feels that some sort of strong action is necessary but does not know precisely what it should be. Now there are two things that come to my mind. A few weeks ago we turned off a B-52 exercise because it would be provocative to the Chinese. We might resurrect that exercise. The second possibility would be to alert all forces in Korea.

Holloway: We could go from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 3. -----

Kissinger: What would that do?

Holloway: Unless we had a specific plan in mind or the North Koreans felt we had a specific plan in mind they probably would not react at all.

Kissinger: Well on that basis you could not threaten anything.

Abramovitz: Stillwell recommends that we finish pruning the tree.

Clements: I am in complete accord with that and think we should cut the God damn thing down.

Kissinger: I am in favor of that too but I don't think we should do anything ^{about the tree} until after we do something with our forces. What is the meaning of the LITCOM alert stages?

Holloway: 5 is normal and 1 is war. Stage 2 means that war is inevitable and stage 1 is when the shooting starts.

.....
..... if the alert was moved up to 3 how would the media and the US people react to that in this campaign year.

Kissinger: That has nothing to do with it. The important thing is that they lost two American to death and must pay the price.

.....
..... The North Koreans are looking for indications that they can create another Vietnam type mentality in this country. Therefore to disabuse them of this it is important to have the right kinds of expressions of support from the media and opinion makers.

Kissinger: What about resurrecting the B-52 exercise? The State Department hereby withdraws its objections to it. This is now the best time in the world to run it.

Habib: It was a training exercise.

Abramovitz: Would it scare the Americans or the Koreans?

Glayston: There is another exercise planned.

Kissinger: But everybody already knows about that one.

Clements: Is it true that in the exercise we would fly the B-52s over Korea and then go back?

Holloway: Yes.

Kissinger: How long would it take?

Smith: We could get it going in 72 hours - possibly less.

Kissinger: The quicker the better.

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Mr. Clements: Do we wish to drop live bombs?

Secretary Kissinger: If that is part of the program, do it. If not then don't do it.

Mr. Clements: Well let me play Devil's Advocate. Why not drop live bombs?

Secretary Kissinger: If it is part of the plan do it.

Mr. Clements: I can make it part of the plan.

Mr. Abramowitz: *The exercise* would be well below nightmare range and they were not scheduled to drop live ordinance.

Mr. Habib: Those planes will come within easy range of North Korea. Distances there are close.

Secretary Kissinger: OK. That will be a good lesson for them.

What I would like to do now is to go over possible courses of actions and meet again tomorrow at 8:00 am to discuss them. The President wants to explore the possibility of taking one military step. What can we do? You may wish to think about it over night. Whatever we do must be commensurate.

Adm. Holloway: There are several possibilities, we could lay mines, we could seize a North Korean flag vessel or a fishing boat. But seizing a fishing boat might be beneath our dignity. The North Koreans have 34 commercial flag vessels. None of them are in our ports or allied ports. We have only been able to locate 9 of them so the remainder are probably in North Korean waters.

There is also the possibility of a combined *exercise* with the South Korean's. It would take a minimum of four days to set this up. We could also send in a carrier task group. The Midway could be there between 48-72 hours. It is in Yakuska now. They could have a missile-shoot off the coast.

Secretary Kissinger: I like the idea of cutting the tree down. We should generate our forces first and then cut it down. We should also go on a higher alert. Let's put our forces on defcon 3 tonight and get a plan for cutting down the tree from Stillwell. (to Adm. Holloway) Can you start gearing up the B-52 run?

Adm. Holloway: Yes.

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Secretary Kissinger: We need to know what forces Stilwell needs to cut the tree down?

Adm. Holloway: There are two difficult decisions before us.

1) At what point do we stop putting in reinforcements. In the past when we have moved in men they have acted reciprocally and vice versa. At what point would we stop. The next question is the use of firearms. In this recent incident both sides with firearms that were not used.

had

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

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Kissinger: If I had torn one of these men and was being beaten to death, I would have used a firearm.

Habib: They were attacked from behind and had no chance.

Holloway: Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. They were taught there to die before violating the rules of engagement.

Habib: Stillwell knows the estimated forces and that we can't move men without violating the agreement. If there was a fight there would be a need for reinforcements from outside of the zone.

Hyland: Should we reinforce that company?

Habib: The Koreans are the main force in the zone. Stillwell will have to tell us what to do.

Kissinger: Who consults with the South Koreans.

Habib: Stillwell

Hyland: We need to send a message to Stillwell telling him not to go ahead with the letter and to prepare a plan for cutting down the tree.

Habib: The troops could be prepositioned and he could bring them up the road and have them move in as he requires them.

Kissinger: It will be useful for us to generate enough activity so that the North Koreans begin to wonder what those crazy American bastards are doing or are capable of doing in this election year.

Abromowitz: We should consider putting more US forces into Korea.

Kissinger: That might be desirable.

Habib: There is also the question of the Northwest Island. They are highly vulnerable.

Kissinger: Now about our forces. Should they go on alert tonight. We should also get that training exercise laid on. I would like for tomorrow morning to have a list of US forces which could be moved into Korea. We should consider moving F-111s and F-4s in. Then on Friday morning we can move to cut that tree.

Perhaps we should decide now to move the F-4s and decide on the F-111s tomorrow.

Smith: We can do it from scratch in twelve hours.

Habib: We have to consult with the Japanese.

Kissinger: Well then do it. Get the process started.

Abromowitz: To temporarily move our aircraft does not require us to consult with the Japanese.

Habib: We do have to advise them

Kissinger: I would like to get a working group started. Will you set one up?

Habib: Yes - we will need representatives from State, Defense, JCS and the CIA.

Kissinger: Who will inform Park?

~~SECRET~~

... The Charge and Stillwell should go jointly

Cloysteen: A lot of this will soon become public knowledge.

Kissinger: Yes. We have to decide on press guidance. It should be low key. We can admit to going onto UNFCOM 3 because of the premeditated murders.

Clements: Do we have to notify the UN

Habib: No. We have gone to UNFCOM 3 before without notifying them.

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Holloway: Stillwell gets takes his orders from the JCS not the UN.

Habib: I think there is a procedure for the JCS to inform the UN

Kissinger: For tomorrow's meeting there should be a chart prepared of what everybody has to do.

Abromovitz: What about the War Powers Act?

Kissinger: That is a valid point. There should be one central ^{plan} point for consulting with Congress.

Holloway: We will look at it. I have it right here.

Habib: Your lawyers and our lawyers can study it.

Kissinger: By early this evening we should have

1. What we want to do about the War Powers Act
2. Press Guidance - "we are taking these precautionary moves because of the premeditated murder of American soldiers which raised the question of what the North Koreans might be up to.
3. Consultations with ~~USSR~~ South Korea, Japan ~~and~~

Abromovitz: What about the North Korean allies?

Kissinger: I am seeing the Chinese at 5:00

Habib: The North Koreans have already come out with their version of the story. They have not agreed to a meeting tonight. Eventually they must come to a meeting.

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Nyland: The proposed statement is not very strong.

Habib: Stillwell must be told not to submit a letter at the meeting

Kissinger: For the 8:00 meeting tomorrow I want a spread sheet. We should also alert the task force to the possibility they may ~~may~~ need to move. Tomorrow we can concentrate on ~~four~~ things.

1. Additional military deployments to Korea
2. Possible diplomatic actions. Who we should notify and brief.
3. What military action we might take
4. Congressional activity

The meeting ended at 6:43pm

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~~TOP SECRET~~/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



August 18, 1976

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: W.G. Hyland

Held 45 minute WSAG this afternoon with HAK in chair. Attached is a shopping list of things that are being done or could be done tomorrow. General feeling of the group was first, to put forces in Korea on the alert, second, to return to area of incident and chop down the goddamned tree; third, move F-4s tonight; and fourth, examine whether to move some F-111s tomorrow and a carrier task force.

There was a very hesitant discussion about actual military action as you guessed. WSAG will reconvene at 8:00 tomorrow morning to look into what punitive measures we might undertake. Holloway, sitting in for Brown, discussed seizing ships and patrol craft, etc. I talked to HAK about an option in which we would launch very limited air strike in the eastern end of the DMZ, where it would be unexpected and where it would not necessarily touch off something we couldn't handle. He seemed somewhat taken with the idea.

[REDACTED]

Finally, we are going to get out some low key press guidance which I will send to you as soon as it is available because alerting forces and moving F-4s will become public this evening.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12256, Sec. 3.4.

NR 94-39, #18a NSC Ltr. 5/4/94

By KSH/MARA, Date 6/9/94

TOP SECRET



Actions:

1. Put forces in Korea on DEFCON 3 tonight.
2. Move squadron of F-4s tonight from Japan to South Korea.
3. Alert F-111s for possible movement.
4. Alert carrier task force (MIDWAY) for possible movement
(no discussion of where -- Sea of Japan?)
5. Make preparations for launching B-52 bombing exercise,
in South Korea (72 hours?)
6. Prepare for tonight press guidance: low key -- "given nature
of premeditated murder certain precautionary moves being undertaken."
7. Examine question of War Powers notification.
8. Initiate consultations: with Japan; with South Korea.
9. Modify US statement to be made in MAC (already done?)
(Use State language.)
10. Hold in abeyance Stillwell letter to Kim Il Sung.

* * * *

For Tomorrow Morning WSAG:

1. What additional deployments could be made to South Korea?
2. What military actions (punitive) could be undertaken?
3. What further diplomatic actions - US, Russians, Chinese, etc. --
could or should be undertaken?

TOP SECRET

-2-

4. Plan for handling Congressional consultations, etc.
5. Ask Stillwell for scenario to cut down tree in Joint Security Area tomorrow night (our time).



TOP SECRET

**Memorandum of Conversation, Huang Zhen [Huang Chen] and Henry A. Kissinger
(abridged)**

Date:
18 August 1976

Source:
Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPATIONS

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office
Ms. Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter, PRC Liaison Office

Secretary Kissinger
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P
William H. Gleysteen, National Security Council

**DATE, TIME,
& PLACE:**

August 18, 1976
5:00 p.m.
Secretary's Office

[...]

Kissinger: On Korea. It would of course be best if we could avoid a confrontation. I realize you don't have instructions on the matter, but I should note that there was an event in Korea today in which two Americans were beaten to death. This is a serious matter which could have grave consequences if restraint is not shown.

Huang: I heard about it on the radio, but I don't have any details. As for solution of the Korean question, I think our respective views are well-known to each other. Although I am not informed about the latest incident I can say that we know the Koreans pretty well since they are friendly to us. The Korean people will put up a strong self-defense when they are provoked.

Kissinger: Two U.S. officers are dead and we know from very good pictures that no Koreans were killed. The U.S. officers couldn't have beaten themselves to death.

Huang: Why were the cameras ready?

Kissinger: That is a good question.

Huang: Having the cameras there makes it look as though you were prepared for the incident.

Kissinger: The reason for the cameras is that the observation post nearby the site of the incident takes photographs constantly. Our people were trying to cut down trees which obstructed their views.

Huang: I see.

[...]

Message Text

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03317 190300Z

15

ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-10 EA-09 EUR-12 NEA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-10 OMB-01 /130 W

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FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8746
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA
USLO PEKING

UNCLAS USUN 3317

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJ: 31ST UNGA: KOREA: PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION

REF: USUN 3255

FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL VERSION OF PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION AND
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AS PUBLISHED BY UN SECRETARIAT IN
DOCUMENT A/31/192 ON 16 AUGUST (SOMALIA HAS BEEN ADDED
TO LIST OF COSPONSORS):

QUOTE:

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03317 190300Z

ANNEX I

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. THE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE UNDERGOING THE TRAGEDY OF A NATIONAL SPLIT FOR OVER 30 YEARS AND INTERVENTION IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF KOREA BY A FOREIGN COUNTRY STILL CONTINUES.

2. THE QUESTION OF KOREA'S REUNIFICATION SHOULD BE SOLVED INDEPENDENTLY AND PEACEFULLY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT INTERFERENCE OF ANY OUTSIDE FORCES.

3. A RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AT THE THIRTIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 18 NOVEMBER 1975 ON DISSOLVING THE "UNITED NATIONS COMMAND", WITHDRAWING ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE FLAG OF THE UNITED NATIONS, REPLACING THE KOREAN MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT, PREVENTING ARMED CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OF KOREA, REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARAMAMENTS AND EASING TENSION.

4. HOWEVER, SERIOUS ATTENTION CANNOT BUT BE DIRECTED TO THE FACT THAT NOT ONLY HAS THIS RESOLUTION REMAINED UNIMPLEMENTED BUT TENSION HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY AGGRAVATED IN KOREA AND THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY CONTINUES.

5. ALL THE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ARE EXPRESSING THEIR DEEP APPREHENSIONS ABOUT THE FACT THAT, OF LATE, MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY REINFORCED IN SOUTH KOREA, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARE BROUGHT THERE FROM OUTSIDE IN LARGE QUANTITIES, VARIOUS KINDS OF ARMS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE CONCENTRATED ON A LARGE SCALE ALONG THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS DAILY INCREASING.

6. A STATEMENT AND A MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA WERE ISSUED ON 5 AUGUST 1976 IN CONNEXION WITH THIS CRITICAL SITUATION CREATED IN KOREA.

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PAGE 03 USUN N 03317 190300Z

7. TODAY IT HAS COME TO THE FORE AS THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE TO EASE THE EXTREMELY AGGRAVATED TENSION IN KOREA AND REMOVE THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR.

8. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED OF THIS EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM REQUEST THE INCLUSION IN THE AGENDA OF THE THIRTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF AN ITEM ENTITLED

"REMOVAL OF THE DANGER OF WAR AND MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN KOREA AND ACCELERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA".

9. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL PAY DEEP ATTENTION TO THIS FAIR AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL ON REMOVING THE DAILY AGGRAVATED TENSION AND MAINTAINING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN KOREA, AND EXPRESS SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR IT.

ANNEX II

DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION OF 18 NOVEMBER 1975, ADOPTED AT THE THIRTIETH SESSION ON CONVERTING THE ARMISTICE INTO A DURABLE PEACE IN KOREA AND ACCELERATING THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA,

PAYING SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RESOLUTION HAS, HOWEVER, NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED, THAT THE TENSIONS KEEP AGGRAVATING IN KOREA AND THAT THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY CONTINUES,

EXPRESSING GREAT CONCERN OVER THE CRITICAL SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY FORCES ARE BEING CONTINUOUSLY REINFORCED AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE BEING INTRODUCED INTO SOUTH KOREA FROM OUTSIDE, THAT VARIOUS KINDS OF ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE BEING CONCENTRATED ON A LARGE SCALE ALONG THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 USUN N 03317 190300Z

THAT A THREAT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS BEEN CREATED,

TAKING NOTE OF THE STATEMENT AND THE MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ISSUED ON 5 AUGUST 1976 IN CONNEXION WITH THE TENSIONS CREATED IN KOREA,

CONSIDERING THAT IT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON PROMOTING WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION TO REMOVE THE EXTREMELY AGGRAVATED TENSIONS IN KOREA AT PRESENT AND THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR AND TO ACHIEVE THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA,

1. DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL ACTS OF FOREIGN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND AGGRESSION AGAINST KOREA, THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INTRODUCED INTO SOUTH KOREA AND AN END TO THE CTS OF AGGRAVATING THE TENSIONS AND INCREASING THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR IN KOREA;

2. APPEALS TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO CHECK ALL ACTS OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF KOREA AND FABRICATING "TWO KOREAS" TO HINDER THE REUNIFICATION;

3. HOPES THAT THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA WILL BE REALIZED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES WITHOUT THE INTERFERENCE OF ANY OUTSIDE FORCES, THROUGH SUCH FORMS OF NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE AS A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS WHICH MAY EXTENSIVELY REFLECT THE WILL OF THE ENTIRE NATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE, PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND GREAT NATIONAL UNITY CLARIFIED IN THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT OF 4 JULY 1972;

4. REAFFIRMS THAT THE "UNITED NATIONS COMMAND" SHOULD BE DISSOLVED, THAT ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT, AND CONSIDERS THAT SUBSTANTIAL MEASURES SHOULD BE ARRANGED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE FOR
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PAGE 05 USUN N 03317 190300Z

REALIZING THEM.

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~~SECRET~~ (XGDS) (3)

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP

August 19, 1976

Time and Place: 8:12 a.m. - 9:15 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Korea

Participants:

Chairman: Secretary Henry A. Kissinger

State: Charles Robinson
Philip Habib

DOD: William Clements
Morton Abramowitz

JCS: Admiral James L. Holloway
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA: George Bush
Evelyn Colbert

NSC William G. Hyland
Staff: William Gleysteen
Michael Hornblow

DECISIONS:

1. Seek Presidential approval of a military action to cut down the tree and try to do it in such a way as to avoid confrontation.
2. Seek Presidential approval to start the B-52 exercise. The first such B-52 run should be timed to coincide with the tree cutting.
3. To start moving the Naval Task Force south into either the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea.
4. To start moving 18 F-111s from Mountain Home, Idaho.
5. To develop a contingency plan for hitting the North Korean barracks near the JSA.

~~SECRET~~ (XGDS) (3)

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~~SECRET~~ (XGDS) (3)

Secretary Kissinger: I would like some account of why it took so long for our reaction force to go in.

Adm. Holloway: We have not received an account which satisfies us. Stilwell was in Japan when the incident took place and is investigating.

Secretary Kissinger: I complained to the Chinese yesterday. They asked a good question. They wanted to know why we had cameras there if we were not expecting an incident?

Adm. Holloway: It was a precaution because of previous incidents.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. Their next question was -- if we had a photographer there, why didn't we do something?

Adm. Holloway: We have not received a satisfactory answer from Stilwell on that.

Secretary Kissinger: Why did Stilwell go into see Park alone when he was specifically instructed to go in with the DCM?

Mr. Abramowitz: Well he called Stern and Stern said for him to go ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: But did he tell Stern that Stern was supposed to accompany him?

Mr. Abramowitz: He felt that Park was supposed to be informed right away. That was the environment.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going to let Stilwell run loose. We are not going to let him act like MacArthur. We could have cut him out completely and insured that the whole thing be handled by the DCM.

Adm. Holloway: He talked to the Minister of Defense, then ---

Secretary Kissinger: It should not happen again.

Mr. Clements: I will send him a message.

Secretary Kissinger: I heard on the radio this morning a report that the Pentagon says that military action is inconceivable. The President

~~SECRET~~ (XGDS) (3)

will hit the ceiling when he hears that because I told him we would be discussing possible military actions and that is what the President wants.

Adm. Holloway: It must have been press conjecture.

Mr. Clements: It was probably from our PA.

Secretary Kissinger: George, do you have a briefing?

Mr. Bush: (Begins briefing -- see attached.)

Secretary Kissinger: We must brief our NATO allies.

Mr. Bush(continues briefing.)

Mr. Habib: Neutral observers (referring to NNSC members at Panmunjom) won't go.

Mr. Bush (finishes briefing.)

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that they beat two of our men to death. Let's not lose sight of that.

Mr. Clements: Yesterday Henry asked a question about the order of battle. Holloway's judgement was that they are relatively in balance. Is that also your judgement, George?

Mr. Bush: Evelyn?

Mrs. Colbert: Yes, we basically agree. Our ground forces don't count for much. There is a lack of firepower.

Secretary Kissinger: How come 40,000 Americans don't count for much?

Mr. Habib: They consist of one division. The rest are air and ground support.

Adm. Holloway: Our air and mobile forces count for more than is reflected in the numbers. They have great influence.

Secretary Kissinger: I am uneasy about these net assessments. You can look at military history. Wars are often won by the side with the smaller forces. You look at World War I where the Germans were outnumbered. Then again in World War II, the Germans were outnumbered by the French and British. They were able to concentrate their forces at decisive key points and win.

Mr. Habib: Our battle plan for Korea is based on exactly that assumption.

Adm. Holloway: On balance the South Korean forces with US assistance are adequate to stop the North Koreans from reaching Seoul. However a surprise attack could upset that. But that is no longer a possibility since we have gone to DEFCON 3. Of course a lot depends on how the troops fight for there can be breakthroughs. One breakthrough can raise havoc. A bold stroke could cause a lot of trouble. But the North Koreans by their attack on the two men have given away the element of surprise.

Secretary Kissinger: If they had wanted to launch an attack they would not have beat the two Americans to death.

Mr. Hyland: It is obvious from their propaganda that the Chinese were cool to the North Korean August 5 statement. If the North Koreans really want to fight they will need Chinese and Russian support.


Secretary Kissinger: If we do nothing they will think of us as the paper tigers of Saigon. They might then try to create a series of events. If we do nothing there may be another incident and then another.

Mr. Hyland: There is a substantial body of opinion in the US that we should pull out of Korea. Ed Reichauer in the Christian Science Monitor wrote that we should not honor our commitment even if attacked.

Mr. Robinson: When was this article?

Mr. Hyland: About three weeks ago. There may be a problem if the North Koreans think that this crisis will cause controversy in this country.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly there will be controversy. There would be a controversy if we did nothing. The only way to act is to do something effectively.

Mr. Bush: 

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of alert did they have for the EC-121?

Mr. Bush: There was no such strip alert at that time.

Mrs. Colbert: It was intended to demonstrate to the US a high degree of readiness and to give us pause from undertaking military action. They laid everything on before publicizing their alert.

Secretary Kissinger: You still think that yesterday's incident was a planned action?

Mrs. Colbert: Yes. The way they handled the alert was another indication that it was planned. Within one hour of our going on DEFCON 3 they had their strip alert.

Secretary Kissinger: You do think it was planned.

Mrs. Colbert: An incident was planned but the actual killing of the two Americans may not have been in the plan. Those guards have been indoctrinated to hate Americans. The Koreans are very violent. The weight of the evidence including the number of Korean reinforcements ready prior to the incident indicates that our interpretation is true.

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously the tree was going to be a contentious issue and it was probably clear to the North Koreans that our going-in was likely to create an incident. So why didn't we also anticipate this. Where was our reaction force? We had no authority to prune the tree. We went in, advised the North Korean Officer who said good and then all hell broke loose.

Mr. Clements: Well, I agree. I remember our discussion yesterday and what you (to Holloway) said about our troops being Vietnam veterans trained to obey the rules. But they were armed and I can't understand how they could have let the Koreans get that close to them and get themselves clobbered and chopped up.

Secretary Kissinger: What military options do we have?

Adm. Holloway: Stilwell was in Japan during the incident and still does not understand what happened. It was a surprise to him. One thing he did point out on the telephone is that once the two officers were killed the troops were leaderless.

Secretary Kissinger: What about the guy in the observation tower.

Adm. Holloway: Our information on that is garbled. There is no reasonable excuse. Since yesterday's meeting we have gone up to DEFCON 3 and our F-4s arrived in Korea before nightfall. The North Koreans are aware of it because they complained about it at the MAC meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Habib: Technically speaking any introduction of forces into Korea is illegal. We have done this thousands of times and the North Koreans have always complained. They do it too. The introduction of any weapons not there at the time of the agreement is illegal.

Secretary Kissinger: What are we going to do?

Adm. Holloway: The first priority is to prune or cut the tree. The preliminary plan is to move in with some forces and chop it down quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: Does the Army have highly trained tree choppers?

Adm. Holloway: It would be done by specially trained Army engineers. The second option mentioned by Stilwell would be to announce to the press and observers and the North Koreans that we were going in to cut down the tree. Stilwell says this would be okay politically but might cause some military problems.

Secretary Kissinger: I respect Stilwell's military judgements but politics is not his forte. Can you imagine inviting the world press to a tree cutting. We would be a laughing stock. It would be theatrical. The thing is to do it and then get out. The press could be invited in to look at the stump.

Adm. Holloway: The plan as we know it is not entirely adequate. They are getting it to us.

Mr. Clements: This business of sending in a squad is nonsense. It will just lead to a confrontation and may get a bunch of others killed. What for? A tree? One guy with explosives, some plastique, could do the job. He could go in on a bicycle. Why risk a bunch of people for a tree? I don't like it at all. It makes no sense. We should not expect unarmed Americans to go in there and get killed over a tree.

Secretary Kissinger: The basic point is that we know we have the right to cut down the tree. They have killed two Americans and if we do nothing they will do it again. We have to do something.

Adm. Holloway: The Chiefs are looking at the tree as a military action and looking to see if we have the force to back it up. One option we are looking at is to have the SR-71 penetrate North Korean air space for reconnaissance purposes and advertise this to the world. Nobody would get hurt if we did this.

Secretary Kissinger: Why advertise?

Adm. Holloway: Advertising would tend to embarrass them.

Secretary Kissinger: Advertising would get us involved in a UN debate.

Adm. Holloway: We can advertise or not advertise it. With regard to the B-52 training flights they will proceed from Guam to South Korea and approach to within 43 miles of the DMZ. They will drop radar bombs and return. One option would be to use live conventional ordnance and bring them closer to the DMZ. We could also adjust the profile of B-52s so that North Korean radar can detect them.

Mr. Hyland: How many aircraft?

Adm. Holloway: There would be two to three aircraft per cell. They could have a live load of bombs.

Secretary Kissinger: There is not much point in having a live load unless it was always part of the plan.

Gen. Smith: No, it wasn't.

Secretary Kissinger: Then let's just do it. It is better to talk less and do more.

Adm. Holloway: Is that an execute order?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me check it out with Kansas City. What else can we do?

Adm. Holloway: This show of force in our air operations would not be too impressive to the North Koreans. We could reinforce our ground forces in Korea. The Marines on Okinawa could get there in five days. Or we could keep them afloat. We could fly the Marines from Okinawa in C-130s but a couple of batallions of Marines might not make much difference. We could also send in a Ranger batallion. That could be done in five days. They can do unconventional warfare tasks. But I am not sure we can get the attention of the North Koreans by these kinds of moves.

Secretary Kissinger: Well they have seen us do it twice.

Adm. Holloway: We could use a guided weapon such as an Honest John against a pinpointed target. But the Army can't guarantee its accuracy. We could use artillery to hit some of their observers but the trouble with that is they could come back and do the same thing.

Another option is to prevail upon the South Koreans to reinforce the off-shore islands. The North Koreans would regard that as a very provocative act.

We can move our Naval forces into the Yellow Sea. That would be a high visibility move for until now we have restricted ourselves from the Yellow Sea. We could be there in five days.

Secretary Kissinger: Before we chop the tree down, and we have to do it tonight, can we get one B-52 cell there which they can see before the tree is chopped down?

Adm. Holloway: Yes. The B-52s could be evident first thing in the morning Korean time.

Gen. Smith: They can be there in 7-8 hours.

Adm. Holloway: We could hit the DMZ or North Korean targets by air or a power plant. But this is not practicable in view of the North Koreans' high state of alert. We could hit the tree with a laser bomb.

Secretary Kissinger: Isn't there anything along the DMZ that we can hit?

Adm. Holloway: There are some observation posts. But it would be better to use artillery rather than aircraft. If we go into North Korean airspace we are violating their territorial sovereignty and it would make our airbase a target.

Secretary Kissinger: The logical thing to do is to hit the base from which the killers of the Americans came from.

Mr. Abramowitz: That could be done with artillery.

Adm. Holloway: Yes. With aircraft you have to take massive defensive measures but artillery is discrete.

Secretary Kissinger: Are the barracks reachable with artillery?

Mr. Abramowitz: Possibly only by South Korean artillery.

Mr. Habib: They can be hit with American artillery.

Secretary Kissinger: But will we know exactly what is being hit? Can we know exactly what is going to happen?

Adm. Holloway: We can come back with a plan.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that the most logical thing is to hit the barracks. There would then be a high probability of getting the people who did this.

Mr. Clements: We all agree that taking out that tree is a must. But we should also do these other things. We have to get that task force moving

and do the B-52s. But what I would like to do is to have a party land up that coast and blow the hell out of an industrial site. It could be done [REDACTED]

Adm. Holloway: It could be a "seal" operation. We would need to have 24 hours and two selected targets. They could go in on a rubber boat. There would be a high risk of success.

Secretary Kissinger: What does that mean - a high probability of success?

Adm. Holloway: It could be dangerous as hell. If we pick a target which is significant in their view we would have a 50% chance of doing it without getting some people killed. The North Koreans are in a high state of alert.

Mr. Clements: What do you think, Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: I am a bit leary of getting Americans captured that far up the coast. We have to make it clear that we will not be pushed around and that we are not afraid of the North Koreans. If we let this incident go then there will be other incidents. Ideally we should do something quickly and then generate our forces afterwards. I remember with the EC-121 incident that by the time we had identified our targets, and had meetings and moved the carriers -- it was too late.

Mr. Bush: If we try to take that tree down probably that same group of North Koreans as before will come out.

Secretary Kissinger: If we shell the barracks maybe we don't need to take the tree down.

Mr. Habib: The barracks are outside of the Joint Security Area. They have reaction forces outside of the JSA. We are only talking about two miles.

Mr. Clements: I don't like the idea of shelling the barracks. It could start something. What do we do after we shell them? The North Koreans would certainly react violently. I think we should go up the coast.

Adm. Holloway: If we did that, we might have difficulty getting the guys out.

Secretary Kissinger: Why should that operation be with frogmen rather than airplanes? Airplanes would be a lot safer. Also a coastal operation would risk an infinitely more violent North Korean reaction. However the barracks are clearly related to the incident. If we aren't willing to accept some risk then we should not do anything.

Mr. Clements: I like the other operation better. It could be a harbor and we could blow up a couple of ships. They would be wondering what happened and who did it.

Secretary Kissinger: If we don't take that tree tonight we will have to forget about the tree.

Mr. Bush: They will react.

Mr. Abramowitz: If we send in 35 guys, would they mortar?

Mr. Habib: No, they would either leave us alone or move in 100 people.

Secretary Kissinger: What do I tell the President?

Adm. Holloway: That we are going in to cut down the tree. That our forces will be in position and ready to act depending on what happens. And they will take it from there.

Mr. Hyland: If necessary could we withdraw our forces and then plaster them?

Mr. Clements: Why can't we just send one guy in there?

Secretary Kissinger: The purpose of doing something is to show that we are ready to take risks. The trick is to do something from which they will back off.

Mr. Hyland: Then we will get Stilwell's plan and use all men possible.

Secretary Kissinger: It should be done quickly.

Mr. Hyland: Stilwell will need fairly precise instructions about what happens if a fight starts.

Mr. Habib (explains situation from a map)

~~SECRET (XGDS) (3)~~

11

Adm. Holloway: There could be 200-300 people and a guy with a chain saw.

Mr. Abramowitz: The North Koreans probably expect this and are making plans for it.

Secretary Kissinger: One always assumes the unlimited willingness of opponents to take risks. The purpose of this exercise is to overawe them. We are 200 million people and they are 16 million.

Mr. Abramowitz: They could overawe us locally.

Mr. Hyland: If a fight starts we should get our men out and then plaster the area.

Adm. Holloway: We have to cut down the tree before that happens. We can go in with a full batallion.

Secretary Kissinger: We can start the B-52s before.

Adm. Holloway: Yes.

Mr. Clements: We can cut the tree down and plan the B-52 exercise so that they see the B-52s coming. That will give them something to occupy themselves with in Pyongyang. We can cut the tree down while the B-52s are on their way and then keep the B-52s going for a few days.

Secretary Kissinger: How many days.

Adm. Holloway: Five days.

Secretary Kissinger: And make a contingency plan for shelling the barracks.

Mr. Clements: And the Navy task force should move in that direction.

Adm. Holloway: And we can move the F-111s.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes and start the task force moving.

Meeting ended at 9:15 a. m.

~~SECRET (XGDS) (3)~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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PAGE 01

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1 OF 15 COPIES

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ORIGIN N005-00

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.6

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

MR 01-15, #15 dt. ltr 9/17/01

DRAFTED BY DRAFTED:EA/K:EHURWITZ:IBCL
APPROVED BY S - THE SECRETARY
JCS - CAPT. COMBS
ISA - PFLINT
NSC - MR. HYLAND
EA - MR. ARMSTRONG
P - MR. HABIB
S/S-OIA, OTTO

By dal NARA, Date 10/15/01

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TO AMEMBASSY SEUL FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 206084

N0018

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, POPS

SUBJECT: INFORMING PRESIDENT PARK OF IMPENDING MILITARY MEASURES

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. CHARGE AND GENERAL STILLWELL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL ON PRESIDENT PARK TO INFORM HIM OF CERTAIN MEASURES WE INTEND TO TAKE AND OTHERS WE ARE CONSIDERING IN CONNECTION WITH AUGUST 18 JOINT SECURITY AREA INCIDENT.
2. YOU SHOULD TELL PARK THAT WE CONSIDER INCIDENT TO BE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE ON PART OF NORTH KOREA AND THAT WE MUST MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO PYONGYANG THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE A FREE HAND TO ENGAGE IN THIS OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 205294

IN THE FUTURE. TO SUPPORT THE STRENGTH OF THIS MESSAGE TO PYONGYANG, WE PROPOSE IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHING DEFCUN 3 IN SOUTH KOREA AND TO BRING INTO THE ROK AN ADDITIONAL SQUADRON OF F-4'S FROM KADENA. IN ADDITION WE ARE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING SUCH MEASURES AS: (A) HOLDING A B-52 BOMBING EXERCISE IN SOUTH KOREA, (B) BRINGING AN F-111 SQUADRON INTO THE ROK, (C) MOVING A CARRIER TASK FORCE INTO THE SEA OF JAPAN.

3. YOU SHOULD REQUEST PARK'S VIEWS ON NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS, AND REPORT HIS REACTION TO OUR MOVES AND ANY SUGGESTIONS HE MAY HAVE FOR FURTHER ACTION.
KISSINGER



SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 206295

53

ORIGIN EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-13

ACDA-07 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 OMB-01 /071 R

DRAFTED BY:EA/K:JBOARDMAN:CB

APPROVED BY:EA-MR.ARMSTRONG

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MANILA NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

JCS IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

CINCUNC IMMEDIATE

OSD/ISA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 206295

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, POPS

SUBJECT: INCREASED READINESS POSTURE IN KOREA

1. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAVE BEEN PLACED ON INCREASED ALERT.

2. THIS ALERT WAS INITIATED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT INCIDENT IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA, PANMUNJUM, KOREA IN WHICH NORTH KOREANS KILLED TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS AND INJURED OTHER U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA MILITARY PERSONNEL. THIS INCREASED READINESS POSTURE IS IN EFFECT ONLY FOR KOREA.

KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

August 19, 1976

TOSCO _____

3215

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM HYLAND *WH*

1. I have just finished a fairly lengthy conversation with Bill Clements and Admiral Holloway. Phil Habib could not join us, but he claims his views are well known to Secretary Kissinger. (As you probably know, he is deeply concerned that we not set off a series of escalatory and dangerous incidents.). As I see it, we will need reasonably clear guidance no later than 0900 eastern daylight time tomorrow on three issues: (1) the beginning of the B-52 exercises (2) the great tree surgery operation, and (3) any additional military action either in conjunction with or following on the tree operation.

2. As for the B-52's, regardless of how we decide to proceed with the tree, we should start the B-52 exercise. I believe everyone here agrees with that, and an execute message will go out this evening so that the necessary lead time will put the B-52's in the air and over the target area. at about the same time that Stillwell would launch his tree operation, that is, 1800 EDT tomorrow. So unless we hear otherwise this will proceed.

3. On taking out the tree, there are strong differences in Washington. The JCS support General Stillwell's plan. After listening to Holloway, I conclude they are supporting it out of

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DECLASSIFIED TO: E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
 DATE 94-39 #24 NSC 142 5/1/94
 BY KATK [unclear] 6/9/94

loyalty to the Field Commander and in recognition that we must make a strong show of manhood in an area we were driven out of two days ago. The Chiefs, however, recognize that there are severe risks and there could be casualties. Bill Clements does not support the Stillwell plan; he feels it will lead to a major fight, that the Koreans are in effect baiting an attack and that we should take out the tree by some other method. He suggests, for example, running a helicopter in, dropping a satchel with napalm, and igniting the tree which would make a tremendous fireworks display for all to witness. The third option would be to ignore the tree, and some time at our choosing tomorrow,

..... treating that as our tit-for-tat. A further option unanimously opposed by Clements, the Chiefs, and I think Habib would be to at the same time we were chopping down the tree. As the Chiefs point out this runs a major risk of an attack by fire on the tree choppers who would be in an exposed area. A final option would be to conduct the Stillwell tree chopping plan and, if it runs into major trouble, to withdraw

.....

4. Obviously, General Stillwell will need substantial lead time to prepare for whatever option is decided, particularly if his general plan, which involves movement of a US rifle company, a Korean battalion, etc, is to be in place and ready to go at 1800 EDT.

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5. My recommendation after considerable agonizing is as follows: (a) to proceed with the Stillwell plan; (b) to instruct Stillwell that if he receives unfriendly fire, to withdraw immediately and, once his forces are secured,

 If this scenario should develop, you, the President and Henry would then need to pause and with consider very carefully the next US move. Basically I share/the others the conviction that the North Koreans are prepared to play a bloody game, but, in my view, probably will let the Stillwell tree-chopping go without a fire fight.

6. In sum, we need a go or no-go decision on the Stillwell plan or any of the alternatives.

7. If and only if you decide to bypass the tree operation in preference for then South /we would certainly need to go to the/Koreans, explain our plan and permit Stillwell sufficient time for his forces to protect themselves, etc.

But I think it is safe to assume that he could accomplish this quite easily after a decision is made tomorrow morning our time.

8. Perhaps you can see in this some other variance or better scenario, but this seems to be the situation as I see it after arguing all day with various protagonists and listening to the TV events in my old home town.

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9. ' Let me highlight two practical contingencies that you should keep in mind. First, if the tree surgery team arrives and finds the area occupied by a large group of North Koreans, Stillwell will almost certainly need instructions on whether to charge in and start a fracas or to withdraw for a later time. This could occur about 1800 tomorrow or thereabouts when key people such as yourself, the President or Kissinger may not in fact be immediately available. Second, if there is an unfavorable turn of events during the tree chopping and a real fire fight develops, it will also occur around 1830 tomorrow EDT, and we will need some clear, fast guidance on whether we retaliate immediately. !.....

.....

10. To wrap this all up, keep in mind that a number of moves are coinciding. The F-111's will be in place about 0400 our time. Task group 77.4 will get underway about 1900 our time tomorrow and the B-52 exercise will be occurring in between.

11. A final addendum concerns the War Powers Act notification. If I know the bureaucracy, they will all decide that notification is the better part of valor and the President will be stuck with it some time when he is in the great State of Kansas, but since the law allows us 48 hours we probably can do it after you arrive in Vail, but you may want to advise the President that the legal

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eagles will probably conclude the addition of 18 F-4's and 20 F-111's
"substantially enlarges US Armed Forces" in the area.

12. Will await to hear from you tomorrow morning or late
tonight.

13. Warm regards.

Declassified
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Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.387

Date: 20 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM
Sender: New York
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 20.08.1976/24:00
No.: 060.387
Regarding: Korea

1. On August 20th, the deputy permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations Organization, Ambassador T. Bennett, relayed a detailed report, on behalf of the Unified Command of UN Troops in Korea, to the president of the Security Council of the United Nations, about the incidents which took place on August 18th in the demilitarized zone in Korea. The report describes the incidents and assigns the entire blame on the North Koreans.

The report is written in a relatively sober, moderate tone, compared with the public speeches of the United States on this matter.

The report is meant to inform [the president of the Security Council] and does not comprise a request to summon the Security Council or to have the United Nations undertake any sort of action.

2. In a casual discussion, the Japanese ambassador, who is the president of the Security Council this month, made the following remarks on the incident in the demilitarized zone in Korea:

The action of the North Korean armed forces was premeditated. His assertion is based on many facts, including on the absence of president Kim Il Sung from Colombo; the coincidence [of the incident] with the high-level meeting of non-aligned states and the inclusion by surprise, two day prior to the occurrence of the incident, of the Korean matter on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. Anyway, the Japanese ambassador said, the Koreans wanted and still want to take advantage of the electoral campaign atmosphere in the United States.

This incident and the consequences it may have will raise serious issues in the relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China, and with countries in Indochina, given that Japan has an alliance treaty with South Korea.

He said that there had been a danger that the Americans reacted violently to this incident, given that it had occurred on the day of President Ford being sworn in. He also said that the US reaction was cautious but that if such incidents occur again, it is not impossible that the United States brings the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

It is to be expected that the United States consults with the USSR and China and asks them to exert pressures on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to compel it not to repeat such actions.

His personal opinion was that the Chinese are not happy at what happened in the demilitarized zone, because the tension and a potential conflict in Korea would ruin their plans regarding their relations with the United States and regarding the balance of power between the three superpowers.

A certain degree of discontent can be noticed in Soviet [officials], caused both by the aforementioned incident as well as by the fact that the [North] Koreans registered the Korean matter on the agenda of the General Assembly without consulting with the [Soviets] beforehand.

[People] in the UN Secretariat believe that the August 18th incident will be exploited both by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to prove the necessity of US troops withdrawing from South Korea, as well as by the United States, to justify its proposal regarding the summoning of a conference on Korea.

Signed: Ion Datcu

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.212

Date: 21 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 21.08.1976/04:30
No.: 067.212
To: Comrade C. Oancea
Regarding the Incident in Panmunjeom

The August 18th incident in Panmunjeom represents almost the only topic covered by the written press and by radio broadcasts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Starting with the afternoon of August 18th, radio broadcasting stations and television stations are repeatedly broadcasting about the aforementioned incident, they broadcast the entire text of the Supreme Commandment of the Korean People's Army communiqué, the orders of the Supreme Commandment regarding the activation of its 'readiness for battle' mode, as well as the declaration of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency on the same matter.

Commentaries are being transmitted and published, in which it is underlined that the "Korean people is not afraid of war and if such a war is imposed upon itself, then it will crush the aggressor." The determination of the Army, of the entire [Korean] people, to defend its homeland, is being expressed. Snapshots depicting the preparations of the Army, its technical endowment, etc., are being shown. Television stations are reproducing caricatures and critical commentaries towards President Ford, the US administration, the American armed forces, movies and caricatures regarding the defeat of the United States in various parts of the world, including in Korea in the 1950-1953 War.

On August 20th, in Pyongyang and Wonsan, and according to the information we received, in other parts of the country as well, anti-air military defense drills took place.

We noticed that the population is preoccupied, being more worried than on other occasions by the situation which was thus created, but it is not alarmed, [nor] confused.

At the same time we believe that the current situation is special compared to previous periods when such incidents, more or less similar, took place.

Although, according to some open sources, a great concentration of human forces and military technology is currently taking place in South Korea, both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea declared state of emergency.

We do not possess enough pieces of evidence on which to draw the conclusion that a large-scale military conflict could break out of this situation.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 209294

62

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/K:PMAYHEW:CGH

APPROVED BY P - MR HABIB

S/S - MR REDDY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 209294

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, KS, US

SUBJECT: PANMUNJOM INCIDENT: ROKG AMBASSADOR'S CALL
ON UNDER SECRETARY HABIB

1. AT HIS REQUEST, ROKG AMBASSADOR HAHM CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY HABIB AUGUST 23. SAYING THAT SEOUL WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT THE NEXT DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE FOLLOWING THE NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE IN THE AUGUST 21 MAC MEETING, AMBASSADOR HAHM PROBED FOR HOW LONG DEPLOYMENTS TO KOREA WOULD LAST AND FOR MEANING OF THE DEPARTMENT'S AUGUST 23 PRESS BRIEFING STATEMENT THAT WE REGARDED NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE AS A POSITIVE ONE.

2. THE UNDER SECRETARY CALLED ATTENTION TO DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S FULL EXPLANATION, INCLUDING THE CALLING OF A MAC MEETING AND OUR INTENTION TO INSIST ON ASSURANCES OF SAFETY FOR OUR PERSONNEL IN THE DMZ. HAHM ASKED WHAT WOULD THEN HAPPEN. HABIB REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AFTER THE MAC MEETING. HE ALSO NOTED THAT ROKG HAD SAID IT BELIEVED RECEIVING ASSURANCES DESIRABLE. AS FOR THE CURRENT AUGMENTATION OF FORCES IN KOREA, THEY WOULD BE

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PAGE 02 STATE 209294

CONTINUED FOR THE PRESENT AND WOULD NOT BE PULLED OUT

BEFORE DISCUSSION WITH THE ROKG. KISSINGER

SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

August 25, 1976

Time and Place: 10:30 a. m. - , White House Situation Room

Subject: Korea: MAC Meeting and Poss. W. Military Action

Participants:

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger

State: Philip Habib

DOD: William Clements

JCS: Gen. George S. Brown

CIA: George Bush

NSC: William Hyland
William Gleysteen

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Kissinger: I see that Stilwell's now beginning to take a tough line even though he was so cautious last week when I was talking of tough action. I saw his incoherent message. As I understand it, ^{of} the North Korean proposal ~~of August 25~~ is evil, immoral, dangerous, etc. but it amounts to unilateral North Korean withdrawal of their guardposts. I want to know what's wrong with it. Would they withdraw all their guardposts and personnel from our side? Supposing we said there must be freedom of movement but that we can accept the proposal to remove the guardposts?

Habib: We couldn't send our guards over to their side. ~~Now~~ There are two kinds of personnel. They are suggesting that the security ^{of} ~~of our~~ guard personnel be split apart, but ^{personnel could presumably} ~~the other~~ ^{could} still move around within the joint security area.

Kissinger: But we would get rid of the North Korean posts on our side and this would be a good thing.

Habib: There may be some problem ^{of} ~~of~~ the effect ^{on} ~~of~~ the armistice agreement.

Kissinger: I want to play it as a concession on the part of the North Koreans. We should construct our answer so that ^{their proposal} ~~it~~ looks like a concession rather than a deal. Let's first get rid of the guardposts.

Clements: Henry's saying makes ^{it} ~~it~~ look like we kicked them out.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

Kissinger: Yes. First get rid of the posts, then deal with the problem of access by our security personnel into their part of the area.

Clements: I like that idea. Our people get treated so badly. They get kicked, spit on, cursed, and we are unable to tell our people to protect themselves. Every morning they have a special meeting where they are told to take abuse and to maximize their restraint. Remember our man who got kicked in the throat not long ago?

Kissinger: Who was that? When?

Habib: A Navy commander who got badly kicked in June 1975.

Brown: We had to protect the Pentagon the same way during the riots. Our man had to take almost endless abuse without reacting.

Kissinger: You know my preference was to hit the barracks but that was overruled. Now, we have to find a way of winding the thing up. The practical consequences will be that they will have removed the guardposts.

Clements: And the guards. (mistakenly believing that the North Korean barracks in the JSA area would be removed under the August 25 proposal)

Kissinger: Their barracks will stay. As I understand it their two guardposts on our side would go. We have no posts on their side so we would dismantle nothing.

Habib: I am reading from the North Korean statement: "In order to prevent a conflict between military personnel of both sides and in order that each side insure the security of each personnel in the conference area,

Panmunjom, we believe it most reasonable to separate the security personnel of both sides in this area with the MDL between them so that they may perform their guard duty moving in their respective area only. This will make both sides have their guard posts only in their respective part of the conference area. And this will prevent military personnel of both sides from both encountering each other and passing by the posts of the other side. Then there will occur no conflicts."

Kissinger: In effect they are offering to dismantle their guardposts. We should say to them: We notice your proposal amounts to removing two guard posts on your side; we have none on your side; we believe there should be freedom of movement in the zone and suggest that our Secretaries meet to discuss this. First we have to get their assurances about the safety of our personnel, then we can discuss implementation of drawing a line. We should play it up as a retreat on their part. Phil -- you will have to find some form of words ^{to} do this.

Habib: We will draft a message and we will also draft guidance. We will have to clear both with President Park.


Kissinger: Everytime I wanted to hit hard at the North Koreans last week I was told that Park didn't want to take military action. Now I gather he wants to do something.

Clements: He really was playing it very soft at the beginning of this business.

Kissinger: I think we are coming out pretty well.

(Turning to Clements) But we called this meeting to discuss your plan. Go ahead and explain it.

Clements: (Using a map of North Korea and pointing to the area of Sonjin Hang Harbor) We all recognize this coast line is fairly open. Here is a fuel dump. It is easy to get into the harbor. I would like to interrupt to emphasize that in Defense we are treating this matter ^{on} ~~as~~ a really strict "need-to-know" basis.



Brown: Better make that November 1 rather than December 1.

Clements: It will be too damned cold.

Kissinger: How about November 2? It may not make the front page that day. What would they do?

Clements: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: George, what do you think?

Bush: I think it would be terribly risky, but I know you don't need our advice on that score.

Clements: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: What kind of defenses do the North Koreans have?

Brown: They have superb defenses, and the operation would involve a very high risk. The North Koreans have excellent coastal radar. It would be a very high - risk operation.

Clements: I don't completely agree with that.

Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Clements: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: What would we have achieved if the North Koreans did not know who did it?

Clements: The advantage would be the element of doubt.

Brown: They ^{would have to} ~~must~~ know we did it if it ^{were} ~~is~~ worth doing.

Kissinger: I'm just thinking the process through. No matter how we did it, the North Koreans would charge us with being responsible for it. Then we would be faced with questioning by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and what would we say to them?

Brown: According to Buchen, we would have to report under the War Powers Act to both the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.

Kissinger: What would we say to them as to why we did it?

Clements: Our Assistant General Counsel says you would not have to report under the War Powers Act.

Kissinger: They (the Congress) will say that we have to report and if we don't want to lie we would ~~have been~~ forced to take a no-comment line which would in effect be admitting that we did it.

Brown: In explaining why we would have to say that it was a response to the murder of two Americans.

Kissinger: Our explanation would look very weak, particularly after two months (??)

I respect your position. Last week I was in favor of firm action but it was overruled at Vail, not by this group. It was a tragedy. I have never seen the North Koreans so scared.

Brown: They didn't get any comfort from the Chinese or Soviets.

Bush: Or from the third world.

Clements: I like the plan.

Brown: I think we should go ahead working out the plan.

Kissinger: Yes. Develop the plan.

Brown: If we have the plan developed, it would be ready if we wanted to use it.

Kissinger: I think this is a good way.

Clements: I like it. It doesn't have ^{an} overt character. I ha^{ve} been told that there ha^{ve} been 200 other such operations and none of these ^{had} ~~had been~~ ^{have} surfaced. ~~had~~

Kissinger: It is different for us with ~~the era~~ of the War Powers Act. I don't remember any such operations.

What barracks were we going to hit in North Korea?

Clements: We thought we would need 36 Max (??)

Kissinger: I am positive they would not have hit back. Unfortunately, we can't do it now. My idea had been to cut down the tree, get out of the JSA, take out the North Korean barracks, and then stand down. Of course, there was the risk of further casualties.

Could we have done it with Walleyes? How many Walleyes would it have taken? Could we hit the ^{barracks} ^ from our side of the DMZ?

Brown: I don't know how many bombs it would take because I haven't studied the target, but I'm sure we could hit it from our side of the DMZ

Kissinger: (The advantage of a Walleye would be to) avoid counter-battery fire.

Clements: Why would an air strike avoid counter-battery fire?

✓ Hyland: Because they would not be responding to ^{masked} ~~matched~~ artillery. (22)

Clements: I still think they would have reacted.

Kissinger: You told me last week of your concerns and asked me to relay them to the President, and I did. But the real problem, I think, was not your concerns but the President's speech on Thursday night saying that there were no Americans in combat anywhere in the world. Second, the President was in Vail and I was on an airplane, not the best arrangement for conducting military operations. I don't think the decision had anything to do with your recommendation.

If we can first get the North Koreans to ^{guarantee} ~~agree~~ the safety of our men, then we can cooperate with them on practical plans. We can say that we will have our Secretaries work out the problem of movement of personnel in the JSA while maintaining the principle of the freedom of movement. There are two things to do. First, draft a message on the JSA and second,

continue to develop the military plan (for hitting North Korea) but also look at other targets. Then we will have contingency plans next time if there is a further incident.

Brown: I would like to stress once more the close hold we have put on this operation.

Clements: For example, Don (Rumsfeld) knows about the plan but Holcomb doesn't.

Kissinger: Let's keep our extra deployments in Korea until we get the guardposts removed and get some satisfaction from the North Koreans. Don't remove DefCon 3 until we get positive action. Let's try to get a MAC meeting Friday or Saturday.

Habib: We will ask tomorrow and get one Friday. I don't think the North Koreans will stall.

Kissinger: After the meeting, then we can start the drawdown. After we get some satisfaction, we can start to move things down but I want to keep something there for a while.

Clements: We have in mind keeping some of the F-111's in Korea.

Brown: We have sent Stilwell a planning message outlining our views about drawing down from our current alert but they have been told to make no changes without execute order. So far, we have not had any comments from Stilwell on our plan. The B-52's will continue flying through Sunday. If we allow them to ^{stand} ~~stay~~ down for a while, we would

then have the option of resuming them as a pressure tactic if the North Koreans keep giving us trouble.

Kissinger: (to Habib) Ask for a MAC meeting on Friday. Demand assurances from the North Koreans for the safety of our men and then discuss the deployment of our security personnel. The first thing is to get the guard posts removed. Then we can let the Secretaries work out movement of personnel in the JSA.

Habib: I don't think we should make an assurance about safety a pre-condition.

Kissinger: I want the principal ^{de} ~~to~~ ^{ed} accept ~~it~~, first of all.

Habib: Why don't we imply that they have accepted it or ~~state that~~ ^{talk} on the assumption that they are accepting it?

Kissinger: You can say on the assumption that the North Koreans accept ^{our} ~~or~~ demand for assurances for the safety of our personnel, we are prepared to have them remove their guardposts on our side and to discuss the deployment of our security personnel, while maintaining the principle of freedom of movement in the JSA.

We will discuss the future of B-52 operations next Monday.

Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 066.252

Date: 25 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM
Sender: Beijing
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 25.08.1976/12.30
No.: 066.252
To: Comrade Constantin Oancea
Regarding the Incident in Panmunjeom

1. Following the recent discussions with Chinese officials (Yu Zhan, Deputy Foreign Minister; Peng Xiaohui – Deputy Chief of Staff, and others), the following assessments regarding the incident in Panmunjeom came to light:

- The incident will not degenerate into a military conflict. A conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in case it breaks out, will not start with the parties involved in it announcing measures (similar to those announced recently by the United States, respectively by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), but it will be started impromptu.

- Our interlocutors said that the incident was a provocation of the United States of America, but they acknowledged that the North Korean comrades let themselves caught in this provocation. The incident, to their mind, did not bring any political benefits to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Militarily, the United States of America increased its presence in the area.

We would like to point out as significant the fact that that the Chinese media did not award a great deal of space to the incident, limiting themselves to repeating the official declarations of the North Koreans, without offering their own commentaries and interpretations.

2. The diplomatic corps in Beijing broadly comments on the incident. Most diplomats we talked to (from socialist and non-aligned countries as well as from capitalist countries) think this was a mistake on behalf of the North Koreans, which would not bring them any political or diplomatic gains. The reserved tone of the Chinese propaganda apparatus is to be noticed, as it does not want to get engaged in an international campaign which may derail the course adopted by the People's Republic of China in its relations with the United States and with surrounding countries. The same sources believe that the USSR cannot get engaged in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula either, for its own reasons.

Certain diplomats are not ruling out the hypothesis that the North Korean action was partly aimed at checking the reactions of China, the USSR and other friendly countries within the Non-Aligned Movement, and on the other hand, to prepare a condemnation of the United States at the forthcoming session of the United Nations.

We will continue to follow the reactions and commentaries [which emerge] on this incident.

Signed: Nicolae Gavrilescu

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 084.527

Date: 20 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Washington

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Flash

Date: 25.08.1976/19:00

No.: 084.527

Regarding: The Incident between the American Military and the North Korean One in the Demilitarized Zone

In political-diplomatic circles in Washington, the following assessments are being made:

1. The US administration avoided to take any measures that could have led to the aggravation of the situation between the two Koreas, on the one hand, and between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other hand. It is believed that the reaction of the United States towards the incident in the demilitarized zone was moderate and somehow ambiguous, which generated discontent at the level of the South Korean government and in some American circles hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, especially in the Pentagon.

2. The moderate reaction of the US administration is justified as follows:

- President Gerald Ford is not interested in the emergence of a Korean crisis in which the United States become directly involved, during the electoral campaign.

- The United States are interested in promoting the idea of organizing a four-party conference on the Korean matter, [a proposal] recently launched by State Secretary Henry Kissinger, and subsequently, the American administration is therefore interested not to aggravate its relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

- Within the American government there is the belief that a US retaliation against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could give birth to negative reactions from the People's Republic of China, leading even to a deterioration of Sino-American relations, which President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger do not want.

3. The fact that the American administration viewed as a positive step the message sent by president Kim Il Sung through which he was expressing his regret that the aforementioned incident led to the death of two American military personnel is interpreted as the desire of the US to overcome the difficulties created by this incident and to avoid a military confrontation between the two Koreas.

4. It is believed that the measures taken by the United States along the line of strengthening the US armed forces in South Korea, following the incident, are mainly aimed at demonstrating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the American administration is not willing to give up under duress. At the same time, through these measures, the American administration is aiming to show to the South Korean regime that the United States are ready to resort to appropriate military measures to counter potential military attacks against South Korea.

Note: This telegram was written using the information gathered through the talks held by Comrade Gheorghe Ionita with Joe Waggoner, Congressman, R. Petcovic, Minister-Counselor at the Yugoslav Embassy and A.P. Venkateswarn, minister in the Indian Embassy.

Signed: Nicolae M. Nicolae

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.219

Date: 26 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 26.08.1976/03:00

No.: 067.219

To: Comrade Constantin Oancea, First Direction – Relations

On August 25th, Han Sihae, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at a meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions from socialist countries, offered a broad overview on the August 18th incident, which took place in the neutral area of Panmunjeom. The entire overview, which detailed all moments of the incident, pointed to the American side as the one to blame for attacking the North Korean sentinel.

Subsequently, Han Sihae showed that the incident was planned and premeditated by the Americans. Therefore, although the Americans knew that in order to cut the respective tree it is required to get the accord of the North Korean side, being aware of this following a similar attempt on August 6th, on August 18th, the Americans took unilateral action and did not take into account the warning given by the North Korean sentinel. Moreover, close to the spot where the incident took place, on a mound, recording cameras and photo-cameras were installed. Immediately after the incident, the US authorities, amongst whom was President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, released some ultimatum-sounding declarations towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, trying to place all the blame on the North Koreans.

On August 19th, the US Department of Defense ordered American troops in South Korea to assume the state of emergency and, moreover, to transfer military forces and weapons, including the F-111 and F-4 aircraft, to Okinawa and from the United States, the arrival of the aircraft carrier Midway in the waters of South Korea, etc.—all demonstrate that the incident was premeditated by the United States to aggravate the situation in the region and it therefore found the necessary pretext to provoke a war of aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Subsequently, Han Sihae showed that the provocation of this incident also aimed at a political target, namely to dent the international prestige of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to undermine the support and the international solidarity towards the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Conference in Colombo, after having submitted the resolution draft on the Korean matter to the United Nations. On top of these is the request of the Commandment of US Forces in South Korea that the matter of the Panmunjeom incident be discussed by the Security Council.

Out of a desire to provoke a large-scale military conflict, said Han Sihae, on August 21st the Americans uprooted the tree which represented the trigger of the incident, and demolished the outpost of the North Korean sentinel, while mobilizing a large number of military (300 military personnel; 26 helicopters, 3 B-52 bombers, F-111 bombers. The North Koreans, to avoid a large-scale war, showed patience and restraint regarding retaliation.

In conclusion, the North Korean official, pointing out that the situation thus created is serious, requested that brotherly socialist countries undertake a vast international political campaign, to condemn the American imperialists who are committing acts meant to provoke a new war in Korea; to firmly support the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the struggle of the Korean people for the unification of the homeland. He asked that the media in socialist countries publish a declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government, condemning the provocative acts committed by the United States in Korea, solidarity and supportive articles towards the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the governments of these countries to undertake certain political measures. Moreover, mass organizations in socialist countries [were requested] to organize various manifestations of a similar nature.

Given the general state of tension, the Deputy Foreign Minister said that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided not to receive foreign delegations for a while, and not to send North Korean delegations to other countries. He also asked that in the future, on the occasion of celebrating the national day of other countries, [diplomatic missions] do not organize actions which gather a large number of people.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

Worldwide Reaction to Axe Murder Incident

Date: 26 August 1976 **Source:** South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Number: PHW-0891 Date : 261900
To : Minister Reference (Copy)
From : Ambassador to the United States of America

Response to : AH-0828

Regarding : PHW-0877, 0879

Regarding the North Korean puppet state's provocation at Panmunjeom on August 18th, I have contacted the following officials and report the following.

1. On August 20th, between 12:30 and 13:15, I described the details of the incident on August 18th and our standpoint regarding the incident to Minister of Public Justice, [illegible] and also reporter of The Daily Express, [illegible] Lim. I also exposed the North Korean puppet state's ambition to forcefully reunify [the peninsula] by communizing the South and the country's internal circumstances, such as [the North's] inability to repay foreign debt, economic breakdown, and internal power struggle caused by Kim Il Sung's decision for his successor. As I explained our peace policy, UN policy, and economic development, they [the Minister and the reporter] seemed to have accurately understood the facts about the [Panmunjeom] incident and also the North Korean puppet state's aggressive character prior to their visit to Korea while showing strong agreement with our stance.
2. On August 21, I discussed the above matter on the phone with American Ambassador Sullivan, who is currently visiting [illegible]. I have obtained the announcements by the White House and the Department of State and utilized them in our public announcement activities.
3. On August 23 11:00-11:30, I met with Minister of Foreign Affairs, [name (illegible)] and described the details, circumstances and our viewpoint on the incident. He was deeply shocked by the North Korean puppet state's brutal and provocative action and expressed sympathy with our viewpoint. He mentioned he has received a letter from the U.S. Embassy explaining that the state of emergency for the U.S. Army is limited to U.S. Army units stationed in Korea.
4. On August 23, from 12:30-13:00, I [met with] roving Ambassador, [name (illegible)] (former member of the Senate), Supreme Court judge Palma and President of [name (illegible)] Women's University [...], who visited Korea to participate in the 7th Asian Women's Conference [...]

August 16th Incident and Contact between the U.S. - Communist China

In response to the incident on August 18, Secretary Kissinger met with Ambassador Huang Zhen twice on August 19. We observe that the purpose of U.S. contact with Communist China and Communist China's viewpoint can be summarized as follows:.

1. Purpose
 - The reason for U.S. contact with Communist China is to test, in diplomatic terms, how Communist China perceives issues on the Korean Peninsula.
2. Communist China's Viewpoint

- It appears that Communist China has made a commitment to the North Korean puppet state that forceful provocation must not be conducted and that China approves of North Korea's political negotiations with the U.S.
- Communist China would have notified the North Korean puppet state of the United States' standpoint and persuaded the country because there are more benefits from the relationship with the U.S. than that of the Communist China-North Korean puppet state.
- In case the North Korean puppet state is driven into a very difficult military situation due to the U.S. adopting hardline policy, Communist China has no other choice but to respond to such a situation. This will result in the U.S. cooperating with the Soviet Union.
- In such case, Communist China is put into a very difficult position. Thus, Communist China has had conversations with the United States and may have urged Kim Il Sung to express regrets.
- In order to control the conflict, Kissinger appears to have requested Communist China to exercise its influence over the North Korean puppet state. In response, Kim Il Sung appears to have immediately sent his message to the United Nations Armed Forces. The North Korean puppet state would have not taken such a measure without consulting Communist China. On the other hand, Communist China appears to have made the request in order to ease the United States' hardline position. Therefore, [the United States] appears to have positively accepted the North Korean puppet's message.

(Anderson)

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.220

Date: 27 August 1976	Source: <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1976/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Telegrams from Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January – December 1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.</i>
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TELEGRAM
Sender: Pyongyang
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
Urgent
Date: 27.08.1976
No.: 067.220
To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - First Direction – Relations

On August 25, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a press conference attended by Korean journalists, as well as foreign press attaches and correspondents accredited in Pyongyang.

Kim Yongjib the ad interim head of the Press Division in the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered a description of the August 18th incident around Panmunjeom, which resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides. 'Currently, the Korean official said, according to the rules established at the 25th session of the Armistice Commission on October 19th 1953, guards working in the Panmunjeom area cannot be provided with protection and [they] cannot be kept under control.

At the 380th session of the Armistice Commission on August 25 [1976], held on the aforementioned topic, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed to abolish the outposts of one side on the territory of the other side, in the neutral area of Panmunjeom.

This measure, according to Kim Yongjib would lead to greater security in the area. With respect to the current situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Korean official assessed it as being 'critical,' there being the possibility that at any given moment war breaks out.

Kim Yongjib expressed his conviction that the mass media of friendly countries would continue to expose the provocative actions of American imperialists, thus contributing to the resolution of the Korean matter.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The Cabinet

DATE AND TIME: Monday, August 30, 1976
10:41 a. m. - 12:28 p. m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room

President: (Introductory comments)

Henry, why don't you tell us about Korea and South Africa?

Kissinger: Let me describe the DMZ and the Joint Security Area.

North Korea has four guard posts on our side of the line. We have none on their side. At the meetings, our troops sometimes go into their part of the zone, but rarely, especially compared to the number of times they are in our area.

(Described the tree pruning incident and sequence) They said the incident was "regretful" -- which is the farthest they had ever gone. We said that that statement was a positive sign but it was not enough -- it had to insure the security of our forces. They have proposed that each side be restricted to its side of the line. The practical effect of that is they dismantle four guard posts and we do nothing.

The ROK is now talking tougher -- in direct proportion to the reduction in the likelihood of conflict. We must either wrap this up, be willing to use force, or they will see we are bluffing and hit us in the face again.

President: I want you all to know we were prepared to take other military actions had the need developed. It is my opinion, we should wrap it up now.

How about Africa?

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUTHORITY SEC Review 12/2/04; state visit 3/13/04
BY hp NLF, DATE 4/19/07

Report on the 'Axe Murder Incident' from the GDR Embassy in North Korea

Date:
31 August 1976

Source:
Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer

GDR Embassy to the DPRK
Pyongyang, 31 August 1976

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Acting Head of Far Eastern Department
Comrade Rolf Berthold
Berlin

Dear Comrade Berthold!

Please allow me, in addition to our wired information, to share some more reflections on recent developments in Korea.

1. The reason behind the scuffle between guards from the American-South Korean and the North Korean side on 18 August 1976 was a petty one (North Korean version: attempt to cut down a tree in the Joint Security Area; version of the adversary: trimming a tree). It lays bare the senselessness behind the killing of two American officers from the border unit well known to the North Korean guards.

To our knowledge, incidents with similar outcomes occurred in recent years only in 1967 when twelve American soldiers were killed, and in 1975 when one U.S. officer was severely injured.

We think it is highly speculative to assert that one side had planned this incident. An analysis of overall developments since August 18, in particular the DPRK response to the statement by the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in South Korea, shows at least that the death of two officers was not part of any calculation. It was an "over-reaction" by the DPRK personnel involved in the incident, whose background probably lies in fanatical feelings of hate.

The swift and strong reactions from both sides testify to the indeed permanently tense situation on the Korean peninsula. At any time, a sudden escalation can occur which might indeed result in a serious threat to peace. Tensions already exist as a result of the large number of troops and arms on a comparatively small territory, and a permanent ideological pressure on people on both sides to stay alert for armed conflict in order to bring about unification.

The lack of military reaction by the DPRK to the entrance of a large number of fully armed American soldiers into the Joint Security Area, and the felling of the disputed tree under military protection on August 21, was surprising. There is no doubt that this was a serious violation of the armistice and its subsequent agreements. Perhaps the DPRK was taken by surprise. However, since then the troops were alerted to combat readiness on August 19 already, respective countermeasures could certainly have been undertaken. Thus, the only conclusion left to be drawn is that the DPRK, indeed, did not desire any further aggravation, which might have caused a hardly controllable escalation. During discussions, Korean comrades also emphasized that the DPRK did not want to let itself be provoked. In addition, the determination displayed by the U.S. through its spectacular military presence and the combat readiness of its troops made any prospects for a quick [North Korean] military success quite remote.

It is remarkable that the DPRK has, so far, not published the message by the Supreme Commander of U.N. Forces in South Korea to the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (Kim Il Sung) and the latter's response. Even the DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Han Shi Hae, was willing to concede on August 25, and only after repeated pressure from representatives of socialist states convened to a briefing, that [Kim Il Sung's] response called the incident as "regrettable". Though the DPRK comrades are energetically refuting it, this still represents a certain concession they want to keep secret from their people for matters of prestige.

Obviously, the U.S. and South Korea on one side and the DPRK on the other side tried, and are still trying, to exploit the incident for their political objectives.

As far as we can see from here, it must have been a welcome opportunity for [U.S. President Gerald] Ford to demonstrate leadership and determination in his [Republican primary] campaign against [Ronald] Reagan. It also represented a convenient chance to improve the U.S. image, and to demonstrate loyalty and credibility towards American allies in Asia in light of the U.S. debacle in Indochina and the political defeat in Angola. It remains to be seen how the conflict in Korea will reflect on, [Democratic presidential candidate], Jimmy Carter's positions. As it is well known, he has promised to withdraw U.S. troops from

Korea over the coming years. The DPRK is obviously interested in fomenting the slogan “not our boys” in the United States. However, recent developments might also embolden those in the U.S. who advocate a continuing American presence in Korea to sustain the armistice. Certainly the ruling circles in the United States will exploit the existing situation to move along with a program of modernization of the South Korean army.

According to South Korean sources, South Korea advocates a position of strength, sparks off a new large-scale anti-communist campaign among the South Korean population, and again attempts to legitimize its dictatorial system through the “threat from the North”. Currently, criticism of the domestic situation in South Korea is markedly on the rise internationally, for instance in the United States. It also gets combined with demands to cut down economic and military aid to South Korea. Apparently, the current tensions are very convenient to [South Korean President] Park Chung Hee. He swiftly used the opportunity to denounce opposition forces, for instance the former presidential candidate Kim Daejung and former President Yun Bo-seon.

Based on recent developments, the DPRK is eager to bolster its theory from its 5 August 1976 government declaration according to which the U.S. and South Korea have finalized their war preparations and moved on towards actually launching a war. The DPRK wants to prove that the threat to peace in Korea, and thus also in the entire world, emanates from the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. At the same time, the incident will reaffirm the DPRK’s negative opinion on [Soviet-American] détente and support the [North Korean] demand to negotiate and solve current problems in direct talks with the United States.

At the 380th meeting of the armistice commission, the DPRK proposed, to divide the Joint Security Area along the course of the demarcation line. It is supposed to demonstrate before the world, the DPRK’s peaceful intentions and its willingness towards constructive solutions. It was worth noting that DPRK propaganda, presumably out of foreign policy considerations, did not link the determination to smash the enemy in the case of aggression to the previously common phrase about the achievement of unification.

In retrospect, the incident justified Kim Il Sung’s non-attendance at the Non-Aligned Movement’s summit in Colombo.

It is clearly evident by now that the DPRK leadership seizes on the current situation to further solidify the people’s unity on the basis of “juche” ideology and increases the economic norms for the workers. These efforts are strongly reflected by the mass media.

We think that the conflict had no influence on the agreements in Colombo. However, it will have major impact for both the American-South Korean and the DPRK side concerning preparations for the 31st U.N. General Assembly. Both sides will attempt to use the conflict in their arguments for their respective different resolution drafts.

We do not have much to say on positions held by the People’s Republic of China in the current situation. There was only a note in the DPRK press that [the Chinese news agency] “Xinhua” has published, without a commentary of its own, excerpts from the North Korean statement of August 19, as well as the content of the order by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army about the alert of combat readiness. Like the major Western news agencies, South Korean sources report extensive contacts in Washington between the U.S. State Department and the Chinese Liaison Office. The PR China is said to have followed up on the U.S. request to exert moderating influence on the DPRK, but also to have asked the U.S. to show restraint. Compared to the otherwise common habit of the Maoists support of the DPRK with strong rhetoric, China’s current unusual restraint seems to validate this theory. This Chinese position would also reflect the result of Kim Il Sung’s visit to China in 1975.

According to its official information, the DPRK also declined any requests to receive or send delegations to a couple of socialist countries in recent days. Strangely, the cancellations already extend well into December. Also, the “Second Meeting of the Youth of the Third World” in Pyongyang has been postponed for now. A somewhat illogical exception is the travel by a party delegation vacation to the GDR, the first of such kind after many years. The Deputy Head of the KWP Central Committee Department for Workers and Peasants Militia is part of the delegation. Otherwise, with the de facto cessation of any other delegation activity, the DPRK wants to convey to foreign countries the tenseness of the current situation. We can already conclude, at this point, that all this will result in partial limitation of relations with other socialist states and developing countries for a certain period of time. It is also expected that the DPRK will rationalize its current inability to meet its export requirements in bilateral trade and to reduce its growing financial debts by pointing to the aggravated situation, the need for further increase of defense capabilities, and by demanding even more foreign aid.

2. In general, we currently have the impression that the situation has somewhat calmed down and tensions are decreasing. In short sequence, the 380th, 381st, and 382nd meeting of the armistice commission were held. Given the tense situation, they took place in a comparatively sober atmosphere. The U.S. accepted the DPRK proposal to discuss a division of the Joint Security Area. It was agreed at the 381st meeting to

forward this proposal to the secretaries of the commission for further consideration. The U.S. softened its initial negative reaction to the DPRK response to the American message. Though, the United States still demands security guarantees for its personnel in Panmunjom and punishment of those directly responsible for the killing of the two U.S. officers.

The DPRK has also become more restrained in its statements. The danger of war has already changed its status as the only dominant issue in [North Korean] mass media.

According to our information, a cancellation of combat readiness for armed forces in both South Korea and the DPRK is to be expected. However, it would be wrong to completely exclude the possibility of another drastic aggravation, particularly as long as the troops are still in a status of combat readiness.

3. Official information by DPRK organs to the embassies of socialist fraternal countries is unsatisfactory and inappropriate to the situation. Not earlier than August 25 the ambassadors and acting ambassadors were called to the DPRK Foreign Ministry on short notice where they were officially, and in detail, informed about the August 18 incident. There were no references to other relevant aspects of the overall situation or intentions of the DPRK. Some ambassadors expressed, in polite fashion, their dissatisfaction to the DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Han Shi Hae.
4. The our collective embassy was always informed, in close cooperation with the party secretary and in a timely manner, about the development of the situation. We referred to the seriousness of the situation without hiding our conviction that an outbreak of war is, currently, very unlikely. All the employees acted calmly and with discipline. Also, the pre-announced air raid warning (the embassies were told to dim the daylight) went along smoothly for the embassy. We initiated those measures we considered appropriate in the interest of security.

The condition of our air raid shelter in the basement is still unsatisfactory. Despite certain construction measures, it still floods during the rainy period. Thus, we have to apply additional measures.

Concerning your telegram of August 23, which apparently crossed with our information from the same day, I am happy to assure you that the core statements of our information were, of course, coordinated with comrades from the Soviet embassy and other fraternal embassies.

With socialist greetings,
[signed] Steinhof
Acting Ambassador

Memorandum, Hungarian National Commission of Atomic Energy to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date:

31 August
1976

Source:

XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 4, 004522/8/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai

The occasion of the socialist coordinating meeting in Minsk that preceded the General Assembly of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], on 26 August 1976, late in the evening, Park Heon-cheol, the head of the DPRK delegation, as well as the representative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry visited me, and described various incidents that had occurred on the South Korean border. [...]

They also informed me that the Technical Assistance program of the IAEA planned to deliver a complete reprocessing plant for the Far Eastern region. The plant is to be established in South Korea, since this region has the most developed technical base.

Their request was that the socialist countries should assist them in preventing the establishment of this plant in South Korea; if such a plant were established at all in the Far Eastern region, then it should be given to the Philippines.

[...]

Having given me a few small gifts, they once again said thanks for the very valuable advice they had received from the Hungarian delegation at the coordinating meeting held in Székesfehérvár in 1974. As a result of [this advice], the DPRK obtained IAEA membership at the general assembly without any difficulty.

[...]

Dr. György Osztrovszki
[Chairman of the National Commission of Atomic Energy]

Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 058.014

Date:

1 September 1976

Source:

Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe

TELEGRAM

Sender: Moscow

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Flash

Date: 01.09.1976/21:30

No.: 058.014

To: First and Second Directions – Relations

Synthesis Direction

Regarding: Assessments and Commentaries Regarding the Recent Korean-American Incident in Panmunjeom

Gathering from the discussions I, together with Gh. Micu, had with M.S. Kapita, Director in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with Pak Sigwon and Li Duyeol, the charge d'affaires of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, respectively, the first secretary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Embassy, and with Li Tingquan, first secretary of the Chinese embassy, as well as from the analysis of Soviet press materials, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The central written press and radio-television broadcasting stations provided brief news about the Korean-American incident in Panmunjeom, as well as about the press conference on this issue, held at the Korean embassy in Moscow. 'Izvestia' and 'Sovetskaya Rossyia' dated August 28th published some commentaries, but against the background of the initiative taken by some socialist and non-aligned countries to register the Korean matter on the agenda of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy made pressures on the Soviet side to support the Korean position through press activity, by publishing some governmental declarations which would condemn the United States.

North Korean diplomats said that the "commentaries and the support from the Soviet Union, are of little importance."

2. Judging from our conversation with M.S. Kapita, the Soviets did not seem willing to amplify the incident per se and avoided fora or measures which would commit itself, such as the publication of a governmental declaration.

Explaining this to us, Kapita said that to his mind, the incident provoked by the North Koreans had a local character, not having originated, so it seems, from the centre.

The coverage given by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea propaganda apparatus, the large-scale internal measures, including mobilizations, military maneuvers, measures adopted in relation to other countries (not to send nor to receive official delegations) do not have, according to Soviet beliefs, a ready ground on which these measures could be justified. This can be explained, in turn, through the internal difficulties, mostly in terms of economic matters, such as a bad harvest, drought, the failure to fulfill certain main indicators in industry, as well as an attempt to use this incident to promote even further the national vigilance spirit and the effective military preparedness of the entire people. We would like to mention that Pak Sigwon pointed out that this year's harvest is very good, superior to that from last year. At the same time, he confirmed the existence of difficulties in other industrial sectors, such as energy, for example.

3. Answering to a question regarding the consequences of the incident, respectively its influence on the whole of the Korean matter and on the larger-scale situation, M.S. Kapita said that to his mind, the United States are not currently and they will not be in the future interested in getting involved in Korea militarily. Moreover, the North Korean side must logically not be interested in the tensions in the area.

Through the measures taken by the United States, which, according to Kapita, "are understandable," as well as following the "regret" expressed by the North Koreans on the things which occurred [recently], it can be seen that in general, the incident overcame its critical moment.

Nonetheless, the United States will use the situation thus created and its concrete consequences (the killing of two American officers) in international organizations and first and foremost at the UN.

It is not to be ruled out that the situation in the region worsens. In addition, there are no reasons to fear the outbreak of a large-scale conflict. "Neither the USSR, nor the People's Republic of China will allow the United States to launch a war on the Korean peninsula. The possible attempts of the United States in this respect will encounter the unfavorable reaction of the Japanese too. At its turn, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not benefit from the agreement and support of the USSR, of China or of other socialist countries if it is the initiator of a regional conflagration."

Against the background of the efforts and concerns for the reunification of Korea, this incident does not seem to have any special meaning, as Kapita pointed out.

4. Li Tingquan mentioned that the People's Republic of China unreservedly supported the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with respect to the incident, released a governmental declaration to the public, just like the Korean comrades asked them to do, decisively condemning the aggressive actions of the United States in the region, and it asked for the withdrawal of US troops from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"In contrast to this position adopted by China," the Chinese diplomat observed, "the Soviet action on this incident was ambiguous." To his mind, this situation has its origin in the approach the USSR adopted towards the United States, "to maintain control over international events together."

Regarding the evolution of the incident, the Chinese diplomat said that the situation is heading towards normalization.

Written: Gh. Micu

Signed: Gh Colt

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 217373

62

ORIGIN IO-13

INFO OCT-01 AF-08 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 ACDA-07 /104 R

DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:DKURTZER:MR

APPROVED BY IO:DRTOUSSAINT

IO/UNP:GBHELMAN

ARA/LA:GMONSMA

AF/I:JWHITING

NEA/RA:SPERRY

EA/K:EHURWITZ

IO/ML:PWKRIEBEL

P:DO'DONOHUE S/S-O: SESTEINER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BANGUI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BANJUL IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LILONGWE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MASERU IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MBABANE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 217373

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217373

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, UNGA, KN, KS

SUBJECT: KOREA IN UNGA: COSPONSORSHIP OF FRIENDLY
RESOLUTION

REF: A) USUN 3490; B) STATE 206086 NOTAL; C) STATE 211055;
D) STATE 212753; E) STATE 181897

1. SINCE NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS HAVE SET THE STAGE
FOR ANOTHER UNGA DEBATE ON KOREA BY SUBMITTING A
RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO THE ONE THEY SPONSORED LAST YEAR
(REF C), KOREA CORE GROUP HAS DECIDED TO PRESS FOR
COSPONSORS OF FRIENDLY KOREA RESOLUTION IN UNGA. ACTION
ADDRESSEES SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVT ALONG FOLLOWING
LINES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING
YOUR COUNTRY LATER IN MESSAGE IN REQUESTING COSPONSORSHIP
OF FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. REPORT REACTION SOONEST. ALL
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 STATE 217373

POSTS MAY ALSO DRAW ON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- ALGERIA, ON BEHALF OF NORTH KOREA, ON AUGUST 16
INTRODUCED UNUSUALLY HOSTILE AND CONFRONTATIONAL
RESOLUTION ON KOREA FOR CONSIDERATION AT 31ST UNGA.
AS OF AUGUST 30, RESOLUTION HAS 32 COSPONSORS.

-- WE DID NOT SEEK SUCH CONFRONTATION AND SOUGHT TO

AVOID ANOTHER STERILE DEBATE ON KOREA ITEM AT UNGA.

-- HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA IS ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF HOSTILITY AS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT BRUTAL DMZ INCIDENT, IN THEIR ACTIONS AT THE NAM SUMMIT, AND IN INTRODUCTION ON THEIR BEHALF OF TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THESE EVENTS INTENSIFY OUR CONCERN THAT UNGA NOT TAKE ACTION WHICH WOULD FURTHER INCREASE TENSIONS OR THREATEN THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS. FYI: AT RECENT NAM CONFERENCE, AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE COUNTRIES EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON THE ONE-SIDED PRO-NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO TRUE NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS FOR THAT RESOLUTION. END FYI.)

-- US AND OTHERS COULD NOT IGNORE A RESOLUTION WHICH, IF ADOPTED, WOULD EXACERBATE SITUATION IN KOREA, AND THEREFORE INTRODUCED COUNTER-RESOLUTION ON AUGUST 20. AS OF AUGUST 30, RESOLUTION HAS 19 COSPONSORS. (CO-SPONSORS INCLUDE: BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, CANADA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GABON, FRG, GRENADA, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, URUGUAY.)

-- WE SEEK COSPONSORSHIP OF FRIENDLY RESOLUTION BY HOST GOVERNMENT AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF BALANCED AND REASONABLE APPROACH TO KOREA SITUATION.

-- AS INDICATED IN REF D, FRIENDLY RESOLUTION CALLS FOR RESUMPTION OF SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE AND A CONFERENCE OF PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO FIND MORE LASTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. YOU MAY ALSO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 217373

REFER, AS APPROPRIATE, TO SECRETARY'S JULY 22 SPEECH (REF E).

2. FOR ABIDJAN: YOU MAY WISH TO REFER TO SPECIAL JULY 30 DEPART,ENTAL MESSAGE IN THE PRE-NAM APPROACH CABLE. LAST YEAR IVORY COAST-VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAYNST HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

3. FOR BAHRAIN, NAIROBI: HOST GOVERNMENTS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON KOREA SECTION OF NAM MEETING PROCEEDINGS, AND ABSTAINED ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS LAST YEAR.

4. FOR BANGUI, BANJUL AND MANILA: ROK WILL HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR APPROACHES TO CAR, PHILIPPINES AND

GAMBIA. IF ROK DESIRES YOUR HELP, YOU MAY DRAW ON TALKING POINTS ABOVE. FOR GAMBIA: IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY MADE APPROACH (REF B), COORDINATE APPROACH BEFOREHAND WITH ROK.

5. FOR BOGOTA, BRASILIA, LILONGWE, MBABANE: EMBASSY HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING COSPONSORSHIP OF HOST GOVTS (REF A). COLOMBIA COSPONSORED LAST YEAR (GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S RECENT EFFORTS -- USUN 3446 - SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ANY FURTHER APPROACHES.) BRAZIL VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND ABSTAINED ON HOSTILE. MALAWI AND SWAZILAND VOTED FOR FRIENDLY AND AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTIONS. SWAZILAND ALSO SPOKE AGAINST DPRK DRAFT AT NAM.

6. FOR BRIDGETOWN: EMBASSY AND CANADIANS SHARE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING GOB COSPONSORSHIP (REF A). BARBADOS COSPONSORED LAST YEAR.

7. FOR BUENOS AIRES: LAST YEAR ARGENTINA ABSTAINED ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS. THIS YEAR IT REFUSED TO SUPPORT DPRK LANGUAGE IN COMMITTEE AT COLOMBO AND EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS THEREUPON.

8. FOR JIDDA, MUSCAT, SANTIAGO: ALL THREE COUNTRIES VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAINST HOSTILE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 217373

RESOLUTION LAST YEAR. OMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON KOREA LANGUAGE AT NAM MEETING IN COLOMBO.

9. FOR KINSHASA: SINCE FRG HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR APPROACH TO GOZ (REF A) YOU SHOULD COORDINATE WITH FRG IN DETERMINING WHAT FURTHER ASSISTANCE MAY BE NEEDED, BEARING IN MIND INDEPENDENT ROK EFFORT (KINSHASA 7203). YOU MAY ALSO REFER TO SPECIAL JULY 30 DEPARTMENT MESSAGE IN PRE-NAM APPROACH CABLE IN ANY SEPARATE REPRESENTATION. ZAIRE ABSTAINED ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS LAST YEAR. IT COSPONSORED THE CAR AMENDMENTS TO THE PRO-NORTH KOREA RESOLUTION AT NAM MEETING IN COLOMBO AND WAS OTHERWISE VERY HELPFUL.

10. FOR KUWAIT AND LIMA: GOK AND GOP, IN PARTICULAR, STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CAR DRAFT AMENDMENTS IN COMMITTEE AT THE NAM MEETING IN COLOMBO.

11. FOR MASERU: CANADA, UK AND ROK SHARE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING GOL COSPONSORSHIP (REF A). YOU MAY JOIN THEIR APPROACH, IF THEY DESIRE. GOL VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAINST HOSTILE

RESOLUTION LAST YEAR.

12. FOR MONROVIA: EMBASSY MAY REFER TO SPECIAL JULY 30 DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGE IN P E-NAM APPROACH CABLE IN CURRENT REPRESENTATION. LAST YEAR, LIBERIA WAS COSPONSOR AND VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

13. FOR PARAMARIBO: NETHERLANDS HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING GOS COSPONSORSHIP (REF A). YOU MAY CONSULT WITH YOUR GON COLLEAGUE TO DETERMINE IF FURTHER ASSISTANCE IS DESIRED.

14. FOR RABAT: BELGIUM HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING GOM COSPONSORSHIP. GIVEN PRE-NAM SOUNDINGS AND MOROCCAN SUPPORT FOR CAR DRAFT RESOLUTION AT COLOMBO, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO JOIN BELGIAN APPROACH.

15. FOR SAN SALVADOR: US AND ROK SHARE RESPONSIBILITY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 217373

FOR SEEKING EL SALVADOR'S COSPONSORSHIP. IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY APPROACHED GOSS, REQUEST AND/OR CONDUCT APPROACH WITH ROK.

16. FOR TEHRAN: UK HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIB;LITY FOR SEEKING GOI COSPONSORSHIP. COORDINATE YOUR APPROACH WITH UK. IRAN VOTED FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND ABSTAINED ON HOSTILE RESOLUTION LAST YEAR.

17. FOR TUNIS: YOU MAY REFER TO SPECIAL JULY 30 DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGE IN PRE-NAM APPROACH CABLE DURING CURRENT REPRESENTATION. LAST YEAR, TUNISIA ABSTAINED ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS. SINCE EVIDENCE AT HAND DOES NOT SHOW THAT TUNISIA WAS AS FORTHCOMING AS EXPECTED AT COLOMBO, EMBASSY MAY USE DISCRETION ABOUT THIS APPROACH.

ROBINSON

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NNN

Reaction of U.S. Congress to Axe Murder Incident

Date:

3 September
1976

Source:

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Report Details

Foreign Affairs U.S. 1 no.700-

September 3, 1976

Recipient: His Excellency President

Subject: U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Resolution related to Korea

[I] Report as the following

The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted resolutions on the Panmunjeom incident of August 18 and the Myeongdong incident, which was suggested by Congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minn) on September 1. A report on this matter is in the attachment.

Attachment: Report on the adoption of the Resolution - one copy.

The End.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

[...]

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Resolution on Panmunjeom incident on August 18th and Myeongdong
incident

1976. September 3rd

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Contents

1. Overview1
2. Key points of the Resolution1
3. Background on the adoption of the Resolution1
4. Evaluations on the Resolution2
5. Measures taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ...4
6. Standpoint of the Department of State6
7. Countermeasures7

Attached: 1. Resolution (translated)
2. Draft resolution and list of congressmen who signed
3. Key points of Congressman Fraser's statement at the U.S. Congress main session on August 31, regarding Myeongdong incident judgment
4. Congressman Fraser's letter to the Korean Ambassador to the U.S. on August 31st (translated)
5. Meeting minutes between Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yoon Hajeong and [Thomas] Stern, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission.

[...]

7. Countermeasures

- A. Take into account that there are many unresolved bills in the U.S. Congress and that the session will be closed. When Fraser's resolution is submitted to the ruling committee, take all measures to delay the passage of the resolution until the end of the session, thus, it is discarded.
- B. Prepare for the resolution being directly presented to the main session of the U.S. Congress. Obstruct the passage of the resolution at the main session through cooperation with leading congressmen and pro-Korean congressmen.
- C. In addition, contact with the U.S. administrative agencies to request indirect assistance.

The end.

[...]

(Attachment 5)
Meeting Minutes

Date: September 3, 1976 14:00 –
Location: Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs' Office
Participants: Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Thomas Stern from the U.S. Embassy in Korea (Director of North American Division 1 and First Secretary John Kelley [illegible])
Subject: U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Resolution related to Korean Affairs

Vice Minister: I would like to express our observation on the hearing on August 18th, Panmunjeom incident, hosted by two sub-committees of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs and also the adoption of the resolution related to Korean affairs.

First of all, we highly evaluate Deputy Under Secretary [Arthur W.] Hummel providing clear explanation of the incident on August 18th and demonstrating the U.S.'s determination on [South] Korea at the hearing.

Secondly, we are stunned at the resolution adopted by the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs and we deeply regret this fact.

The resolution attracts our attention because the details intervene in Korean domestic affairs, especially jurisdiction.

We deeply regret that such resolution has been adopted at the Committee and we are concerned because misunderstandings in the relationship between Korea and the U.S. might incur as a result of the resolution.

As you are well aware of, the presidential emergency measure was essentially induced to stabilize the current status and to promote economic prosperity. It was also to effectively respond to the provocation of the North Korean puppets. Therefore, it is essential for our survival.

We ask for understanding by the U.S. administration of our standpoint regarding the resolution and also for cooperation in hindering the passage of the resolution at the main session.

Minister: I clearly understand the Korean government's standpoint regarding the resolution.

However, reflecting on U.S. history and culture, human rights issue is an important matter. As long as previous cases (we interpret as meaning U.S. domestic and Korean incidents) persist, it is possible for such unfortunate resolution to be introduced.

Vice Minister: Regardless, this resolution has gone too far.

Minister: In a way, the resolution may be beneficial in removing the barriers in bilateral relationship since the resolution is described in detail.

Vice Minister: That is indeed intervention in domestic affairs and because it was described in detail, it is precisely an intervention in domestic affairs. Considering traditional U.S. policy, we are unable to understand this.

Minister: I understand the Korean government's standpoint and I do not intend to argue about this matter. The U.S. Congress and the Americans are making efforts in a direction that can be beneficial for our bilateral relationship and we are trying to remove factors that hinder us in pursuing our goal.

Vice Minister: In the resolution, the part censuring the North Korean puppets is too lukewarm. Especially, I find it extremely unfair to address the North Korean puppet state as "Democratic People's Republic of Joseon" and it is a matter of sincere regret. Was "desist" the best expression to use to warn the North Korean puppets for such a provocative action, when two uniformed American officers are murdered in broad daylight? You should condemn the North Korean puppets' action and provocation more forcefully.

Minister: Your observation is that the expression for the North Korean puppet state was not forceful enough and that the title we used for the North Korean puppets was improper. I do not believe the administration was involved in the initial course of the resolution. [I believe] It is due to the congressmen not being fully familiar with the matter.

Vice Minister: We are especially regretful for such resolution being put into action with the UN assembly scheduled ahead. Anti-[South] Korean group will try to take advantage of the situation and use it as propaganda as if the U.S. is intervening in Korean domestic affairs. For shared benefit between Korea and the U.S., I ask the U.S. administration to show its influence and deter the passing [of the resolution] at the main session.

Minister: I will report the Korean government's standpoint regarding the matter immediately and we will certainly reflect [your standpoint]. Regarding this matter, I request you sincerely consider the Department of State oral note on human rights issues in Korea. (Vice Minister Yoon said nothing and ignored [the request].)

Vice Minister: He mentioned, Myeongdong incident is being appealed at the high court. He explained that the judges will make just decision according to the law and also about the Korean judgment procedure.

The end.

General - FYI 1
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Handwritten initials/signature

CONFIDENTIAL

September 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND *WGH*

SUBJECT: Revision of the Korean DMZ Agreement

It is virtually certain that we will sign a new agreement tomorrow morning with the North Koreans, establishing new regulations for the Joint Security Area where the August 18 incident occurred.

Following the murder of two American Officers in the DMZ and the firm U.S. response, the dispute was referred, at our insistence, to the U.N. Armistice Commission (MAC). At the first meeting, the North Koreans, speaking for Kim Il-sung, expressed "regret" that the incident had taken place and proposed that the Secretaries of the MAC meet to consider changes in the Agreement governing security of each side's forces in the Joint Security Area (JSA).

We agreed and meetings have taken place between the Secretaries of both sides over the past two weeks. As the talks have progressed the North Koreans have conceded several changes to our benefit and final agreement has been reached on a modification to be signed and published jointly tomorrow morning. It provides that the military of both sides will be restricted to their respective sides of the Military Demarcation Line and will not cross into the territory of the other; that neither side will construct barriers or any other obstacle to the vision or right of way in the territory of the other; the security of each other's personnel will be guaranteed; and that the North Koreans will remove existing guard posts (4) on the United Nations side in the JSA.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/02
By KBH, NARA, Date 10/10/02

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This should bring the incident to a close on very favorable terms. What started as a probable attempt by the North Koreans to enhance their position at the Non-Aligned Conference then in session in Colombo, has ended -- due to the firmness of the U.S. response -- in a clear setback to North Korea's international image, as well as a loss of "face" in the Far East.

After publication of the new Agreement on Monday, which will come into effect in ten days, we will gradually return U.S. forces to their former status, going to DEFCON 4 on Monday and commencing the partial withdrawal of the two fighter squadrons (F-4s and F-111s), the following week. We will also withdraw the Midway, after a port visit to Pusan, although we will continue with monthly B-52 training flights.

In sum, our demands have been met; the Koreans expressed regret (the closest they will come to an outright apology); they have agreed to guarantee the safety of our personnel, and have unilaterally withdrawn their four guard posts from the zone.



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Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 07215 110524Z

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ACTION IO-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EA-06 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 7215

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, US, KN
SUBJECT: KOREA AT 31ST UNGA: ROK VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS

1. ON SEPTEMBER 10, FOLLOWING MOST VALUABLE BRIEFING FROM UNC ARMISTICE AFFAIRS DIVISION AND SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO JOINT SECURITY AREA AT PANMUNJOM, USUN MISOFF WILSON AND EMBOFF KELLEY CALLED ON MR. CHUNG WOO YOUNG, DIRECTOR OF ROK FOREIGN MINISTRY'S I O BUREAU, FOR CORDIAL 90-MINUTE CONVERSATION.

2. WILSON REEMPHASIZED TO CHUNG GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S DEEP REGRET THAT HE COULD NOT VISIT SEOUL. CHUNG, ON BEHALF FOREIGN MINISTER PARK, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS.

3. CHUNG WAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC IN CONNECTION FORTHCOMING UNGA CONSIDERATION OF KOREA. IN STRESSING ROK DESIRE PREVENT PASSAGE OF HOSTILE RESOLUTION, CHUNG MADE CLEAR ROK PREFERENCE FOR DEFERMENT OF DEBATE. CHUNG RECOGNIZED NEED FOR COORDINATED CORE GROUP ACTION ON DEFERMENT AND LOOKED
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 07215 110524Z

FORWARD TO LEARNING RESULTS OF POSSIBLE NORWEGIAN

AND AUSTRALIAN SOUNDINGS CONCERNING SENTIMENTS OF NORDICS AND ASEANS REGARDING DEFERMENT.

4. REGARDING SEPTEMBER 8-9 U.S.-JAPAN PRE-UNGA BILATERALS, WILSON SAID THAT JAPANESE VIEWS IN TOKYO IN GENERAL PARALLELED THOSE EXPRESSED BY JAPAN IN CORE GROUP: JAPAN IS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT DEFERMENT AT GENERAL COMMITTEE STAGE, BUT WOULD COOPERATE FULLY SHOULD CORE GROUP MAJORITY DECIDE ON MOVE FOR DEFERMENT AT GENERAL COMMITTEE STAGE. CHUNG THANKED US FOR THIS.

5. CHUNG ACKNOWLEDGED RISKS IN CONNECTION WITH DEFERMENT MOVE IN GENERAL COMMITTEE, BUT CONSIDERED PROSPECTS REASONABLY FAVORABLE BOTH IN GENERAL COMMITTEE AND IN PLENARY.

6. AS TO SUPPORT FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION, SHOULD IT COME TO FIRST COMMITTEE VOTE, CHUNG SAW POSSIBILITY OF SOME 60 VOTES IN FAVOR. HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT GREAT BULK OF 1975 SUPPORTERS IN ABSTAINING ON FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WERE NOT SLIPPING TO LESS FAVORABLE POSITIONS. CHUNG AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT UGANDA, WHICH ABSTAINED IN FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN 1975, REPRESENTED AN UNPREDICTABLE VOTE.

7. CHUNG FORESAW POSSIBILITY OF A FOUR OR FIVE VOTE DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, HE REGARDED POSSIBILITY OF DEFEATING HOSTILE RESOLUTION IN FIRST COMMITTEE TO BE REMOTE. NEVERTHELESS, CHUNG TOOK HEART IN THE PROSPECT OF A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR THE HOSTILE TEXT.

8. CHUNG, WHO WOULD BE TRAVELING IN COMING DAYS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, SAID THAT THE ROK PLANNED ON LESS BULKY REPRESENTATION AT NEW YORK DURING THE FORTHCOMING UNGA. HE INDICATED THAT ROK OBSERVERS OFFICE WAS PERHAPS OVERSTAFFED WITH LOBBYISTS DURING 30TH UNGA.
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 07215 110524Z

9. THE OFFICIAL "SEOUL SHINMUN" HAS RATIONALIZED IN THE LIGHT OF U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM'S REPORT ON THE 30TH UNGA WHICH DEPLORED PASSAGE OF DUAL RESOLUTIONS, THAT "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES" SHOULD TWO RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA BE ADOPTED BY 31ST UNGA.
STERN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft
Ambassador Richard Sneider
William Gleysteen

DATE AND TIME: September 15, 1976; 2:30 p. m.

SUBJECT: August 18 Incident at Panmunjom; U. S. -Korean Relations

General Scowcroft concurred with Ambassador Sneider's view that the August 18 incident at Panmunjom had come out better than expected -- and apparently to our net advantage. Sneider thought it would have a beneficial effect in the U. N. and Scowcroft noted the benefit in the United States, especially in Congress, though the relief might prove temporary.

Scowcroft asked why President Park, after his cautious initial reaction to the August 18 incident, ended up advocating such belligerent measures toward North Korea. Park's toughness seemed to grow as his fears subsided in the face of our buildup and North Korea's soft reaction. Sneider suggested a number of possible reasons for the switch. Perhaps Park was disappointed that the North Koreans had not offered resistance to the tree-cutting operation which would have allowed his special forces to inflict some vengeance. (Despite instructions to the contrary, the ROK forces for the tree-cutting may have been armed.) He explained that Park had a parochial, Israeli complex stemming in part from the protection we have accorded to Korea for so long -- Park tends to ignore or discount the costs that we have to calculate in deciding how to react to North Korean provocations. Park may also have been influenced by his Generals who were egging him on. In any event, he and many other Koreans failed to focus on the fact that we had provided full support to them and had for the first time successfully forced the North Koreans to back down.

Sneider concluded that our own handling of the incident had been correct, including the carefully modulated military response. Scowcroft agreed.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.MR 94-144 #24 NSC H. 4/25/95
By 143H NARA, Date 6/13/95
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While emphasizing that he was not prepared to predict any pattern of North Korean behavior, Sneider suggested that we not rule out the possibility of further soft moves by Pyongyang in a kind of "peace offensive". The North Koreans knew that they had overplayed their hand and they might now shift to a new tack.

Asked what concerned him about the future, Sneider said that the human rights issue probably posed the most immediate difficulty but over the longer term he was most concerned about Park's emotionally-charged drive to seek self-sufficiency and self-reliance through a program of nuclear weapons and missile development. Although there was no immediate need for further action on our part, he felt that within about six months we should start confronting Park on this matter, not only because of direct problems in South Korea but also because North Korea might eventually try to go the same route. Sneider said Park was guilty of sloppy thinking in believing that he could somehow obtain greater security by these policies; yet, given U.S. attitudes, one had to admit that South Koreans had some reason for their concern over their future security. Sneider suggested that we needed more regularity in our relations with the ROK and less emphasis on military matters.

Sneider mentioned his desire to get the U.S. company off the DMZ, granting that it was something we should not consider until after our elections. He explained that the company was excessively exposed and could be a trigger. Scowcroft said he didn't like the idea of removing the company and felt that the exposed quality of this particular deployment was why it was valuable. Sneider agreed there was merit to this view but thought it would be better for us to pull the unit out as an initiative rather than to retreat under domestic pressure. Gleysteen asked what the South Korean response would be and Sneider replied that they were always opposed to all change but would probably take the matter in stride. Scowcroft emphasized his concern about an inclination within certain parts of the government to go ahead with small piecemeal moves which individually had little significance but cumulatively had the net effect of eroding our military presence in East Asia. He said he did not like this tendency and thought we should resist it.

Gleysteen raised the matter of Defense's desire to prepare the way for withdrawal of the nuclear-capable Sargeant missile battalion. He said Defense had a Presidential approval to withdraw the battalion in mid-September but had decided to extend it for 90 days because of the Panmunjom incident. They could not, however, extend it beyond 90 days because



of budgetary considerations and the unsupportability of Sargeant units. Defense wanted to know how they should proceed in preparing the press for the withdrawal. Scowcroft said that they should postpone a decision on press handling until later in November.

Gleysteen asked Sneider if he were satisfied that there could not be a repetition of the August 18 incident. He pointed out that in the WSAG meetings the JCS representative had never been able to explain why more precautions had not been taken on August 18. Sneider agreed that this was a serious problem and that as a result of his own checking he was convinced there were inadequate command and control procedures, especially in the JSA. He had spoken to Stilwell about it but thought it best to focus his efforts on General Vessey who would be taking over in October. Sneider said he would be talking to Vessey himself but would also appreciate Scowcroft's mentioning it as well. Scowcroft agreed to do so.





Department of State TELEGRAM

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NODIS
SEOUL FOR CHARGE ONLY USUN FOR SCRANTON AND BENNETT ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFCR, USUN, KN

SUBJECT: KOREAN QUESTION AT THE UN

1. DURING FOREIGN MINISTER PARK'S CALL ON HABIB, HABIB AND HUMMEL TOOK OCCASION TO DISCUSS WITH HIM INITIATIVE SECRETARY IS CONSIDERING WITH RESPECT TO KOREA PASSAGE OF HIS UNGA SPEECH.
2. WITHOUT DISCUSSING ANY TEXTUAL LANGUAGE, HABIB INDICATED THAT SECRETARY CONSIDERING VARIANT OF FOUR POWER CONFERENCE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE SUGGESTION THAT BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH MIGHT GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND SECURITY SITUATION WITH US AND PRC ACTING AS OBSERVERS. ANY RESULTS OF SUCH MEETING COULD THEN BE RATIFIED BY A LARGER CONFERENCE OF INTER-



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02

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ESTED POWERS.

3. HABIB STRESSED TO FOREIGN MINISTER PARK CONFIDENTIALITY OF EXCHANGE INDICATING WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT AT THIS TIME DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. HABIB ASKED THAT PARK GET PRESIDENT PARK'S REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HOPEFULLY BY MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20 AT THE LATEST. PARK PROMISED TO DO HIS BEST.

4. ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IN EVENT MATTER RAISED BY KOREANS IN EITHER SEOUL OR NEW YORK, YOU SHOULD AVOID GETTING INVOLVED IN ANY DISCUSSION, INDICATING SIMPLY YOUR AWARENESS OF HABIB-PARK DISCUSSION AND NOTING THAT CHANNEL FOR THIS MATTER REMAINS FOREIGN MINISTER PARK AND HABIB. ROBINSON

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Message Text

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03834 202213Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3834

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, UR
SUBJ: KOREA AT 31ST UNGA: PRO-DPRK APPROACH REGARDING
WITHDRAWAL OF RESOLUTIONS

REF: A) USUN 3736; B) SCRANTON-HABIB TELECON, SEPTEMBER 20

1. AMBASSADOR DATCU OF ROMANIA (CHAIRMAN OF EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP) CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON GOVERNOR SCRANTON MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 20. DATCU SAID HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY NORTH KOREANS AND THAT LATTER WERE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF HOSTILE RESOLUTION. DATCU ASKED FOR SCRANTON'S COOPERATION. SCRANTON ASSURED HIM HE WOULD HAVE IT. DATCU ADDED EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP WOULD MEET BEFORE LUNCH.

2. SCRANTON THEN CALLED ON ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TO DISCUSS THIS. PARK SAID HE HOPED THAT WITHDRAWAL OF RESOLUTIONS COULD BE ARRANGED BECAUSE OUR SIDE HAS BEEN MAKING CLEAR SINCE THE BEGINNING ITS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION. PARK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS INFORMATION OF "GREAT SIGNIFICANCE". HE SAID THAT IF OTHER SIDE WOULD PLEDGE FORMALLY TO TAKE BACK ITS ITEM AND RESOLUTION THIS COULD REFLECT "PROGRESS".

3. SCRANTON SAID THAT HE HOPED OUR SIDE WOULD NOT PLAY UP THIS DEVELOPMENT AS A "GREAT VICTORY".

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03834 202213Z

4. PARK ASKED HOW OTHER SIDE INTENDED TO PUT IN ITS

REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL. SCRANTON AGREED TO SEEK DETAILS AND SAID HE WOULD KEEP PARK FULLY INFORMED AS TO DEVELOPMENTS.

5. AMBASSADOR SHERER SHORTLY THEREAFTER TELEPHONED DATCU ON BEHALF OF SCRANTON TO RELAY SOUTH KOREAN REACTION AND TO ASK DETAILS AS TO HOW OTHER SIDE PLANNED WITHDRAW ITS RESOLUTION. DATCU SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE BY MEANS OF "VERY SIMPLE" LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL SIGNED BY ALL COSPONSORS OF PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION. HE SAID THE EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP WOULD BE MEETING AT 12:20 TO ENDORSE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL. THIS IDEA WOULD BE PRESENTED TO GROUP BY NORTH KOREANS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THERE WOULD BE MEETING OF ALL COSPONSORS OF PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION TO SIGN LETTER OF WITHDRAWAL. THE LETTER OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DEPOSITED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY EVENT BEFORE THE GENERAL COMMITTEE CONVENED ON SEPTEMBER 22. DATCU GAVE HIS ASSURANCES THAT ONCE THE LETTER WAS DEPOSITED THERE WOULD BE NO EFFORTS TO REINSCRIBE A PRO-DPRK ITEM "AT LEAST DURING THIS UNGA." IN RELY TO SHERER'S QUESTION, DATCU SAID THAT THE CHINESE HAD "TAKEN NOTE" WHEN INFORMED OF NORTH KOREAN WISH TO WITHDRAW THE PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION. DATCU PROMISED TO KEEP SCRANTON AND SHERER INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS. DATCU SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS GROUP HAD ENDORSED WITH WITHDRAWAL AND THAT A MEETING OF ALL PRO-DPRK RESOLUTION'S COSPONSORS WAS SLATED FOR 4:00 PM MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20.

6. FRIENDLY CORE GROUP SCHEDULED TO MEET AT AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL AT 4:30 PM ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20. AT THIS MEETING, US WILL REPORT ON DATCU'S APPROACH TO SCRANTON AS WELL AS, PURSUANT DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTION (REF B), RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION LEADING TO WITHDRAWAL OF FRIENDLY ITEM AS SOON AS OTHER SIDE HAS WITHDRAWN ITS RESOLUTION. SCRANTON

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PAGE 01 STATE 233237 TOSEC 270434

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA DECIDES TO WITHDRAW ITS UN RESOLUTION

FROM HABIB, LEWIS AND HUMMEL

1. GOVERNOR SCRANTON WILL BE REPORTING FULLY TO YOU THE BACKGROUND OF NORTH KOREA DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS RESOLUTION FROM CONSIDERATION AT THIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS IN NEW YORK TODAY.
2. ROMANIA'S UN PERMREP TOLD GOV. SCRANTON THIS MORNING THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD APPROACHED HIM OVER THE WEEKEND AND HAD ASKED THAT NORTH KOREA'S DRAFT RESOLUTION BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE UNGA PROVISIONAL AGENDA. LATER IN THE DAY, THE TEN COMMUNIST COSPONSORS AGREED TO SIGN THE LETTER OF WITHDRAWAL. THE COSPONSORS OF THE NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION THEN MET AND DECIDED TO PRESENT AT 10:30 A.M. TOMORROW A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL.

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PAGE 02 STATE 233237 TOSEC 270434

3. GOVERNOR SCRANTON MET IN LATE MORNING WITH ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK, WHO IS IN NEW YORK, TO INFORM HIM OF THE DEVELOPMENTS. PARK WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED, SEEING IT AS A VICTORY FOR THE ROKG AND ITS SUPPORTERS, BUT SCRANTON WARNED

HIM "NOT TO GLOAT." (WE ARE CAUTIONING KOREANS NOT TO PREMATURELY LEAK THIS DEVELOPMENT.)

4. THE KOREA CORE GROUP MET AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL LATE IN THE DAY TO DISCUSS THESE DEVELOPMENTS. CORE GROUP MEMBERS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC OVER THE TURN OF EVENTS, AND WE ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS THE MOST FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT AND OUTCOME REGARDING THIS TRADITIONALLY THORNY ISSUE. THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON GAINING ASSURANCES FROM THE HOSTILE COSPONSORS THAT THEY WOULD NOT REINTRODUCE THEIR RESOLUTION AT ANY TIME THIS YEAR.

5. THE CORE GROUP IS TO MEET TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 21, AT 11 A.M. TO CONFIRM ABOVE COURSE OF ACTION. FOLLOWING THAT ALL THE COSPONSORS OF THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WILL MEET IN ORDER TO AGREE ON WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR DRAFT SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER SIDE'S RESOLUTION.

6. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE ARE PLEASED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT. AS YOU KNOW, OUR EARLY OBJECTIVE WAS TO SECURE DEFERMENT OF KOREA ITEM AND SOUTH KOREANS WERE ANXIOUS TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION. FACT THAT NORTH KOREA AND ITS FRIENDS WERE FORCED TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN APPROACHING US IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT INDICATING THEY REALIZE THEY HAD NOTHING TO GAIN IN CONFRONTATION THIS YEAR AS A RESULT OF OUR STRENUOUS EFFORTS IN THE KOREAN QUESTION. IF QUESTION IS WITHDRAWN FROM AGENDA, WE WILL HAVE SECURED NON-CONFRONTATIONAL OUTCOME IN MANNER CLEARLY FAVORABLE TO US AND TO ROK. THIS WILL CREATE AN EVEN BETTER ENVIRONMENT FOR THE KOREA SECTION YOU CONTEMPLATE IN YOUR UNGA SPEECH, ON WHICH WE WILL BE CABLING SEPARATELY.

ROBINSON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Report on a Stay of a GDR Military Delegation in the DPRK in October 1976

Date:
October 1976

Source:
Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer

German Federal Archive – Military Archive (BA-MA), AZN 8283
[Undated October 1976]

GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann
to
General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and
Chairman of the GDR National Defense Council
Comrade Erich Honecker

Report on a stay of a GDR Military Delegation in the DPRK in October 1976

According to your instructions, a GDR military delegation under my leadership stayed in the DPRK between 2nd and 7th of October 1976. They accepted an invitation by the Minister for People's Forces, Army General Oh Jin Wu who in 1968, then still Head of the Political Main Department of the Korean People's Army, visited the GDR as leader of a military delegation.

[...]

The Korean leadership is furthermore interested in demonstrating to our party leadership, and certainly to the Soviet leaders as well, that it will not initiate military actions against the South. It is willing to join the general course of détente pursued by the socialist states. Otherwise, I cannot understand why Oh Jin Wu, and again Kim Il Sung, addressed the incident of 18 August 1976 in detail and interpreted it as a U.S. provocation without North Korean contribution, indeed as directed against the DPRK's own political interest.

[...]

[Meeting with Kim Il Sung on 5 October 1976]
[According to Notes by Comrade Helga Picht]

Kim Il Sung:

How is your health, how do you like the climate? How is Comrade Erich Honecker doing? Is he healthy?

Heinz Hoffmann:

I am pleased to forward cordial greetings of Comrade Erich Honecker and want, also in his name, to repeat my thanks for inviting our military delegation. From time to time, the West German imperialists created some trouble for us, but everything is under control and thus, also, Comrade Honecker is doing well.

Kim Il Sung:

I am grateful that you accepted our invitation and want to welcome you again. Your visit will certainly contribute to further solidifying the friendship between our parties, peoples, states, and especially between our armies. I am glad to see you all in such healthy shape. Our Minister for People's Forces has certainly told you about the situation in our country so that in general you will be well informed.

As you have certainly heard, recently, there was an incident in our country in Panmunjeom. It is always difficult with such incidents to say whether it was a deliberate provocation or an inadvertent accident. However, we obviously ask ourselves what might have caused the adversary to think that, after 20 years, it suddenly has to cut down a certain tree in the Joint Security Area [of the DMZ].

Our soldiers are educated towards the hatred of American imperialism and they are overall well prepared politically and ideologically. What happened? On 18 August at 10:00 a.m. suddenly 7 Americans and 7 soldiers of the South Korean puppets appeared in the Joint Security Area and began to cut down a tree. This happened without previous notification, though it is required according to the agreements.

Four of our soldiers went there to let the enemy soldiers know about this violation of the agreements. There were the South Korean puppet soldiers working on the tree. We demanded that they stop, but the Americans ordered them to continue.

Suddenly one of the Americans threw an axe towards one of our soldiers and hit him in the face. The comrade next to him became very furious and threw the axe back. A fight ensued. During the course of events, some of our people were injured on the head and the throat and two Americans were killed.

From the other side, everything was photographed and even filmed. Since to us the incident came totally unexpected, we obviously did not do any documentation. Nevertheless, the enemies contend we provoked them and they alerted their troops in the Pacific area within two hours. Then, we also alerted our forces and created a state of combat readiness in the entire country – since we did not know if they would attack us right away.

We hold the opinion that this incident was a deliberate provocation by the other side for the following reasons:

1. This tree which bothered nobody for twenty years – why did it have to be trimmed just on August 18?
2. The other side had made preparations to document the events and had cameras ready at hand.
3. The numerical superiority of the enemies was deliberately pre-arranged.
4. Just 2 hours after the incident they raised alarm in the entire Pacific area without investigating the events.

In our opinion, this incident was supposed to create favorable conditions for Ford in the presidential elections. Furthermore it provided a pretext for Park Chung Hee to put the patriots on trial who had been arrested in spring for the distribution of the “Declaration for the Salvation of the Fatherland” in South Korea. The Americans put their most modern aircraft and aircraft carriers on alert and created a complicated situation for the world. Yet, I think we handled this problem properly. First, Kissinger demanded that we apologize and punish our soldiers. However, we have no reason to sanction our comrades since they just acted as good patriots.

Heinz Hoffmann:

To the contrary, you must commend them.

Kim Il Sung:

The Americans have staged this provocation in our country, and they struck first. It can always happen during a fight that somebody gets killed. We declared to the Americans that we regret the incident, but we did not concede anything on reparations.

Then, the enemies ceased to raise further demands. They withdrew their aircraft and aircraft carriers. Only some airbases in Japan are still on alert.

We are sorry that this incident worried the socialist fraternal countries. But this is not our fault, since the Americans staged this provocation. Now everything has calmed down.

Ford staged this provocation for his re-election. The Americans staged provocations in our country all the time. It is same with every President. In 1968, Johnson staged the Pueblo affair, Nixon organized [in 1969] the incident with the spy plane EC-121, and now Ford in 1976 attempted in Panmunjeom to use a little tree to stir up the entire world. Now, they need to resort to such petty events to stir things up before the elections. Now, the situation has calmed down. Obviously, we are monitoring the movements of the enemy but currently there are no major problems.

[...]

Obviously, the required combat readiness in the context of the Panmunjeom incident has slightly impaired our production on all levels. Like you [in the GDR], we have only a small country and accordingly also a small army. Therefore, we had to hold all workers in combat readiness for 14 days. They had to stay on guard and watch if there will be an attack by the enemies. However, now people are back to work and the harvest. [...]

Kim Il Sung:

[...]

I am glad that you had such positive impressions in our country and thank you for your friendly comments. You are defending the Western [outpost of socialism], we are defending the Eastern outpost of socialism. Therefore we have much in common. This is why exchanges and cooperation are good and favorable things. We can learn a lot from you. We know that if our armies are strong and disciplined then peace can be secured.

The character of imperialism has not changed and cannot be changed – if this would be the case, it would be no longer imperialism and the working class would hold power in its hand. The core and character of Leninism is to fight imperialism. Accordingly, we have to fight imperialism today. We are glad to have you as close comrades in arms. We are for unity of the socialist camp, and for the strengthening of the socialist camp. We will fight jointly until the imperialist system is an issue of the past, and we stick to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. You noted that you will support the fight of our people for peaceful unification of the fatherland. We will also continue to support the struggle of your people. This is why it is so good to continue the exchange of delegations and share our opinions. I express my thanks to you.

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[Page D10]

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KCNA CITES REPORTS ON PAK'S BRIBES TO U.S. POLITICIANS

Pyongyang KONA in English 2237 GMT 20 Oct 76 OW

[Text] Pyongyang, October 20 (KCNA)--The Pak Chong-hui puppet clique who cannot prolong their days without the protection of the U.S. imperialists, their masters, are openly resorting to the disgusting act of offering dollars, bribes and women to their masters to win their favour, according to the Washington POST, the Los Angeles TIMES, the Chicago SUNDAY TIMES and other U.S. newspapers.

Among those solicited by the South Korean puppets are U.S. State Secretary Kissinger and the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, the chairman of a U.S. House of Representatives committee, many U.S. congressmen and so-called "politicians". It has been revealed that the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique have regularly offered South Korean kisaeng girls to Kissinger and gave South Korean women to the chairman of a U.S. House of Representatives committee and Carl Albert, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, under the name of "secretaries." The Pak Chong-hui clique of traitors greased the palm of Robert L. Leggette, member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, with 10,000 U.S. dollars under the label of "political contribution" and offered him a South Korean woman for three years till early this year to win his favour.

Among those who received 10,000 U.S. dollars from the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique as "political contributions" is Joseph Addabbo, U.S. Republican congressman. The Pak Chong-hui puppet clique slipped into his pocket that handsome amount of money in return for the appropriate role he had played in ramming through the U.S. House Appropriations Committee the "foreign aid bill" including the "aid" to South Korea and begged him for continued patronage. Recently, the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique attempted to bribe a U.S. congressman with a 200 U.S. dollar wristwatch and a woman, seeking his patronage. But this was disclosed to cause a stir. Besides, the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique "invite" many U.S. congressmen to a free "travel" to South Korea and make a point of corrupting the "invited guests" with dollars, gifts and women.

Bringing to light such underhand dealing, the U.S. paper the Chicago SUNDAY TIMES (June 6, 1976) said that the U.S. congressmen who visit South Korea are all invited to kisaeng houses to be entertained by kisaeng girls, where they sing, dance and do "other things" with the girls.

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Date: 8 December 1976	Source: <i>XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00854/6/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai</i>
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In February 1976, at the time of the session of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Economic, Technical, and Scientific Consultative Commission, [Deputy Premier] Kang Jin-tae, the head of the Korean delegation, handed a letter from Park Song-cheol to Comrade Kosygin. There were three concrete requests in the letter:

1. The 1973 agreement on the component supply of the set of rollers in the Kim Chaek industrial combine should be modified. [...]
2. Four additional blocs, each with an output of 100,000 kw, should be built at the thermal power plant in Bukcheong.
3. The Soviet Union should construct a nuclear power plant in the DPRK.

The Soviet side did not give a concrete reply to the letter. At the session of the commission, the Soviet negotiating delegation took a stand on the extension of Bukcheong and on the construction of the nuclear power plant by [declaring] that they could not discuss these two issues before the 1980s.

Returning from his tour in Africa, in October DPRK Minister of Foreign Trade Kye Eun-tae broke up his journey in Moscow. During official discussions, he declared that the Korean side was waiting for a concrete reply to Pak Song-cheol's letter. On this occasion, the construction of a nuclear power plant was already missing from the list of urgent questions. Kye Eun-tae was given a promise that an official reply would be sent as soon as possible.

As directed by the center, the Soviet chargé d'affaires ad interim sought an audience with Deputy Premier Kang Jin-tae, who received him on 12 November. The chargé d'affaires gave him the verbal reply of Comrade Kosygin. (After careful consideration, they decided not to reply in writing.) Their reply was that the Soviet Union was still unable to deal with the extension of the Bukcheong thermal power plant before 1980 and also insisted on keeping the original agreement with regard to the issue of supplying Kim Chaek with components. [...]

Kang Jin-tae was very dissatisfied with the reply.

On 13 November, Kye Eun-tae asked for an appointment with the Soviet chargé d'affaires. He said that the DPRK was in a difficult economic situation and needed immediate assistance from the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. His concrete request was the following: 200,000 metric tons of oil and 150,000 metric tons of coking coal, as early as this year. (On the basis of the intergovernmental protocol that is in force, this year the Soviet Union supplies the DPRK with slightly more than 1 million metric tons of oil and 1.2 million metric tons of coking coal. By 1 November they completed over 70% of the shipments, and by the end of the year they will send the whole amount without interruptions.) The chargé d'affaires acknowledged the request, and promised to forward it without delay. In the opinion of the Soviet diplomat who told me this information, there is very little likelihood of fulfilling the request. To his knowledge, in the case of Korea, the Soviet Union will not satisfy unexpected demands in the future either. Exceptions can be made only in very justified cases. The Soviet side also takes every possible opportunity to make the Korean side understand that it is the COMECON countries that have priority when [the Soviets] decide on unexpected demands.

[...]

Ferenc Szabó
Ambassador